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Does alien life exist? This perennial question has driven some of humanity’s oldest 
scientific debates, going back to the ancient Greeks. My work investigates the way 
individuals have rhetorically deployed speculations about the impossibility of 
extraterrestrial life to advance other values and beliefs. Specifically, my research traces 
the unity-of-the-world cosmology or “unity,” for short, meaning the belief that humans 
are the only intelligent life form in the universe, in contrast to the “plurality-of worlds” 
one, or “plurality,” which holds open the possibility of multiple intelligent life forms. The 
unity rhetorical cosmology connects the absence of alien life with the idea of human 
value and transcendental, absolute ethics.  Because “we” are alone, “we” are special, the 
thinking goes. 
My dissertation traces the way cosmology serves as an argument in religious, 
political, and philosophical debates. Specifically, it examines the way that individuals 
have used claims of the absence of alien life to justify moral absolutism, teleology, and 
anthropocentrism, from Plato to the present day.  The dissertation examines major 
historical figures as case studies including: Plato, Aquinas, William Whewell, and Alfred 
Russel Wallace.  I draw on Kenneth Burke, Roland Barthes, and rhetoric-of-science-
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literature (as well as many other sources) in order to unveil the hidden rhetorical meaning 
of a cosmology.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
During the height of the Cold War, when nations scanned the skies terrified of an 
impending nuclear catastrophe, scientists in the Soviet Union also searched the heavens 
for signs of extraterrestrial life.  The Soviets believed that dialectical materialism acted as 
a universal principle and expected to discover on other planets advanced life forms 
fighting their own class struggles.1  Over two thousand years earlier, the ancient Greek 
atomists postulated an infinite cosmos filled with every imaginable being.2  In 1277, 
Etienne Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, began a debate about how the gospel applied to 
extraterrestrials and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, scientists like William 
Herschel and Percival Lowell pioneered telescope technology for the purpose of seeking 
alien life.3 The last three centuries have birthed dozens of religions, from Mormonism to 
Scientology, based in whole or in part on the idea of inhabited alien planets. In the 1970s, 
Erich von Däniken sold millions of books worldwide making the argument that rather 
than speaking to God, Moses and other religious figures were speaking to alien visitors.4  
In 1997, a CNN/Time poll reported that fifty-four percent of Americans said they believe 
                                                
1 George Basalla, Civilized Life in the Universe: Scientists on Intelligent Extraterrestrials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 151; David Grinspoon, Lonely Planets: The Natural Philosophy of Alien Life (New 
York: Harper Collins, 2003); I.S. Shklovskii and Carl Sagan, Intelligent Life in the Universe, trans. Paula 
Fern (New York: Dell, 1966). 
2 Steven J. Dick, Plurality of Worlds: The Origins of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate from Democritus to 
Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
3 Ibid.,  28; Grinspoon, Lonely Planets, 39-40. 
4 Michael J. Crowe, "A History of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate," Zygon 32, no. 2 (1997); Erich von 
Däniken, Chariots of the Gods? Unsolved Mysteries of the Past (New York: Bantam Books, 1971); Erich 
Robert Paul, Science, religion, and Mormon cosmology (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992). 
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that life exists on other planets.5  A 2005 poll by the Center for Survey and Research 
Analysis at the University of Connecticut found the number was sixty percent.6  Belief in 
the existence of alien life is an important current in the development of western thought, 
but it is only half the story. 
For every advocate for the existence of a cosmos full of planets inhabited by alien 
life there is one who vehemently opposes it.7  Plato denied the possibility of 
extraterrestrial life in the Timaeus and said that the Earth’s solitude in the universe 
indicated its connection to perfection.8  Plato’s cosmology eclipsed his political 
philosophy in importance in his later dialogues and fundamentally redefined Platonic 
thought.9  Early Christian thinkers believed Plato’s ideas to be in line with their biblical 
cosmology and incorporated Timaeus into religious doctrine, while ignoring the works of 
many of Plato’s contemporaries who argued for many inhabited worlds. The result was 
that Christian theologians merged their own beliefs with a picture of the structure of the 
universe largely unchanged from Plato’s cosmology and this became the standard 
interpretation of the universe throughout Europe during the Medieval period.10 In the year 
1600, Giordano Bruno, a mathematician, astronomer, and memory theorist who traveled 
across Europe and preached, among other “heresies,” the existence of an infinite number 
                                                
5 “Poll: U.S. hiding knowledge of aliens,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/US/9706/15/ufo.poll/. 
6 Tariq Malik, “Most Americans Believe Alien Life is Possible, Study Shows,” Space.com, 
http://www.space.com/news/050531_alienlife_survey.html   
7 The limitations section below will address what I consider to be “alien” life for the purposes of this 
dissertation.  
8 Plato’s Timaeus responds to the cosmology of the atomists who believed that there existed an infinite 
number of universes.  Plato argued that the universe we exist in is the only universe and that in the universe 
Earth is the only location habitable by anything other than mortal creatures.  Plato, "Timaeus," in Plato 
Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 31b. 
9 Gabriela Roxana Carone, Plato's Cosmology and its Ethical Dimensions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
10 Thomas F. Glick, Steven John Livesey, and Faith Wallis, Medieval Science, Technology, and Medicine: 
An Encyclopedia (New York: Routledge, 2005), 412. 
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of worlds, was put to death by the Papal inquisition.11 The Renaissance begat a surge of 
belief in an inhabited cosmos.  Fontenelle’s book, Conversations on the Plurality of 
Worlds (1686), which advocated a multiplicity of extraterrestrial inhabitations, sold a 
massive number of copies and was eventually translated into ten languages.12 A dozen or 
more books and dissertations followed the success of Fontenelle’s book on the subject, 
from 1710-1750, which may not seem like much by today’s standards, but historian 
Michael J. Crowe argues this, “dramatically demonstrates the popularity of pluralism” at 
the time.13  Even at the height of the Age of Reason, Thomas Baker derisively referred to 
proponents of the Plurality-of-Worlds hypothesis as “World-Mongers.”14  Belief in the 
existence of alien life featured among Emmanuel Kant’s and David Hume’s many 
differences of opinion, with Kant in defense of the proposition and Hume in opposition.15  
Just when it seemed as though an academic consensus had formed around the Plurality-
of-Worlds hypothesis, the mid-1800s brought a significant backlash from William 
Whewell, a renowned English scientist, philosopher, and Anglican theologian.16  While 
many dialectic materialists later in the Soviet Union believed in aliens, their original 
                                                
11 The prevailing historiography now suggests that Bruno was killed for a combination of political reasons 
and his belief in hermetic magic rather than his commitment to the Plurality-of-Worlds thesis. Edwards A. 
Gosselin and Lawrence S. Lerner, "Introduction," in The Ash Wednesday Supper (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1995).  Nevertheless, Bruno’s death was widely interpreted as a punishment for his 
advocacy of the Plurality-of-Worlds thesis and created a chilling effect on many intellectuals.  Descartes 
was hesitant to write about the Plurality of Worlds because of Bruno’s execution.  Dick, Plurality of 
Worlds, 112. 
12 Bernard le Bovier Fontenelle, A Discourse of the Plurality of Worlds written in French by the most 
Ingenious Author of the Dialogues of the Dead, trans. W.D. Knight (Dublin: Andr. Crook and Sam  
Helsham and William Norman, 1687). 
Michael J. Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, 1750-1900 (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1999), 
18, 19. 
13 Crowe, Extraterrestrial Life Debate, 34. 
14Thomas Baker, Reflections Upon Learning (London: A. Bosvile, 1699). 
15 David L Clark, "Kant's Aliens: The Anthropology and Its Others," New Centennial Review 1, no. 2 
(2001): 241-48; Crowe, Extraterrestrial Life Debate, 96, 97. 
16 Menachem Fisch and Simon Schaffer, eds., William Whewell: A Composite Portrait (Oxford: Claredeon, 
1991). 
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dialectician Hegel, who deeply influenced Karl Marx, insisted that life on other planets 
violated the “spirit” behind the dialectic, which he constructed in metaphysical terms 
connected specifically with humanity.17  Although the emergent field of astrobiology (the 
study of alien life) now suggests that the scientific debate has been decided in favor of the 
existence of aliens, Rare Earth (2000), a book that argues against the existence of 
intelligent life on other planets, nonetheless became a popular and academic success.18  
While over half of the American population believes the universe contains alien life, 
between forty to forty-five percent believe we are alone.19 
My dissertation does not seek to answer the empirical question of whether life 
exists outside the planet Earth.  I am interested instead in the way individuals rhetorically 
deploy the question of alien life in order to advance other values and beliefs.  There exist 
several bodies of work, for example, that study those who believe that life is ubiquitous 
in the universe and the ways these individuals enthymematically connect this belief with 
other beliefs that are not related by necessity, which I will explore later in this 
introduction.  Underexplored in academic research are individuals and groups who have 
denied the possible existence of alien life.  I am interested in how the belief that we are 
alone in the universe is deployed rhetorically and connected to other ethics, goals and 
politics.  I look for linguistic styles, argumentative tactics, and deep-seated values, which 
                                                
17 K. Rosenkranz, "Rosenkranz on Hegel's History of Philosophy," Journal of Speculative Philosophy 8, no. 
1 (1874); E. T. Winkler, "Religion and Astronomy," Baptist Quarterly 5, no. 1 (1871).  
18 Scott Holter, "Dead Recokining," 2006 (2003), 
http://www.washington.edu/alumni/columns/sept03/dead02.html ; Peter Ward and Donald Brownlee, Rare 
Earth: Why Complex Life is Uncommon in the Universe (New York: Copernicus 2004). 
19 “Poll: U.S. hiding knowledge of aliens.” 
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are repeated in texts that oppose pluralism written centuries apart.  In these pages, I 
disclose a rhetorical environment that undergirds anti-pluralist beliefs.20  
While cosmologies that stem from belief in an inhabited universe have been 
connected with a host of other beliefs from scientific rationalism to New Age Theosophy, 
belief in an uninhabited universe is consistently connected with one set of values and 
beliefs from Plato to its adherents today.  Opponents of the plurality thesis often argue 
that humanity’s solitary position in the universe is meaningful for how we as a species 
should live.  This view takes many forms; some argue that because we are alone that 
ethics are objective and not relativistic as the sophists and others have claimed.21  Others 
suggest that our solitude indicates that humanity exists for a special purpose whether it is 
explicitly religious or simply spreading consciousness throughout space.22  Others still 
connect the harm of human extinction not to the fact that humanity as a species would be 
lost, but the belief that humanity as the only intelligent life in the universe would be 
lost.23  All of these examples converge on the general connection between a cosmology 
where humanity is alone and the idea that the species is more special than if other life 
existed.   
                                                
20 W. Charles Redding, "Communication Research and the 'Rhetorical Environment'," Communication 
Studies 50, no. 4 (1999): 337-51. 
21 Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay W. Richards, The Privileged Planet: How Our Place in the Cosmos is 
Designed for Discovery (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2004); Plato, "Timaeus."; William Whewell, "Of the 
Plurality of Worlds," in Of the Plurality of Worlds. 1853 A Facsimile of the First Edition with an 
introduction by Michael Ruse, ed. Michael Ruse (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
22 Ward and Brownlee, Rare Earth. 
23 Nick Bostrom, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," Journal 
of Evolution and Technology 9 (2002); Martin Rees, Our Final Hour: A Scientist's Warning: How Terror, 
Error, and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind's Future In This Century — On Earth and Beyond 
(New York Basic Books, 2003); Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); John Leslie, The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of Human Extinction 
(New York: Routledge, 1996). 
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A proponent of this viewpoint, Whewell, coined the term “Unity of the World” in 
his bestselling book The Plurality of Worlds (1853) to describe his version of this 
cosmology, which took humanity’s solitary existence as a sign of our importance in the 
eyes of God.24  I will use Whewell’s term unity of the world to reference connection, as 
seen in the several case studies from Plato’s time to the present, of the absolute lack of 
other intelligent life in the universe with the attribution of cosmic importance to 
humanity.25   
My dissertation claims the unity cosmology’s deployment functions as argument.  
I make the case that rhetors use the unity cosmology as a justification for the specialness 
of humanity, which provides a foundation for their religious, philosophical, and political 
beliefs.  I also argue that the argument for human specialness and its attendant ideological 
ramifications has succeeded in having a major impact on audiences.   Finally, I contend 
that while adjustments have been made throughout history, the fundamental premises of 
the unity argument have remained stable for over 2,000 years. 
 
                                                
24 “Plurality of Worlds” was the common name for the hypothesis that other planets were inhabited. In the 
dissertation I will occasionally shorten “unity of the world” to “unity,” just as the literature often shortens 
“plurality of worlds” to “plurality.” Whewell, "Of the Plurality of Worlds." 
25 While most of the case studies I examine would define themselves in opposition to the pluralist position, 
differences do exist in what exactly they believe.  On the one hand, Plato, for example, denies the 
possibility of any mortal material life outside of what we know as the planet Earth.  Whewell, on the other 
hand, argues that intelligent life does not exist elsewhere, but that unintelligent life (animals) may exist 
(although this is unlikely).  Despite the differences in the specifics of their cosmologies, all these authors 
use similar rhetoric to connect the absence of intelligent life in the universe to the importance of humanity.  
 7 
1.1 LIMITATIONS 
My study will focus exclusively on materialistic alien life throughout the cosmos, rather 
than spiritual or religious earthly manifestations. The distinction between material and 
spiritual can at times become blurry, for example, when many individuals claimed the 
planets served as the abode for angels, demons, or the souls of the dead.  I believe a 
distinction can be made, however.  Spiritual inhabitants of the cosmos were not 
considered “alien,” in the sense that religious individuals believed that they existed, could 
be understood through religious texts, interfered in human affairs, and occasionally 
revealed themselves.  In contrast defenders of pluralism could only speculate about the 
nature of life forms on other planets and, for most of history, did not claim to have any 
interaction with them.  Also the plurality hypothesis posited inhabitants like humans, 
even when those inhabitants were created by divine powers they are clearly delineated in 
the literature from angels and gods.  Plato, for example, argued Earth (or rather what we 
recognize as Earth) was the only planet with human-like life, but suggested the 
wandering stars (what we now know as the planets, sun, and moon) were deities.26  The 
distinction between spiritual and material life maintains the necessary components for the 
unity ideology, because material aliens call into question humanity’s uniqueness, whereas 
spiritual inhabitants do not.  
Similarly, my study will not examine reactions to various human groups or 
animals alive on Earth as alien, except in so far as these reactions may shed light on 
attitudes about extraterrestrials.  The “discovery” of the Americas, for example, 
                                                
26 Plato, "Timaeus," 38c-39e. 
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represents a period in history that for many individuals at the time (European and 
indigenous) can be equated to an encounter with extraterrestrial life.  At first, serious 
debate occurred in Europe over whether the inhabitants of America were even human.27 
Some of the literature of the time even reflects this debate, like Shakespeare’s Tempest 
with its quasi-human characters.28  Insofar as the European and indigenous peoples 
viewed each other as alien, this encounter serves as a useful case study for what is at 
stake in the debate over pluralism.29  My dissertation will not examine the treatment of 
human groups as alien as a case study, however.   
The literature on the question of pluralism clearly delineates itself from debate 
over the nature of various human groups.  Defenders of the unity cosmology from Plato 
onward view the confines of the planet as a meaningful boundary to demarcate the 
discussion of alien intelligent life.  The possibility of humanoid intelligence on Earth may 
undermine the narrative of cultural importance (for example European cultural 
importance), but is not nearly as problematic to the myth of anthropocentrism as the 
potential for a universe full of intelligent life. The planet provides a natural boundary, 
which serves to make Earth a complete unit and thus a model for perfection, an idea 
consistently found in the unity writings. Also important is that the view of other humans 
as separate species has always been much more ephemeral than the unity cosmology.  
Even Kupper claims that the belief that the indigenous people in the Americas were not 
human quickly faded from popular European sentiment, because, among other things, the 
                                                
27 Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 1-9; Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One: A 
Study of the Disputation Between Bartholomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the 
Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians (DeKalb: Northern Ilinois University Press, 
1974), 3-17. 
28 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Boston: MIT Press, 2001), 892-912. 
29 Joachim. Küpper, "The Traditional Cosmos and the New World," Modern Language Notes 118, no. 2 
(2003): 363-92. 
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Christian understanding of Genesis allowed most Europeans to assimilate the idea of 
variations of species as representative of the same species (something not applicable to 
alien life).30  More importantly, those who do view subsets of humanity as nonhuman 
often argue that the existence of these quasi or subhumans make them more, not less, 
special, which is in direct contrast to the unity cosmology.  The works of both Mark 
Harrison and Christopher Roth trace the birth of the modern UFO movement and suggest 
that groups that believe in racial distinctions between humans are more likely to be 
pluralists.31   This is not to say that pluralism is strongly correlated to racist beliefs, but 
only that pluralists are more likely to believe in racial distinctions than believers in unity.  
Defenders of the unity cosmology typically argue that all of humanity is a singular 
species.  In the Timaeus, Plato creates a clear category distinction between humans and 
animals which groups all humans together based on their proportions.32  The idea that all 
humans belong to the same species runs throughout Plato’s dialogues.33  Whewell, while 
he still maintains many of the culturally biased beliefs of his time, repeatedly and clearly 
states that all humans are fundamentally the same.34 While the examination of groups that 
view other humans as alien is no doubt important, the unity of the world cosmology is 
distinct enough to warrant an independent examination.  
A final limitation regards the emphasis here on one side of two-sided debate of 
unity versus plurality. With so much solid work on plurality already in print, as can be 
                                                
30 The suggestion that the belief in sharp racial distinctions proved ephemeral does not suggest that it was 
unimportant or did not emerge with disastrous consequences at various points throughout history.   
31 Christopher F. Roth, "Ufology as Anthropology: Race Extraterrestrials, and the Occult," in E.T. Culture: 
Anthropology in Outerspaces, ed. Debbora Battaglia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005); Mark 
Harrison, "The Extraterrestrial in US Culture" (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2006). 
32 Plato, "Timaeus," 90e-92c. 
33 H. C. Baldry, Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 76. 
34 Torben Grodal, "Stories for Eye, Ear, and Muscles: Video Games, Media and Emobied Experiences," in 
The Video Game Theory Reader, ed. Mark Wolf and Bernard Perron (New York: Routledge, 2003), 43, 94. 
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seen throughout the dissertation, the aim here is to recover the oppositional rhetoric to 
what has become today the pluralist orthodoxy. The plurality-unity debate is naturally 
recapitulated in the process in delving into the rhetoric of key thinkers arguing for the 
unity of worlds, but a blow-by-blow account of the debate falls outside the scope of 
study.  
1.2 METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
I plan to trace the Unity-of-World cosmology throughout western history from Plato to 
the modern day.  In order to make this project manageable in scope, I focus on key 
periods of argumentative conflict between the unity and plurality cosmologies.  I use 
Debra Hawhee and Christa Olson’s method of Pan-historiography, which involves taking 
case studies throughout time to illuminate the history of an argument.35  In each period I 
have used authoritative histories of the debate to find the most influential texts defending 
unity.36  I provide uniquely close rhetorical criticism of the portions of these texts 
relevant to cosmology in order to search for an underlying ideology common to the belief 
in unity.37  
I will explain how these texts are situated within their own particular historical 
context, but also highlight elements of the cosmology that stay constant over time.  In 
                                                
35 Debra Hawhee and Christa Olson, "Pan-Historiography: The Challenges of Writing History across Time 
and Space," in Theorizing Historiography in Rhetoric, ed. Michelle Ballif (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press), forthcoming in press.  Dr. Hawhee presented at the University of Pittsburgh and 
mentioned this article would be coming out.  She was kind enough to send me an advance copy. 
36 Crowe, Extraterrestrial Life Debate; Dick, Plurality of Worlds; Steven J. Dick, The Biological Universe: 
The Twentieth-century Extraterrestrial Life Debate and the Limits of Science, 1st pbk. ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
37 Hawhee and Olson, "Pan-Historiography: The Challenges of Writing History across Time and Space." 
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order to understand the reception and dissemination of the cosmology within the 
historical eras I examine, I trace the contemporary responses to the featured work.  In the 
first chapter I do this by using the histories on the debate over extraterrestrial life to point 
me in the direction of texts to examine, such as Steven Dick’s Plurality of Worlds (1982) 
and Michael J. Crowe’s “A History of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate” (1997).38 Unlike 
the other chapters, which provide in-depth case studies of major works that defend unity, 
the second chapter covers a transitional period from the dominance of the unity to its 
serious challenge by the plurality cosmology.  I will examine several works from the 
period that responded to the plurality cosmology and trace the general tenor of the debate 
through secondary sources like the works of Dick and Crowe.  
Some of my research involved systematic searching in online digital archives.  In 
the third chapter, I trace the response to Whewell’s Plurality of World’s through the 
American Periodicals Series database, a major (and robust) digital humanities resource.  
A search reveals over 400 articles that contain the term “plurality of worlds” in the 
American Periodicals Series alone.  That database is the most comprehensive collection 
of magazines stretching published in what is now the U.S. from 1740-1900 and 
encompassing over 1,000 journals. For the fourth chapter, I use LexisNexis Academic 
news database, JSTOR, and the search engine Google to trace the reception of the book 
The Anthropic Cosmological Principle in a similar fashion. 
The combination of close rhetorical reading and archival work illuminate the 
rhetorical use of the unity cosmology throughout history.  Major philosophical and 
religious thinkers have invested the idea of human uniqueness with ideological value.  
                                                
38 Dick, Plurality of Worlds. 
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The scientific question of life on other planets thus becomes entangled in philosophical, 
religious, and political debates.  The close readings and examination of reception detail 
the rhetorical power of the unity cosmology.   
The first chapter, “Plato’s Invented Universe: Unity of the World in the Ancient 
World,” grounds my examination of the unity cosmology.  The unity cosmology does not 
necessarily begin with Plato, but he provides the best starting point for an examination of 
this cultural myth.  His cosmology, presented primarily in the Timaeus (fourth century 
BCE), has two important features that appear to be absent in previous eras.  Earlier 
western cosmologies that claimed no other intelligent life existed in the universe did not 
encounter serious opposition from pluralists.  While myths have the most power when 
society takes them for granted, they also become very difficult for scholars to study.  
When myths have become entrenched in a culture they do not need to be specifically 
referenced in order to be effective.  Plato wrote his cosmology in the face of the atomists’ 
rival materialist cosmology, which postulated an infinite number of inhabitable worlds.  
The conflict between the Plato and the atomists provides an opportunity to examine what 
the aspects of the unity cosmology Plato highlights (including its rhetorical components) 
in opposition to a pluralist cosmology.   
The second factor in favor of beginning with Plato is that he more than any of the 
other cosmologists at the time explicitly connects his physical description of the universe 
to ethical and political positions.  In fact, evidence exists that suggests Plato’s 
deployment of the unity cosmology was almost entirely motivated by his desire to spread 
his philosophy.  The connections Plato draws between the structure of the universe and 
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his other philosophical ideals become the nucleus of the unity mythology throughout later 
eras. 
Plato connects the structure of the universe to his philosophy by arguing that the 
cosmos contains messages for how humans should live.  Unsurprisingly, Plato suggests 
that these messages justify the political philosophy that he had been an advocate of since 
his earliest dialogues.  Plato describes a cosmos where Earth is literally the center of the 
universe.  Positioning the Earth as the center of the universe was a common theme among 
early cosmologies.  Plato, however, not only locates the Earth physically at the center, but 
his cosmology obliterates the potential for any form of alien otherness.  In Plato’s 
cosmology the universe exists solely for the benefit of humanity; outer space becomes a 
fixed entity operating in fixed regularity, endlessly transmitting a message of how to live 
to the human species.  This cosmology makes no space for alien lives, literally, because 
the crystalline universe cannot be inhabited and rhetorically, because the sophists, 
atomists, pre-Socratics and others that disagreed with Plato were acting out of sync with 
the universe.    
Plato’s cosmology became one of the dominant strains of thinking on the universe 
in ancient Greece, but it had competitors.  The atomists’ philosophy still survived, as did 
Aristotle’s more scientific version of Plato’s ideas.  When Christianity became the 
dominant religion of Europe, however, it was Plato’s cosmology that resonated most with 
the prevailing theology. My second chapter, “The Dominance of the Unity Cosmology: 
Unity from Plato to Galileo,” traces the transition of unity beliefs from the ancient to the 
medieval world.  Individuals like Thomas Aquinas, who wrote on unity in de Potenia 
(1265-1266) and the Summa Theologica (1265-1274), harmonized Plato’s cosmology, the 
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scientific ideas of Aristotle, and Christian theology. 39  This new version of the unity 
cosmology became the dominant, largely unquestioned cosmology of Europe well 
through the 1600s.  The unity cosmology provided a foundation for medieval theology 
and ethics throughout Europe.  
The Copernican Revolution provided an important catalyst to the rise of 
modernity.  Up until this time, most of the debate about life on other planets focused on 
whether it was theoretically possible for such a universe to exist, rather than whether 
plurality in fact existed.  These debates typically occurred within a religious context with 
one side making Plato and Aristotle’s arguments for why there could not be a plurality of 
worlds and the other side saying these explanations incorrectly placed limits on an 
omnipotent creator.  The success of the Copernican cosmology opened up space for a 
different kind of discussion, which focused not on whether a plurality of worlds was 
possible, but whether it in fact existed.  Bolstered by the adoption of the Copernican 
cosmology among elite thinkers, the plurality theory became the dominant paradigm in 
scientific and academic discourse. 
Despite the success of the Plurality-of-Worlds cosmology, vocal detractors, 
fearful of the ethical and theological implications of plurality, published works that 
defended the unity cosmology. 40   This minority of scholars fought a losing battle against 
the modern pluralist cosmology.  While Kepler’s telescopic observations caused him to 
proclaim, “Is man the most noble rational creature?  Are things made for him?,” Caspar 
                                                
39 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia Dei, trans. English Dominican Fathers (The 
Newman Press, 1952); Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. Part I QQ. L.-
LXXIV, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2nd Revised ed., 10 vols., vol. 1 (London: Burns 
Oates and Washbourne, 1920). 
40 Robert Jenkin, The Resonableness and Certainty of the Christian Religion, 3rd ed., vol. 1 (London: 
Richard Sare, 1708); Baker, Reflections Upon Learning. 
 15 
Bartholin and Athanasius Kircher responded definitively in the affirmative.41 This chapter 
examines the rise and fall of unity’s hegemony in order to provide a bridge between the 
ancient and modern instantiations of the unity cosmology.  
Upon its publication in 1853, Whewell’s Plurality of Worlds ignited fierce debate 
by its suggestion that the plurality thesis had little basis in science or religion.42  The 
massive controversy that resulted played itself out in academic rejoinders and a 
prolonged back in forth in popular magazines.  This controversy suggests the victory of 
the plurality cosmology in the 1600s was much more ephemeral than real.  My third 
chapter, “William Whewell and Alfred Russel Wallace: Unity Cosmology in the Modern 
Era,” examines the unity cosmology of two of the nineteenth century’s greatest thinkers.  
Whewell offers an impressive array of cutting-edge scientific arguments to back 
his position, but the implications have changed little from Plato’s cosmology.  Whewell 
and his supporters argue that the unity theory is crucial to the premise that humanity has a 
special role in the cosmos. In contrast, the plurality cosmology, “repeatedly annihilate[s]” 
humanity “by the growing magnitude of the known Universe.”43  Whewell used the unity 
cosmology as an argument against the relativism he saw in the philosophies of utilitarians 
and others. 
Alfred Russel Wallace, inspired by Whewell’s work, wrote his own defense of the 
unity cosmology. In Man’s Place in the Universe (1903) and The World of Life (1910) 
                                                
41 Grant McColley, "The Seventeenth-Century Doctrine of a Plurality of Worlds," Annals of Science 1, no. 
4 (1936): 426. 
42 William Whewell, Of the Plurality of Worlds. 1855. A Fascimile of the First Edition with an introduction 
by Michael Ruse, 1st ed., 1st ed. (1855; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1855; reprint, 2001). 
43 Whewell, "Of the Plurality of Worlds," 63. 
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Wallace connects the absence of alien life to a special purpose for humanity. 44  He used 
unity as an argument against capitalism and social Darwinism, claiming that humanity 
represented the telos of the universe and thus could escape the survival of the fittest 
paradigm.  
In the early 1900s another wave of belief in extraterrestrial life overtook both the 
academic and popular imagination.  Percival Lowell popularized the idea that Mars was 
home to an advanced alien civilization, which became a view held by many other 
prominent scientists.  Science fiction and popular science magazines popularized the 
plurality viewpoint even as Lowell’s belief in advanced life on Mars began to fade from 
mainstream scientific thought.  When governments sent probes to nearby planets in the 
1970s, the hopes of scientists and the public ran high that at least microbial life would be 
found.  Each new mission of discovery brought more disappointing news for those that 
were invested in the idea that life was ubiquitous in the universe. 
As the chance of finding life in the solar system declined, the time was ripe for 
another emergence of the unity cosmology. My fourth chapter, “Tipler and Barrow: The 
Unity Cosmology in the Present Day,” traces the recent reemergence of unity in the work 
The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. 45 In the 1980s Frank Tipler and John Barrow 
created an updated version of Plato’s unity cosmology that combined the absence of alien 
life with cutting edge principles from quantum physics to present an anthropocentric 
picture of the universe.  They argue that this anthropocentric universe provides a material 
                                                
44 Alfred Russel Wallace, The World of Life: A Manifestation of Creative Power, Directive Mind and 
Ultimate Purpose (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1911); Alfred Russel Wallace, "Man's Place in 
the Universe," Fortnightly Review 74, no. 435-411 (1903). 
45 John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986). 
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foundation to the belief that humans are special and that morality has a foundation in the 
structure of the cosmos. 
1.3  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Two major bases of literature need exploration before proceeding to my case studies.  
The first, involves academic pieces that examine the rhetorical implications of plurality 
and unity cosmologies.  These works will provide a glimpse into the current thinking on 
the subject and the literature examining plurality will provide a foil with which to 
understand the role the unity argument plays rhetorically.  The second set of important 
sources provides the critical foundation to understand how the unity argument gains its 
rhetorical power.  This section outlines both of these literature bases in order to provide a 
picture of the current writing on rhetoric and alien life and to map the tools I will use for 
my own critical intervention into that literature. 
No major study of the Unity-of-the-World (under that or any other name) 
cosmology as an argument currently exists.  In fact, very little has been written about 
those who reject the possibility of alien life as a group. 46  Michael J. Crowe and Steven 
Dick trace the history of the debate over the question of alien life, but their works, while 
incredibly thorough, are intellectual histories of cosmological thinking and do not 
                                                
46 Plato’s cosmology has attracted serious scholarly attention, but these works do not connect his 
cosmologies to others that reject the possibility of alien life. 
A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (New York: Garland, 1967); Donald J. Zeyl, Timaeus 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000); Gregory Vlastos, Plato's Universe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1975); Carone, Plato's Cosmology; Francis MacDonald Cornford, Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of 
Plato (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
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examine the ways these cosmologies act as rhetorical devices.47  Only a few articles and 
brief references in larger works discuss the way the unity cosmology helps shape other 
discourses. 
Michael Zimmerman touches on the issue briefly in an article about UFO 
abductions.  He argues that cosmologies that exclude the possibility of alien life are part 
of a long history of cultural myths that allow people to feel more important by narrowly 
drawing the boundaries of which beings are valued or, in this case, exist.48  Zimmerman 
uses the analogy of the European exploration of the Americas to show how 
dehumanization and denial of existence serve the same mythic function.   
He describes how the Europeans “discovered” two continents of people blissfully 
ignorant of Europe, much less ideas Europeans took for granted like Christianity and 
capitalism.  Zimmerman believes the finding that Europe did not exist as central conduit 
for all human activity on the planet provided an existential shock to its inhabitants.  He 
argues that in order to minimize the significance of the discovery the Europeans first 
dehumanized the inhabitants of “the new world,” then embarked on a plan to eliminate 
them.  The first contact between Europeans and the indigenous peoples of America shows 
how dehumanization and denial serve the similar rhetorical function of building up a 
sense of importance.49  Zimmerman suggests that the same cultural mythology that 
                                                
47 Dick, Plurality of Worlds; ibid.; Dick, The Biological Universe; Crowe, Extraterrestrial Life Debate. 
48 Michael E. Zimmerman, "Encountering Alien Otherness," in The Concept of the Foreign, ed. Rebecca 
Saunders (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002). 
49 Although Joachim Küpper never makes the connection to life on other planets, he reaches similar 
conclusions to Zimmerman.  Küpper suggests that the Europeans were especially vulnerable to the shock of 
discovery because a Küpper, "The Traditional Cosmos and the New World."“creationist, monotheistic view 
of the world—is liable to be shaken fundamentally by the emergence of ‘new’ worlds.”49  Again the idea of 
stability and permanence are juxtaposed with alien life, even when the aliens in question are human.  The 
powerful reactions of many individuals to humans perceived as alien indicate that nonhuman alien 
intelligence would probably be even more difficult for to confront. Ibid.,  368-75, 89. 
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recoiled at the possibility of a civilization of people on the other side of the world could 
be at work when individuals deny the possibility of alien life.50  
Renowned political theorist Alexander Wendt and political scientist Raymond 
Duvall make a similar argument in another academic piece about UFOs.  Wendt and 
Duvall argue that the state refuses to investigate UFOs, because the possibility of 
intelligent life undermines the state’s power.51  Intelligent alien life, they argue, calls into 
question the metaphysics of anthropocentrism that the state relies on in order to maintain 
order.  The state depends on biopolitical control, categorizing who is and is not a being of 
value.  Wendt and Duvall argue that a serious investigation of UFOs may confirm that 
nonhuman life can be intelligent and thus is beyond the ability of the state to assign or 
revoke value.  When the state is unable to use biopolitical control in order to subdue 
opposition it simply destroys the opposition with force.  Here again the UFO exists 
outsides the state’s power, because the ability to travel to Earth implies enough scientific 
prowess to avoid or retaliate against aggression.  Wendt and Duvall argue that in order to 
preserve its power the state simply chooses to ignore any possibility of UFOs.52  
Zimmerman and Wendt and Duvall focus narrowly on UFOs, but their analysis 
could be applied to the discovery of intelligent life anywhere in the universe. The myth of 
constant progression towards a more perfect society rests heavily on the myth that Earth 
is alone in the cosmos.  The possibility of alien planets that exist in different, much less 
unimagined, ways calls into question the foundations of all human institutions. The 
existence of other worlds suggests a lack in our own world, whereas a cosmology that 
                                                
50 Zimmerman, "Encountering Alien Otherness," 157-60. 
51 Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Sovereignty and the UFO," Political Theory 36 (2008). 
52 Ibid.,  625-29. 
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treats Earth as solitary allows individuals to see the present as inevitable and thus read 
history in a teleological fashion.  I use these works as a starting point and expand the 
analysis from rejection of UFOs to the unity cosmology as a whole. 
Michael Hyde comments briefly on cosmologies that focus only on humanity, 
“Our presence in the Universe, I think it is fair to say, is rather insignificant. How dare 
we be as selfish self-centered—as rotten with perfection—as we sometimes are?”53  
Hyde’s use of the phrase “rotten with perfection,” references Kenneth Burke’s belief that 
humanity inevitably seeks to achieve perfection even at great expense.54  This innate 
drive for perfection helps to explain the European panic at the discovery of “the new 
world” and the refusal of states to seriously search for UFOs.  The possibility of radical 
otherness calls into question one’s own claims to perfection or perfectibility.  My 
dissertation argues that the question of perfection (not objective presence or absence of 
alien life) lies at the center of the unity cosmology. 
In contrast to the dearth of scholarship on the unity cosmology there have been 
numerous examinations of various incarnations of the plurality cosmology.  These works 
provide important insights into my own study.  Because the myths associated with unity 
cosmology and the plurality cosmology are often in direct opposition, it becomes 
important to have an understanding of the literature on the plurality of worlds.  My 
reading of the plurality literature suggests, on the one hand, a much more fluid approach 
to the myths and meanings attached to the presence of alien intelligence; the unity 
cosmology, on the other hand, has a more fixed ideological component.  Reading the 
                                                
53 Michael J. Hyde, The Life-Giving Gift of Acknowledgment, ed. Ramsey Eric Ramsey (West Lafayette, 
Ind.: Purdue University, 2006), 286. 
54 Michael J. Hyde, Perfection: Coming to Terms with Being Human (Waco, Tx.: Baylor University, 2010). 
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plurality literature in connection with the unity literature shows points of stasis as well as 
common ground between the two cosmologies. 
George Basalla offers a comprehensive study of the plurality cosmology from 
Copernicus to the present.55  He examines scientists writing in defense of plurality and 
argues that these figures connect a plurality to their belief in progress and scientific 
rationality. He argues these scientists craft a narrative of intelligent life being plentiful in 
the universe.  They then hypothesize that some of this life will be much more 
technologically and socially advanced than humanity.  Soon imaginations run wild; the 
scientists offer potential scenarios for advanced alien species that seem more like science 
fiction than science fact.  Ordinarily clear-headed scientists like Carl Sagan make 
outlandish claims about how contact with advanced life forms will solve all of Earth 
problems, because humanity would be able to learn from a more evolved race.  Basalla 
makes the case that these secular scientists replace God in traditional religious myth with 
advanced alien life.56  
Of all the research I have examined, Basalla’s study of the plurality cosmology is 
the academic work that most clearly mirrors my own.  He traces the historical 
development of the plurality cosmology in modern times, but focuses on how individuals 
tie the cosmology to social issues outside the realm of astronomy. Like Plato before them, 
the scientists Basalla studies use the construction of the universe to justify a contingently 
related worldview.  My own study will be similar to Basalla’s, but instead focused on the 
unity cosmology.  
                                                
55 Basalla, Civilized Life in the Universe. 
56 Ibid.,  158-60. 
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Mark Harrison’s study of the modern UFO movement is the only explicitly 
rhetorical examination of the belief in alien life.57  He traces the development of the 
modern UFO movement from the ashes of Theosophy.58  Theosophy developed in the 
1870s as a reaction to the conflict between Darwinism and Christian Creation Science.  
Theosophy mixed racial science, folktales, and superficial knowledge of eastern 
traditions into one of the more bizarre movements in history.  The group became a haven 
for Nazis and other racists who refused to accept that all humans were created from the 
same mechanism (whether God or evolution). Harrison argues that Theosophy initially 
deified magical Ascended Masters (enlightened individuals), but these figures get 
replaced in cultural lore with alien visitors as the UFO craze comes into fruition.  The 
UFO movement in the West still contains many of the problematic racist beliefs that it 
inherited from its Theosophical origins.  
The Theosophists projected their racism onto the structure of the universe and 
came up with a complicated hierarchy of visiting alien races correspondent to the “races” 
of humans on Earth.  The racial hierarchy of aliens served as a justification for the 
Theosophists’ earthly racism.  This example appears to blur the line between cosmology 
and religion, since it goes without saying that Theosophist teachings lack any sort of 
objective verification.  It is true that cosmologies can be founded on faith, but they can 
also claim a basis in material reality.  Both Christopher Roth and Harrison argue that the 
Theosophists existed at the fringes of science, rather than rejecting science whole-
heartedly.  While the Theosophists’ beliefs may seem bizarre and counterfactual they hid 
                                                
57 Harrison, "The Extraterrestrial in US Culture". 
58 Roth provides a very similar study from an anthropological perspective. Roth, "Ufology as 
Anthropology." 
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them behind a layer of (pseudo)science.  The works of Roth and Harrison have important 
insights for my dissertation, because like the Theosophists the unity and plurality camps 
use cosmology as a scientific mask to justify their political and ethical values. 
All of these examinations of the question of alien life provide insightful analysis 
that informs my dissertation.  The fact remains, however, that not much has been written 
about the rhetorical implications of alien life, much less the lack of alien life.  In order to 
make sense of my case studies it becomes necessary to draw from more rhetorical 
theories and apply them to the specific case of alien life.  These rhetorical theories 
provide a lens to understand the why the unity cosmology has gained such traction 
throughout the years and also provide the starting point to demystify unity with the from 
the ideologies attached to it.  
Although not writing explicitly about alien life, Stephen Edelston Toulmin’s book 
Cosmopolis (1990) provides a lucid account of the way in which individuals can harness 
the rhetorical force of cosmology.59  He argues that rationalists used the Copernican 
revolution as an opening to rewrite the academic disciplines from the ground up.  An 
alliance of scientists, philosophers and political thinkers interpreted the finding that the 
earth and it inhabitants did not occupy a privileged position in the solar system, as a 
justification for an empirical methodology.60  Toulmin suggests that this shift was an 
important catalyst to the spread of modernity throughout Europe, which resulted in 
drastic changes in the study of natural philosophy, religion and politics.  While 
Copernicus’s discovery represents the archetype of scientific revolution, Toulmin 
                                                
59 Stephen Edelston Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990). 
60 Ibid.,  82-84. 
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articulates how this shift is fundamentally a rhetorical one even as it occurs within the 
framework of the scientific (a point I will return to later in the chapter).61 
Cosmology exists at the intersection of science and cultural mythology. It is 
relatively uncontroversial to suggest that myths shaped the political, religious, scientific, 
and cultural existence of early humankind.  Scholars point out that myths continue to play 
an important role in daily affairs, and though the specific content of the myths may have 
changed over time, the form of mythic language remains relatively unchanged.  Barthes 
argues that myth exists as a type of speech rather than as a particular idea or thing.  The 
power of mythic language is that it hides the ideological nature of particular terms and 
thus fills the inevitable ambiguities that arise from language.62  Another way that myth 
exerts rhetorical force is Barthe’s belief that myths act as propositions that need no 
support.63  Myth is simply taken for granted whether it’s the prevailing belief that 
everything can be put into monetary values or the medieval European practice of 
justifying monarchy on the basis of religion.64 
The way that myth invokes unstated premises makes it very similar to Aristotle’s 
enthymeme and in fact those that deploy the unity cosmology almost exclusively do so in 
enthymeme form.65  They almost never explicitly make the connection between 
                                                
61 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996); ibid. 
62 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (London: Paladin, 1973), 109, 32. 
63 Ibid.,  143. 
64 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkley: University of California Press, 1962), 116-17. 
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humanity’s solitary existence and the tenants of the unity mythology.  This leaves 
audience members to make the connection for themselves, drawing on their own 
preexisting (perhaps unrecognized) feelings.  Aristotle argues that enthymemes act as the 
most effective form of syllogism, precisely because it calls on the audience to 
participate.66  In contrast to the analytic style of eristic logic, enthymemes draw on 
commonplaces in order to rhetorically connect with the audience.67  In the case of the 
unity cosmology the unstated premise could be that rare things are valuable or that the 
existence of other ways of being would make our own appear relative rather than 
teleological.  Either way, the enthymematic deployment of the unity cosmology both 
strengthens its appeal and reveals something about the audiences to which it appeals, 
often the degree to which they subscribe to belief in absolute morality, teleology, and 
anthropocentrism. 
Cosmology provides a strong foundation for myth and enthymemes precisely 
because it does not seem ideological.  The question of whether or not life exists on other 
planets is an empirical one, grounded in objective reality, although not verifiable in the 
past or, for the most part, in the present.  It is not the material condition of the universe 
that constitutes myth, however, but the attempt to put that into language as Burke 
describes  
 
a reduction of the world to the dimension of words… any terminology of motives 
reduces the vast complexity of life by reduction to principles, laws, sequences, 
                                                
66 Aristotle, "Rhetoric," in Aristotle, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, trans., W. Rhys Roberts (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1952), 1355a. 
67 Jeffrey Walker, "The Body of Persuasion: A Theory of the Enthymeme," College English 56, no. 1 
(1994): 47. 
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classifications, correlations, in brief, abstractions or generalizations of one sort or 
another.  And any generalization is necessarily a reduction in that it selects a 
group of things and gives them a property which makes it possible to consider 
them a single entity68  
 
The way that humans verbalize their “knowledge” of the universe allows them to 
highlight or neglect an infinite number of interpretations.  
Even the question “are we alone?” contains countless unexplored premises that 
are filled in by common cultural mythology.  Who, for example, is the “We” that seeks to 
know if they are alone?  Presumably the “we” represents humanity as a species, but this 
need not be the case.  In order to be meaningful, the question presupposes that the 
existence of other life on the planet Earth does not warrant a negative response to the 
question.  If the life forms on Earth do not meet the criteria for a definitive answer, it is 
difficult to know what would.  Many astrobiologists speculate that extraterrestrials will 
be so alien to humanity that we may fail to recognize them as life.69  These gaps in 
linguistic certainty allow individuals to infuse something nonideological (the state of the 
universe) with ideological content (humanity is special and perfectible).70  
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In addition to being a powerful form of myth because of its appearance of being 
nonideological, the societal view of the universe as timeless also adds to the effectiveness 
of cosmological rhetoric.  Barthes argues that effective myth makes the contingent appear 
eternal.71  If the Soviets did find aliens engaged in class struggle on Mars it would give 
credence to their belief that dialectic materialism was an inevitable result of the nature of 
the universe.  Conversely, the Institute of Astrobotany, in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist 
Republic, predicted that if life were not found on Mars it would be “clear disproof of the 
philosophical basis of Communism.”72  Definitive proof one way or another of life could 
represent a powerful rhetorical appeal, even though the existence or absence of 
Communists on Mars or other planets does not necessitate the truth or falsity of Marxist 
philosophy.  Similarly, Plato, unable to persuade Callicles of the error in his ethics, 
accuses him of being out of sync with the universe.73   The appeal to the eternal calls 
upon a force viewed as more powerful than any human creation.  Ethics, art, and politics 
are intrinsically contingent (in that they could be rearranged to exist in a different 
formation by human action); individuals see the structure of the universe as necessary.  
Society generally views rhetorical appeals to necessary forces as less arbitrary and thus 
these appeals prove more effective. 
The third reason that cosmology represents a particularly powerful myth is 
because of its connection to the physical location that we inhabit.  Michael Hyde 
identifies the ethos of rhetoric as “discourse [that] is used to transform space and time 
into ‘dwelling places’ with the hope that “we might feel more at home with others and 
                                                
71 Barthes, Mythologies, 142. 
72 Shklovskii and Sagan, Intelligent Life in the Universe, viii. 
73 Plato, "Gorgias," 507e-08a.   
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our surroundings.”74  This passage introduces a series of essays on the various ways that 
language makes sense out of the world; absent these discourses everyday human 
existence would appear chaotic and inhospitable.  At the risk of taking the idea of 
“dwelling places” too literally, I propose that the cosmologies used to describe the 
universe humanity inhabits represent an a priori rhetorical ethos function.  Before 
discussions of complex social relations can develop there needs to exist a sense of what it 
means to live in the world, which in turn necessitates a way of interpreting the cosmos.  
Absent the existence of an ethos of place, humans could only perceive the universe as 
terrifying randomness.   
The appearance of being grounded in objective fact, of being eternal, and its 
connection to humanity’s literal “dwelling place” all make cosmology a particularly 
powerful myth.  Cosmological myths can be so powerful that it is sometimes difficult to 
accept it as a rhetorical construction, but as Heidegger writes,  
 
Who the human being is—for philosophy, the answer to this problem is not 
inscribed somewhere in heaven…the essence of human being is never an answer, 
but is essentially a question…The question cannot be asked adequately within the 
domain of traditional metaphysics, which essentially remains “physics.”75   
 
Despite their power to shape events, cosmologies will always tell us more about those 
who construct and use them then they will about some objective reality.  Humanity’s 
                                                
74 Michael J. Hyde, The Ethos of Rhetoric (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), xiiv. 
75 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 149. 
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“being” is not written into the stars, but can become manifest in the way humans position 
themselves in relation to the stars. 
Finally, one must recognize the important role of the rhetoric of science in 
bolstering the persuasive power of the unity cosmology.  All of the case studies I examine 
draw on empiricism to ground their philosophical, religious, and ethical claims.  Most of 
the scholarship on the rhetoric of science examines scientific discourses following the 
1600s. Peter Dear, for example, locates the consolidation of scientific discourse within 
the scientific societies of the 1640s and 1650s.76  These works have enormous value for 
my understanding final two case studies, which take place with a firmly established 
scientific discourse.  They also may potentially illuminate nascent scientific discourses in 
my first two chapters. 
Scientific rhetoric plays a powerful role in conditioning audiences to accept 
arguments. Philip Wander argues that the standard of scientific refutation forecloses the 
avenues of response to all but others versed in the discourse.77  This means the scientists’ 
ethos stands in for the ability of the audience to understand the specifics of the scientific 
arguments.78  This is important because despite its claims to objectivity, scientific 
discourse can easily serve as a conduit to hide metaphysical assumptions.79  I argue 
precisely that the scientific framework of the unity case studies I examine serves to help 
justify the religious, political, and ethical of the authors.  Once framed as a scientific 
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question the issues of the trueness of unity, become difficult to separate from the 
ideological implications put forward by the rhetors. 
The scientific framework also shields a large part of the unity argument from 
examination by the public.  If one continues with the view of the cosmological argument 
as an enthymeme, than science supports the first premise: “we are alone.”  Given the 
strong intellectual ethos of all of the case studies I examine it should come as no surprise 
that many audience members take their scientific justifications of unity as truth.  With 
one premise so grounded in common thinking that it need not be stated (singularity 
makes something special) and the other (we are singular) shielded from popular inquiry 
by its scientific nature, its little surprise that the cosmological argument from unity has 
remained such a force throughout history. 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
Individuals throughout history do not make use of the unity cosmology as some trite 
metaphor or simple observation of fact.  Plato first deployed the unity cosmology in one 
of history’s greatest culture wars in order to undermine his sophist opponents. His anti-
sophists’ victory proved a decisive moment in the history of Western philosophical 
thinking. From then until now, the discussion of alien life frequently intertwines itself 
with political, religious, and philosophical debates.  The unity cosmology’s denial of 
alien life helps its proponents imagine a purposeful, teleological existence for mankind 
that poses a serious challenge to relativistic viewpoints that eschew seeing history as so 
purpose-driven.  The unity cosmology represents an argumentative strategy thousands of 
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years old, but largely unexplored by rhetoricians.  This dissertation fills this lacuna in the 
communication literature, by exploring how this argumentative strategy exists throughout 
history and has evolved through time. 
In addition to its role in many ongoing debates the unity cosmology acts to 
construct rhetorically what it means to be human.  Society’s privilege of a rhetorical 
ethos structured around the idea of human perfection means extraterrestrial discoveries 
have the potential to prove highly destabilizing.  Much as the “discovery” of the 
American continents by the Europeans resulted in ideological confusion and ultimately 
violence, an ethos built on the unity cosmology confines the range of human responses to 
evidence of alien life to panic or some form of violence (whether physical or discursive).  
The constitution of identity in relation to the nonexistence of alien life proves a 
crucial concern for the Communication discipline.  In partial reference to extraterrestrial 
life, John Durham Peters writes,  
 
“man” suddenly found many of the distinction—of species, mechanism, gender 
and divinity—that had once sustained his status as lord over the earth 
unprecedentedly permeable.  The failure to recognize the paranormal and the 
inhuman as founding questions for communication theory in our time goes 
together with the failure to recognize the inhuman when it stares back at you from 
the mirror.  Both are containment strategies, props supporting a dangerously 
brittle identity. 80 
 
                                                
80 John Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
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Peters rightly makes the case that dichotomies and distinctions exist at the heart of 
communication.  The unity cosmology intersects with these dichotomies because it 
presupposes alien life does not exist and thus represents an a priori “no” to the question 
of whether academics should carve out space for “aliens” within communicative theory.  
My dissertation is the first in-depth case study in the way that a cosmology acts as 
rhetoric. The exploration of the unity cosmology as argument strategy and rhetorical 
ethos function should present an important addition to scholarship and open the door to 
rhetorical examination of other cosmological beliefs. 
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2.0  PLATO’S RHETORICAL COSMOLOGY: THE UNITY OF THE 
WORLD AS FOUNDATIONAL MYTH  
The theme of relativism versus absolutes emerges in almost all of Plato’s dialogues.81  
Plato believed in absolute values, the Good, Beautiful, and True, which exist 
independently of human society and culture. From these ideals Plato extrapolated the 
desirability of leading good lives, defined by behavior such as acting justly and 
placing group needs over individual needs.82  The prevailing intellectual zeitgeist of 
the time favored relativism, as championed by Plato’s nemeses, the sophists.  In 
contrast to the Good, Beautiful and True, sophists typically defended more relativistic 
worldviews.  Protagoras’ maxim summed up this relativism: “of all things the measure 
is man, of the things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are 
not.”83  The passage represents the view that all values exist only as social constructs; 
no values exist outside of human minds.  This had serious implications for Plato’s 
efforts to get others to lead good lives.  Under Protagoras’s relativistic framework, 
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murder, for example, is not intrinsically wrong, but only bad because society has 
proclaimed it so.  Plato believed relativism incentivized selfish and evil behavior, even 
if the sophists who proclaimed it had no intention of encouraging malevolence.  
Protagoras’s specific maxim “man is the measure” so disturbed Plato that he devoted 
extensive attention to it, beyond his commonly severe treatment of relativism 
generally.84  As Ugo Zilioli writes, “[Protagoras] and his relativism were indeed the 
most dangerous enemy for [Plato] and the kind of objectivist doctrines he 
maintained.”85 
The debate between Plato and the sophists ultimately took place in the public 
sphere, with consequences for Greek society.  During the time Plato wrote his 
dialogues (387 B.C.E.-347 B.C.E.) the sophists grew in prominence.  As public 
speeches, trials, and voting occurred with more frequency and held more importance, a 
sophistic education became a valuable commodity, which raised the public standing of 
the teachers.86  The influence of the sophists challenged the traditional ethics and 
social structure of Athens, because their ideas suggested that rather than being divine 
and preordained, the organization of society existed as only one of many possible 
systems.  This opened class stratification up to criticism, provided the skills necessary 
to challenge authority, and offered an intellectual justification for democracy.87 While 
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Plato had his own criticisms of Greek society, the changes the sophists heralded were 
anathema to his beliefs.  He believed sophistic ideas encouraged selfishness and unjust 
behavior, by dethroning traditional notions of the good.  He felt compelled to weigh 
into the public debate against relativism and for absolute values, throughout his 
dialogues.  
The consuming nature of Plato’s battle against relativism makes his decision to 
write a cosmology surprising at first.  His conflict with the sophists over the nature of 
values occurred in the here and now, the state of the structure of the universe does not 
appear to have much relevance for how one should structure society.  The division 
between cosmology and practical philosophy widens even more when one examines 
the practice of astronomy at the time.  The presocratic cosmologists, who set the terms 
for cosmological thinking, largely took a scientific approach that is empirical and not 
involving recourse to traditional myth to answer cosmological questions.  Their 
method removed (if not entirely detached) their cosmologies from ethical concerns. 
Plato even criticized, in his early and middle dialogues, the practice of cosmology for 
its failure to synthesize the physical structure of the universe with morality.  Ignoring 
cosmology except to remark on its problems, Plato focused on a variety of other 
rhetorical strategies to win over public opinion to his beliefs in absolute values.   
In his early and middle dialogues, Plato uses math, logic, dialectic, and, above 
all, myths to make his case for the Good, Beautiful, and True.  Plato based his own 
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myths on traditional Greek ones, as he hoped to capture their rhetorical power to sway 
his audiences.88  In his later dialogues, however, Plato attempts, in what has become a 
decisive moment in the history of Western thought, a new argumentative strategy 
based in scientific cosmology to defeat his sophistic opponents in the market place of 
ideas.89  
In the Timaeus he constructs a cosmology that in many ways mirrors the style 
of the presocratics, but he connects the structure of the universe with the existence of 
absolute values.  One can simplify Plato’s argument in the basic form of a syllogism, 
A. If humanity is unique in the universe; 
B. And uniqueness represents value and access to perfection; 
C. Then humanity is valuable and has access to perfection. 
Plato’s cosmology merges his philosophical and ethical ideals about living just 
lives with an argument about the structure of the universe.  Most presocratics scientist, 
like Democritus, Anaximander, Thales and Anaximenes, defended a plurality of 
worlds. These figures, however, treated this cosmological question as distinct from 
issues of philosophy, ethics, and politics.90  Plato defended a unity cosmology with the 
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Earth holding a central position and representing a unique abode for life and connected 
this universal structure with a value system. Plato borrows the scientific framework of 
the presocratics to legitimize his own cosmology and then infuses his depiction of the 
universe with meaning for how to appropriately live.  Plato’s cosmological argument 
connects humanity’s cosmic aloneness with the need for the kind of just behavior that 
Plato advocated. This resulted in a scientific cosmology with mythological traits. 
This chapter contends that Plato’s connection of unity with the Good, 
Beautiful, and True, succeeded in advancing his beliefs, far beyond his previous 
strategies. The connection of scientifically-deduced unity with absolute morality 
struck a chord with audiences.  His cosmology and its philosophical implications 
became a dominant meme throughout Western history and with it, so did the idea of 
the unity of the world.  However, one must remember, as discussed in the previous 
chapter , that all myth’s rhetorical power emerges from connecting the contingent to 
the eternal.  Plato’s scientific-mythic cosmology functions no differently.  Audiences 
may find the connection of unity with absolute values aesthetically pleasing, but it 
ultimately lacks a logical foundation as an argument.  Plato deploys respect for science 
and awe at the eternal nature of the universe, in the service of his philosophical 
agenda. 91 As we will see, Plato’s cosmology can be read as a rhetorical strategy in his 
ongoing debate with the sophists, rather than as a claim of absolute truth.  
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For Plato, victory over the sophists, rather than an accurate description of the 
universe, represents the telos (in a rhetorical reading better framed as techne) of his 
cosmology.92  In order to make this case, the chapter traces the evolution of Plato’s 
thought from his disdain of cosmology to his use of it as a rhetorical strategy. The first 
section details the state of cosmology during the era, including Plato’s hostile attitude 
towards it in his early dialogues.93  This early hostility gives credence to the 
hypothesis that Plato’s deployment of cosmology primarily represents a rhetorical 
response to the sophists rather than a necessary component of Platonic thought. The 
second section highlights Plato’s creation of myths written in defense of his 
philosophy, in his early and middle dialogues.  These writings, based on traditional 
Greek myths, act as a rhetorical strategy against sophistic relativism.  Plato’s use of 
traditional myth establishes a model, which he later uses to graft a mythic dimension 
onto a scientific cosmology.  The third section examines the way Plato shifts to 
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cosmology as argument for human beings’ singularity in the universe.  The final 
section examines the consequences of this rhetorical maneuver for Plato’s thought and 
investigates the way that his attack on relativism becomes intertwined with the unity 
cosmology to the point where many thinkers throughout history see attacks on unity as 
attacks on absolute values. 
2.1 STATE OF COSMOLOGY AND PLATO’S EARLY DIALOGUES 
Before Plato developed his earliest ideas there was a proliferation of cosmologies that 
coincided with the development of Greek scientific thought.  Thales, Anaximander, 
and Anaximenes became the first “physicists,” a term for those who study the natural 
world, including the universe.  These early physicists embarked on a project drastically 
unlike those of the previous intellectual currents.  Guthrie provides a succinct 
explanation, 
 
The questions which excited them were of this kind: Can this apparently 
confused and disordered world be reduced to simpler principles so that our 
reason can grasp what it is and how it works? What is it made of? How does 
change take place? Why do things spring up and grow, then decline and die?  
How can one explain the alternation of day and night, summer and winter?  
They claim our attention by having been the first to suggest that answers to 
these questions may be found by taking thought. They abandoned mythological 
and substituted intellectual solutions.  There might or might not be a divine 
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mind at the back of, or permeating, the works of nature (that was a question to 
which some of them sought an answer), but it was no longer satisfying to say 
that storms were roused by the wrath of Poseidon, or death caused by the 
arrows of Apollo or Artemis. A world ruled by anthropomorphic gods of the 
kind in which their contemporaries believed — gods human in their passions as 
well as in their outward form — was a world ruled by caprice. Philosophy and 
science start with the bold confession of faith that not caprice but an inherent 
orderliness underlies the phenomena, and the explanation of nature is to be 
sought within nature itself.94  
 
Thinkers like Heraclitus, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, Diogenes of Apollonia, 
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Philolaus, and Democritus, followed in the initial 
physicists’ footsteps.   
Cosmology served as the focus of much of the scientific thinking of the 
physicists and their intellectual decedents. The physicists, however, did not agree on 
the details of their cosmologies. For example, Thales postulated the Earth floated on a 
bed of water, whereas Democritus believed void surrounded the Earth. But all 
physicists shared a commitment to a nascent scientific method.  The physicists and 
their intellectual heirs broke with the previous cosmologies that relied on religious 
explanations for the creation and function of the universe, and instead offered 
                                                
94 William Keith Chambers Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy: The Earlier Presocratics and the 
Pythagoreans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 44-45.  
 41 
cosmologies built on natural explanations derived from logic and observation. 95  
These thinkers in most cases isolated their scientific observations from their religious 
and moral thinking.96  The gulf between empirical observation and logical speculation, 
and ethical principles kept one major intellectual contemporary of the Greek 
                                                
95 Several prominent early works challenged the idea that the presocratic cosmologists operated under a 
scientific methodology.  Cornford and Jaeger argue that the work of the presocratics resembled theology 
much more than science.  Francis MacDonald Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the 
Origins of Western Speculation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Francis MacDonald 
Cornford, Principium  Sapientiae (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952); Werner Wilhelm 
Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).  
Even at the time of its writing, however, Cornford’s thesis stood out as a highly contrarian position.  
The view of the presocratics as primarily theological or not scientific has largely faded from the 
academic discourse, although the question of how scientific the presocratics were remains open for 
debate.  Even if the presocratics did not endorse all of the elements of modern science, however, they 
are widely credited as either founding the discipline or among its earliest practitioners.  Gregory 
Vlastos, "Cornford’s Principium Sapientiae," in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, ed. David J. Furley 
and R. E. Allen (New York: Humanities, 1970), 50-55; Walter Burkert, "The Logic of Cosmogony," in 
From Myth to Reason?: Studies in the Development of Greek Thought, ed. Richard Buxton (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 104-06; Hussey, The Presocratics, 154, 55; Keimpe Algra, "The 
Beginnings of Cosmology," in The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 60-63; M. R. Wright, Cosmology in Antiquity, 
Sciences of antiquity (London: Routledge, 1995), 4, 5; Gregory Vlastos, "Ethics and Physics in 
Democritus," in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, ed. R. E. Allen and David J. Furley (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1975), 383; Vlastos, Plato's Universe, 18-22; Nicholas Rescher, 
Cosmos and Cognition: Studies in Greek Philosophy (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2005), 26; Karl 
Popper, "Back to the Presocratics," in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, ed. David J. Furley and R. E. 
Allen (New York: Humanities, 1970); G. S. Kirk, "Popper on Science and the Presocratics," in Studies 
in Presocratic Philosophy, ed. David J. Furley and R. E. Allen (New York: Humanities Press, 1970). 
96 Furley argues that Pythagoras’ cosmology may have been the first to merge the new scientific 
thinking with religious and ethical beliefs.  David J. Furley, The Greek Cosmologists (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 59.  Furley does not provide a response to Walter Burkert’s well-
argued case against Pythagoras as a scientist. Walter Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient 
Pythagoreanism, trans. Edwin L. Minar Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 208-17.  
More recently, Huffman goes back through the fragments from Pythagoras and his followers and 
demonstrates that many of the scientific views attributed to Pythagoras really belong to his students.  
Huffman argues, “Pythagoreanism has no room for examination of ideas and philosophical argument 
but is based on the authority of its founder.  The later tradition reports that Pythagoreans felt no need to 
argue for positions and rested content with the primary assertion that ‘he himself said it.’”  Pythagoreas’ 
student Empedocles later shows how Pythagorean ideas are compatible with scientific theories and 
another follower Philolaus moves away from the metaphysical aspects of Pythagoreanism to develop its 
scientific and mathematical aspects.  Carl A. Huffman, "The Pythagorian tradition," in The Cambridge 
Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 75, 76-85.  Even if Plato is not the first to make the connection between scientific cosmology and 
ethical values he still deserves study.  Coming second to the Pythagoreans, Plato’s cosmology would 
still be among the first uses of a scientific cosmology to justify ethics and more definitively the first of 
such cosmologies that persist to this day. Later in the chapter I present the divergent scholarly on to 
what extent Plato’s cosmology represented a scientific endeavor.   
 42 
cosmologists, Socrates, from dabbling in the practice. 97  Plato, Socrates’ most famous 
student, appeared to take a similar approach in his early dialogues.     
In the Phaedo Plato depicts Socrates as initially intrigued by the ideas of 
Anaxagoras, one of the earliest Greek cosmologists, “I was ready to find out in the 
same way about the sun and the moon and the other heavenly bodies, about their 
relative speed, their turnings and whatever else happened to them, how it is best that 
each should act or be acted upon.”98  Socrates sees potential in cosmology to act as a 
method for truly understanding the Good.  Upon reading Anaxagoras’ writings, 
however, Socrates realizes that Anaxagoras does not describe cosmology in terms of 
what is good, but instead as the result of a series of scientific processes.  He claims 
Anaxagoras wastes his time because he does not examine the celestial objects through 
the lens of their “capacity of being in the best place they could possibly be put.”99  
Anaxagoras’ materialist approach displeases Socrates because it fails to provide a 
model for the Good that can be useful on Earth.  Plato argues that if the stars rotate in 
the best possible arrangement it would help elucidate principles of the Good that could 
be helpful in social interactions.  Plato makes clear his critique extends beyond 
Anaxagoras to all of the cosmologists of the time when he describes Socrates as 
saying, 
  
It is what the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it 
a cause, thus giving it a name that does not belong to it.  That is why one man 
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surrounds the earth with a vortex to make the heavens keep it in place, another 
makes the air support it like a wide lid.100  
 
Here Plato references ideas that from the popular cosmologies of the time in order to 
dismiss the field as “groping in the dark.” 
Similarly, in the Thaetetus, Plato has Socrates retell an old joke about the 
astronomer Thales, rumored to have fallen in a well because he was so distracted 
staring at the stars.101  Socrates goes on to contrast astronomers with true philosophers, 
who concern themselves with issues critical for how to live on Earth.  Plato sets up a 
crucial contrast between astronomy and his own search for the Good, the Beautiful, 
and the True.  Astronomers disconnect themselves from the daily affairs of humanity, 
preferring to “keep their heads in the clouds.”  In contrast, Plato believes philosophers 
should focus their attention on how one should best live her or his life. 
Socrates initially objected to astronomy because astronomers focused on 
celestial objects to the exclusion of important questions on Earth.  This can be read as 
an indictment of the way certain astronomers practiced their craft rather than the 
discipline of astronomy.  A different astronomy could potentially avoid this criticism, 
for example, if one examined astronomy from the perspective of the Good.  Plato, 
however, provides additional critiques of astronomy in Rival Lovers and Republic that 
are more intrinsically connected to the practice of astronomy itself. 
In the Rival Lovers Socrates stumbles upon two boys debating astronomy, or as 
an onlooker in the dialogue points out, “babbling about things up in the sky and 
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talking philosophical nonsense.”102  Socrates takes offense at the idea that philosophy 
is nonsense, but later in the dialogue seems to agree that what the boys were doing was 
nonsense.  One rival lover tries to convince Socrates that philosophy means learning as 
much as possible in all the subjects.  Socrates indicates that the true philosopher must 
specialize solely in philosophy and not dilute knowledge by learning so many different 
subjects.  Socrates suggests that the rival lovers may have thought they were 
discussing philosophy, but in reality they were discussing astronomy and thinking it 
was philosophical. Although the dialogue focuses on academic pluralism in general, 
the fact that it begins with an argument about cosmology suggests Plato rejects 
cosmology as part of the philosophical project.  The idea that cosmology detracts from 
one’s ability at philosophy ends the possibility (still an open question in the Phaedo) 
that one could carry out cosmology in a philosophical manner. 
In the Republic, Plato includes astronomy in the list of subjects that should be 
studied by the guardians, which at first appears to represent a major change in his 
thought.  He, however, believes that astronomy should be dramatically reenvisioned  
from the way astronomers conducted it at the time.  He refers to the current 
astronomers as those who seek to understand higher powers by, “studying ornaments 
on a ceiling.”103  The actual celestial objects move too “slow or fast” for Plato, 
meaning that their actual physical movements do not conform to the Good as defined 
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as “geometrical figures.”104  Plato believes that rather than studying the actual orbits of 
celestial objects, astronomy should act as a form of four-dimensional geometry.  This 
approach would have students work on theoretical problems involving mathematic 
ratios and “leave the things in the sky alone.”105  Plato’s theoretical astronomy 
required students to focus on perfect ratios and other harmonious constructions rather 
than the messy reality of celestial movement.  Plato suggests that looking for higher 
meaning in celestial motion represents a danger, because the objects move in 
discordant ways.  For Plato the study of discord is not compatible with a search for the 
Good.   
These four dialogues indicate that Plato had little use for cosmology.  In the 
Phaedo Plato argues that cosmology is something different than the philosophical 
project.  In the Thaetetus he jokes about how astronomers focus so much attention to 
the stars that they cannot see what lies directly in front of them.  In Rival Lovers he 
expands this critique to say that studying cosmology detracts from one’s ability as a 
philosopher.  In the Republic he goes further saying that studying celestial movements 
actually gives a warped sense of the Good, because the celestial objects move in an 
unharmonious manner.  Given the importance of harmony to Plato’s philosophy this 
last criticism represents a fairly serious indictment of astronomy.   
Despite these seemingly harsh criticisms, however, the cosmologists in Plato’s 
early and middle dialogues play relatively peripheral roles as intellectual antagonists.  
For the most part Plato does not attack the practice of cosmology directly.  Instead, he 
accuses it of failing to confront the issues of ethics and morality at the center of his 
                                                
104 Ibid.,  VII 529d.  
105 Ibid.,  VII 530 b-c    
 46 
dialogues.  Despite his suggestion that astronomy warps one’s ethical values, Plato 
realized that many of the cosmologists of the time actually shared his values.  
Democritus proposed the cosmology most in opposition to the cosmology Plato later 
presents in the Timaeus, where random chance and chaos represent the dominant 
forces in the universe.  Yet Democritus agreed with Plato on many important issues of 
ethics and morality and specifically opposed Protagoras’ dictum, “Man is the measure 
of all things.”106  But in his later dialogues, Plato would not only directly assail the 
prevailing cosmologies, but also create his own cosmology that was rooted in his 
philosophy of the Good, the Beautiful and the True.  In order to understand why Plato 
advances his own cosmology in his later dialogues and viciously attacks (rather than 
indirectly reproaches) other cosmologists one needs to examine Plato’s rhetorical 
strategies throughout his early and middle dialogues.  One of these strategies was to 
employ traditional myth in his argumentation.  When that failed, Plato turned, as we 
will see, to empiricism. 
2.2 MYTH AND RHETORIC IN PLATO’S DIALOGUES 
In his early and middle dialogues Plato relied extensively on traditional myth in order 
to persuade others of his beliefs.  In his later dialogues he shifts away from such a 
heavy dependence on traditional mythology.  Cosmological appeals become Plato’s 
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new argument strategy to convince others to believe in the Good, Beautiful, and True.  
The next section traces Plato’s use of myth in order to provide the background for 
Plato’s cosmological turn.  
Plato’s grasp of the power of traditional myth played an important part in his 
repertoire of persuasion he deployed in his dialogues.  He understood that mythology 
played a crucial role in shaping the beliefs of a citizenry, independent from that 
mythology’s relation to fact.  Plato’s philosophical program centered on the Good, 
Beautiful, and True, but the Sophists and others had placed these ideas under relentless 
attack from the perspective of relativism and materialism. The supernatural figures of 
traditional mythology allowed Plato to ground his conceptions of the Good, Beautiful, 
and True in a veneer of the eternal, just as the Homeric mythology had provided a 
foundation for Greek ethics.107  One should not be surprised then that all of Plato’s 
dialogues have “mythical characters and motifs” and starting with the Protagoras and 
Gorgias (regarded as the last of the dialogues from Plato’s early period), all of Plato’s 
dialogues contain myths (here I mean the mythology in the traditional sense of 
legendary stories).108  Some of the myths are well-known legends altered or combined 
to help him make his point.  Other myths, like the tale of Atlantis, Plato likely made up 
entirely.109   
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Partenie argues that Plato used traditional myth to make his philosophy more 
accessible.110  She makes a compelling case, but the evidence also suggests that Plato 
understood the rhetorical power of myth.  This does not represent a simplification of 
his philosophy useful solely in expanding the audience, but rather draws on the power 
of myth as a persuasive device.111  In the Republic, Plato argues that individuals,  
 
shape their children’s souls with [myths] more than they shape their bodies by 
handling them….The young can’t distinguish what is allegorical from what 
isn’t, and the opinions they absorb at that age are hard to erase and apt to 
become unalterable.112  
 
Plato believed that teaching children myths could ensure that their opinions become 
“unalterable,” which if true represents a strong rhetorical tactic. Although in this quote 
he references children, Plato later goes on to discuss the power of myth more generally 
when he says the poets, “persuaded many people to believe” the myth of the Ages of 
Man.113 Plato believes that myths so easily persuade the public that a myth with a 
problematic moral should be hidden from the public even if it is true.114   Plato’s 
respect for the power of myths to shape society makes it unsurprising that he made 
frequent use of them. 
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In the Timaeus, Plato has Critias tell the tale of the city of Atlantis.  According 
to the story Atlantis was a “vast power” that eclipsed all of Athen’s accomplishments 
“in magnitude and excellence.”115  Despite the city’s military strength and technical 
achievements, however, it ultimately collapsed because it lacked justice.  The myth 
serves as a cautionary tale for those that would put the search for material gain ahead 
of morality.  In the Gorgias, Plato tells of gods judging the souls of humans in the 
afterlife as a justification for good behavior.116  This myth functions very similarly to 
the myth of Atlantis.  Material pleasures at the expense of just behavior in the present 
risk punishment in the future.  
Unfortunately for Plato, the use of traditional myths, which centered on 
divinities, mystical locals, and ancient peoples, posed two distinct problems.  The 
existence of a long-held set of mythological beliefs passed on through the work of the 
poets, in which the gods and goddesses behaved in ways unbefitting the Good, 
Beautiful and, True, represented the first obstacle to Plato’s use of myths.  Plato had 
no ability to distinguish the truth-value of the new and altered myths he told as 
arguments for his philosophy, from the old Greek myths, which contained wanton sex, 
violence, and other dishonorable activities.  The problematic morals of Greece’s 
prevailing mythology troubled Plato so deeply that he vehemently attacked the poets, 
whose mythology he believed promoted values inconsistent with his philosophy.117  
Even though one could use myth for noble causes, the degenerate nature of Greek 
myths made this a difficult endeavor.  
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Nor could Plato simply create his own myths with good morals to replace the 
common myths.  In the Republic, the character Adeimantus expresses the difficulty 
involved in generating new, superior myths and separating his new good myths from 
Greece’s old problematic myth, 
 
If [the gods] do exist and do concern themselves with us, we’ve learned all we 
know about them from the laws and the poets who give their genealogies--
nowhere else.  But these are the very people who tell us that the gods can be 
persuaded and influenced by sacrifice, gentle prayers and offerings.118 
 
The Gods of Homeric myth did not believe in absolute ideals like Plato, but rather, like 
the sophists taught their patrons, one could “persuade” the gods with rhetoric in the 
form of “prayers and offerings.”119  Socrates later agrees and says that it would take a 
sustained effort to entrench a new myth and it would likely take at least a generation 
before the public believed it.120 Most of Plato’s myths begin by him retelling a legend 
that he has overheard, which would have no more claim to truth than the old myths 
that children would have been taught from a young age.  
The move to secularism in Athens represents the second problem for Plato’s 
use of traditional myths.  Even if Plato effectively created and disseminated a myth, it 
may not have done him much good as Athenians at the time began a serious move 
away from old-fashioned myths centered on Gods, heroes, and monsters.  The massive 
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suffering of the plague caused morality to collapse as people struggled for survival.121  
The Peloponnesian league defeated Athens subjecting the city to rule by tyrants for 
thirty years, which called into question the idea of divine protection.122  Playwrights 
publically attacked religious attitudes.  Euripides used his plays to ask how the Gods 
could exist in the face of such extensive misery.  Critias’ play Sisyphus had a leader 
who invented a religion to better control the population, much as Plato literally 
suggests in the Republic. The emergence of materialist cosmologies must have added 
another argument in favor of abandoning the traditional religious ethics.  Whether or 
not materialism actually became the majority opinion among Athenians, it had taken 
hold of the intellectual climate and many scholars believe that Plato personally felt that 
it held enormous sway over academic discourse.123 
The difficulties facing traditional myth may lead one to question why Plato 
relied on them throughout his dialogues.  Some truth likely lies in Partenie’s claim that 
myth helped elucidate points in ways that made the dialogues more broadly accessible.  
Brisson argues that passages in the Protagoras and Timaeus suggest audiences like 
hearing myths for aesthetic reasons.124  Beyond these motives, Plato likely hoped to 
find a way to recapture the previous power of myth to control the population.  As 
many problems as Plato had with the Homeric myths, the societal move away from 
them coincided with the rise of the sophists.  These traditional myths, as flawed as 
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they were, had helped create a barrier to relativism that had held for much of Greece’s 
history.   
In fact, only after the disasters befell Athens and the public faith was shaken 
did sophists and others really begin to point out the problematic morals of Homeric 
mythology.  Atheism helped give rise to relativistic thinking, which allowed for 
individuals to problematize the content of the Homeric myths, which opened up more 
individuals to atheistic thinking.  This cycle made the two problems for traditional 
myth I identified above mutually reinforcing.  By using traditional myth Plato likely 
felt he could appeal to those that still believed in traditional mythology, but now heard 
Pindar and others point out that Homeric myth’s questionable content did not justify 
moral behavior.125  Plato hoped to create a new mythology, similar in structure to the 
traditional myths, but harmonious with his philosophical ideals.  This new mythology 
could potentially stop the self-reinforcing move away from myths and return the social 
stability that existed before the sophists. 
Unwilling to surrender the use of mythology, but aware of the difficulties I 
mentioned above, Plato explored techniques to recapture the power of the traditional 
myths and deploy them to support his philosophy.  In the Republic, Plato advocates 
sustained effort to eliminate many of the older traditional myths from Homer and 
Hesiod,  
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We must first of all, it seems, supervise the storytellers.  We’ll select their 
stories whenever they are fine or beautiful and reject them when they aren’t… 
Many of the stories they tell now, however, must be thrown out.126 
 
Plato goes so far in the Republic, as to endorse legal censorship of myths that he 
believed were problematic.127  This move suggests Plato’s undying belief in the power 
of myth to shape society if deployed correctly.   
Plato’s call to censor the myth-telling poets in his middle dialogues represents 
a radical shift from his early dialogues. Vlastos summarizes the severity of the change 
between Socrates in Plato’s early and middle dialogues when he writes,  
 
[Early Socrates’] mission ‘to live philosophizing, examining [him]self and 
others’ (Ap. 28e), those ‘others’ being ‘anyone of you I happen to meet,… 
young or old, citizen or alien’ (29d-30d).  He believes that ‘the unexamined life 
is not worth living by a human being’ (Ap. 38a).”  By contrast, [Socrates’] 
project in the Republic, where only “an exceptionally gifted, rigorously trained 
elite” practice philosophy “after they have completed their qualifying 
mathematical studies,” would appear to [early Socrates] to “condemn the great 
majority of its citizens… to life ‘not worth living by a human being.’  In the 
whole history of Western thought no philosophy has been more populist in its 
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outreach than [early Socrates’], none more elitist than Socrates’ [middle 
period].128 
 
Here, given the adverse historical circumstances, it may not have been that Plato 
became more elitist, so much as he was desperately searching for any strategy that 
would bring people to the Good.   
Plato’s own early and middle dialogues suggest that his philosophy had 
difficulty making converts, whether he spread his ideas to everyone or tried to restrict 
them to the elite.  In the Gorgias, for example, Socrates says that most people agree 
with Callicles, the nihilistic, self-interested, materialist. 129 In other words, Plato’s 
potential audience was more interested in unsavory ideas than in the Good.  Similarly, 
Plato has his characters lament how easily the public is misled in the Republic. 130  
Plato’s desire to restrict the audience of his philosophy may have been a result of 
practical, rather than philosophical reasons.  Rather than suggest that Plato gave up on 
the philosophical project it seems more likely that Plato’s failure to impact social 
practice meaningfully by dialogue alone made him more cognizant of the realities of 
creating a society based on the Good.  Even though the citizens of the Republic may 
not have lived examined lives, Plato reasoned the Guardians could trick them into 
leading good lives.   
Unfortunately for Plato, the model in the Republic also faces numerous 
problems as a method for encouraging people to live a good life.  Plato does not even 
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seem very enthusiastic about the chances of an ideal city coming about in the 
Republic.  This view may have been further bolstered by a failed attempt by Plato to 
direct the governance of Syracuse.131  The Timaeus begins with the story of Atlantis, a 
city in the model of the Plato’s ideal republic that ultimately collapses because of 
hubris.  This further indicates that by the time Plato writes the Timaeus his belief that 
the governmental structure represents a sound starting point for ethical change has 
dissipated. 
2.3 SCIENCE, MATHEMATICS, AND EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT 
IN PLATO’S DIALOGUES  
Given the public rejection of traditional myths generally, the ubiquity of problematic 
traditional myths and the difficulty of imposing new traditional myths, it is 
unsurprising that Plato would try other strategies to lead individuals to the Good.  
Among these strategies one can find moves by Plato to use scientific and empirical 
argument that foreshadow his turn to cosmology.  In the Meno, for example, Plato 
presents an experiment with a slave boy to prove that morality exist independently 
from the human mind.132  No evidence exists as to whether this experiment convinced 
others of his philosophy, although its absence from Plato’s other dialogues suggests it 
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did not.  Evidence does exist for the public reaction to another attempt to offer 
evidence for the Good, Beautiful, and True.  Plato reportedly offered a free lecture on 
mathematics, which he attempted to connect with his philosophical program.  His 
lecture ended in disaster when much of the audience left in the middle of his speech.133  
Even if this event did not occur, there is more solid evidence to support the notion that 
the public dismissed Plato’s melding of math and ethics. In Greater Hippias, Plato has 
Hippias reference the population’s disinterest in math and harmony; the very 
alternatives Plato believed could replace ancient myth.134 
Plato’s philosophical project centers on encouraging individuals to lead moral 
lives, but historical evidence and his own dialogues suggest that a sophistic value 
system continued to dominate public thinking.  Plato deployed myth, math, and 
empirical experiments as tools in order to convince his readers and listeners to live 
justly.  If one views Plato’s ultimate goal as persuading individuals to behave in a 
manner befitting the Good, Beautiful, and True, one should not be surprised that Plato 
altered his rhetorical strategies over time in an effort to best reach the most people.   
2.4 PLATO’S RECONCILIATION WITH COSMOLOGY 
Plato first invokes cosmology in a positive light (and may first invoke cosmology at 
all, depending on the chronology of the dialogues) in the Gorgias when Socrates 
debates with Callicles.  Callicles proves a particularly difficult opponent for Plato 
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because of his shameless disregard for the conventional standards of the Good.  
Socrates cannot get Callicles to concede points in the same way he could Gorgias and 
Polus.  The dialogue stretches until Callicles refuses to answer any more questions, 
which he argues are irrelevant to the ethical issues at hand. 135  After Callicles cedes 
the floor, Plato closes the dialogue by referencing both cosmology and the judgment of 
souls.136 The idea that souls will be judged does not seem out of place since Plato 
refers to this myth in his earlier dialogue Phaedo.137  The reference to cosmology does 
seem strange, however, given his critique of it in his other early dialogues.  Plato has 
Socrates say, 
 
Yes, Callicles, wise men claim that partnership and friendship, orderliness, 
self-control, and justice hold together heaven and earth, and gods and men, and 
that is why they call this universe a world order, my friend, and not an 
undisciplined world-disorder. I believe that you don’t pay attention to these 
facts, even though you’re a wise man in these matters.138   
 
The passage does little to explore the details of what he means by “world order,” so 
much so that without further background knowledge it can easily be read 
independently of the structure of the universe.  The Greek words Plato uses strongly 
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suggest that he references the universe, however.139  Given this knowledge, one can 
read this passage to say that something about the structure of the universe justifies 
behaving in concordance with traditional morality.  Callicles’ rejection of “partnership 
and friendship, orderliness, self-control, and justice,” means that he operates out of 
step with the “world order.”  Contrary to Callicles’ belief that nature justified might 
over right, nature in the form of the universe, actually supports just behavior.  This 
quote provides an important milestone in Plato’s thinking, because it connects the 
question of cosmology to ethics.  Plato suggests here that cosmology can serve as 
model for order that guides how humans should live their lives.140   
One should note that in the Gorgias when Plato has Socrates debate a morally 
unscrupulous fellow, like Callicles, Socrates is unsuccessful in his use of dialectic to 
change the mind of his opponent.  The dialogue ends with Plato lecturing Callicles and 
referencing both cosmology and religion (the idea that humans have souls that are 
judged) because Callicles accepts the existence of the soul---a surprise given his 
distaste for traditional ethics and the increasing popular rejection of religion.141   But 
even with Callicle’s belief in the soul it is debatable whether Plato ended the dialogue 
to Socrates’ advantage.  Charles Kaufman argues that Plato’s monologue represented a 
collapse of the dialectic and the equivalent of a Hail Mary turn to a rhetorical 
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appeal.142  Plato’s reliance on metaphysical principles when debating relativistic 
opponents represents a strategy that would likely have begun to lose its effectiveness.  
Nonetheless, this issue provides the context in which Plato begins to write his own 
cosmology in his later dialogues the Timaeus and Laws.   
In the Timaeus, Plato expands on the brief, though important, invocation of 
cosmology found in Gorgias.  Now, however, cosmology—sans judgment in the 
afterlife—serves as the central focus of the dialogue, though the function of 
cosmology remains similar--- a demonstration of why one should live a good life. In 
the middle of the dialogue Plato presents a defense of empirical study in general and 
argues for cosmology specifically as a method to discover the Good: 
 
Let us conclude, then, our discussion of the accompanying auxiliary causes that 
gave our eyes the power which they now possess.  We must next speak of that 
supremely beneficial function for which the god gave them to us.  As my 
account has it, our sight has indeed proved to be a source of supreme benefit to 
us, in that none of our present statements about the universe could ever have 
been made if we had never seen any stars, sun or heaven.  As it is, however, 
our ability to see the periods of day-and-night, of months and of years, of 
equinoxes and solstices, has led to the invention of number, and has given us 
the idea of time and opened the path to inquiry into the nature of the universe.  
These pursuits have given us philosophy. A gift from the gods to the mortal 
race whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed.  I’m quite 
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prepared to declare this to be the supreme good our eyesight offers us.  Why 
then should we exalt all the lesser good things, which a non-philosopher would 
“lament and bewail in vain”?  Let us rather declare that the cause and purpose 
of this supreme good is this: the god invented sight and gave it to us so that we 
might observe the orbits of intelligence in the universe and apply them to the 
revolutions of our own understanding.143 
 
The passage indicates a major change from Plato’s previous attitude towards 
cosmology.  In the Republic Plato specifically denounces an empirical approach to 
astronomy.  Here he advocates using the power of our eyes to chart the heavens.  He 
even claims that scientific exploration of the universe led the way to the development 
of math, and ultimately his cherished practice of philosophy.   
Plato can now advocate an empirical approach, because of the changes in his 
cosmology that made it different from those of other astronomers. Immediately after 
the above passage about empirical observation, Plato discusses one major change: the 
orderly orbit of the celestial objects, 
 
For there is a kinship between them, even thought our revolutions are 
disturbed, whereas the universal orbits are undisturbed.  So once we have come 
to know them and to share in the ability to make correct calculations according 
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to nature, we should stabilize the straying revolutions within ourselves by 
imitating the completely unstraying revolutions of god.144 
 
Unlike humanity the celestial objects move in complete harmony, but this distinction 
does not deny the possibility for “kinship” between them and us.  Once astronomers 
calculate the perfect orbits of the celestial objects, these “unstraying revolutions” can 
serve as a model for how to correctly live.  The ideas of order and harmony have run 
throughout Plato’s dialogues as justifications for absolute values over relativism, 
including his use of math and traditional myths on the judgment of souls.  To model 
oneself on the perfect orbits of the celestial objects means conforming to Plato’s views 
on how to live a just life.  
The justification of an empirical, scientific defense of ethics, while surprising 
given Plato’s previous statements, actually conforms to his ultimate goal of defeating 
relativism.  Plato’s cosmology suggests the very structure of the universe argues 
against Protagoras’ dictum, “man is the measure of all things.”  In the Gorgias, 
Socrates accuses Callicles of acting out of step with the cosmos.  The Timaeus 
provides the empirical justification for why the cosmos denies moral relativism.  A 
comparison of Plato’s cosmology with Democritus’, serves as a useful tool to 
illuminate the ways in which Plato’s Timaeus links science and ethics.  Democritus 
serves as a useful foil because he created the most recent major cosmology, his 
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cosmology most radically opposes Plato’s own, and, because, he shared many of 
Plato’s ethical values despite the differences between them.   
Democritus argued that the universe was comprised of an infinite number of 
atoms (the tiniest component matter can be broken down into).  These atoms moved 
randomly and were distributed randomly.  The combination of random movement and 
infinite atoms results in an infinite number of universes (its difficult to assess how 
exactly the ancient Greeks understood this term because their understanding of the 
structure of the universe is different than our own, it may be helpful to imagine a 
structure resembling visible space, but finite).  He argued that some of these infinite 
universes would have no inhabitants, while others would have life, some universes 
would have a sun, and others would not.145  Democritus’ vision of the cosmos differed 
radically from Plato’s singular and structured universe. 
Despite Democritus and Plato’s shared values, one can easily imagine why 
such a cosmology would not serve as an effective empirical justification of absolute 
ethics.  Democritus’ cosmology describes nature as random and contingent rather than 
absolute.  The possibility of worlds radically different than our own calls into question 
a teleological worldview.  If one accepts Democritus’ cosmology, after all, how can 
one find absolute values in the structure of the cosmos if what leads an individual to 
live a good life on our planet may result in the opposite on some other planet?  Despite 
their shared rejection of Protagoras’ dictum, “man is the measure of all things,” 
Democritus’ cosmology appears very much in line with that philosophy.  In order to 
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paint a picture of a stable, teleological universe, Plato constructs a cosmology that flips 
many aspects of Democritus’ cosmology on their heads.   
Plato’s depiction of Earth as the only abode for life represents one of the most 
important differences.  Timaeus says,  
 
Have we been correct in speaking of one universe, or would it have been more 
correct to say that there are many, in fact infinitely many universes.  There is 
but one universe, if it is to have been crafted after its model.  For that which 
contains all of the intelligible living things couldn’t even be one of a pair, since 
that would require there to be yet another Living Thing, the one that contained 
those two, of which they then would be parts, and then it would be more 
correct to speak of our universe as made in the likeness, now not of those two, 
but of that other, the one that contains them.  So, in order that this living thing 
should be like the complete Living Thing in respect of uniqueness, the Maker 
made neither two, nor yet an infinite number of worlds.  On the contrary, our 
universe came to be as the one and only thing of its kind, is so now and will 
continue to be so in the future.146 
 
Timaeus indicates that for our universe to represent a complete unit it must exist in a 
solitary state.  If the universe did not exist as a complete unit it would not represent a 
model of the “Maker,” what Plato also refers to as the “Living Thing.”  Whether or not 
Plato refers to a literal God or metaphor for the good is not important to his rhetorical 
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deployment of the cosmology.  The Maker represents perfection; the universe exists in 
the maker’s image by virtue of its unitary nature.  Like the orderly movement of the 
celestial objects, the unity of worlds represents another example of how study of the 
universe points to the way absolute values are embedded in the structure of the 
cosmos.  
If the world did not exist as unity, it could not represent a model of the Good, 
either literally or metaphorically compared to God. Then it could not serve as 
empirical proof of Plato’s philosophy.  
Plato returns to this point several times throughout the dialogue.147  He specifically 
attacks the atomist’s position of infinite worlds.  Timaeus argues those who ponder the 
question of infinite worlds are, “‘unfinished’ in things he ought to be ‘finished’ in.”148 
This statement implies that the fact that the atomists even raise the possibility suggests 
a personal failing.  Plato even ends the dialogue with Timaeus reiterating the idea,  
 
And so now we may say that our account of the universe has reached its 
conclusion.  This world of ours has received and teems with living perceptible 
god, image of the intelligible Living Thing, its grandness, goodness, beauty 
and perfection are unexcelled.  Our one universe, indeed the only one of its 
kind, has come to be.149 
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Plato not only closes on an antipluralist note, but also specifically connects this idea to 
“grandness, goodness, beauty and perfection.” 
For Plato a singular inhabited world represents a complete unit, which allows 
the Earth access to perfection.  The existence of other universes would reflect a lack 
within our own universe and open the possibility for radically different ways of living 
that could conflict with Plato’s own recommendations.  The singularity of the world 
also becomes important in relation to other elements of Plato’s cosmology. 
For example, Plato places the Earth at the center of the cosmos and associates 
this centrality with the value of moderation.150  This move mirrors almost all religious 
cosmologies (though not all of the Greek materialist cosmologies).151  Physical 
centrality implies importance and value.  Protagoras argues that morality exists as an 
arbitrary human creation, but earth’s centrality implies an empirical proof of 
humanity’s connection to a real and nonarbitrary perfection.152  Of course this physical 
centrality also overlaps with the question of plurality of worlds.  The existence of other 
universes would do even more to undermine Earth’s claim to physical centrality than 
the lack of physical centrality in the solar system. 
An expansion of the natural orderly orbit of celestial objects represents the 
final crucial component of Plato’s cosmology for the purpose of ethics.  As previously 
discussed, when Plato references the importance of an empirical approach to 
cosmology in order to elucidate appropriate moral conduct, he specifically discusses 
the orderly movement of celestial objects.  Elsewhere in the dialogue, Plato argues 
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these objects serve as a guide for behavior, because they more closely comprise 
“being” rather than “becoming.”  Plato describes the difference between being and 
becoming, 
 
As I see it, then, we must begin by making the following distinction: What is 
that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which becomes but 
never is?  The former is grasped by understanding, which involves a reasoned 
account. It is unchanging.  The later is grasped by opinion, which involves 
unreasoning sense perception.  It comes to be and passes away, but never really 
is.  Now everything that comes to be must of necessity come to be by the 
agency of some cause, for it is impossible for anything to come to be without a 
cause.  So whenever the craftsman looks at what is always changeless and, 
using a thing of that kind as his model, reproduces its form and character, then 
of necessity, all that he so completes is beautiful.  But were he to look at a 
thing that has come to be and use as his model something that has been 
begotten, his work will lack beauty.153  
  
For Plato, “being” represents perfection; in contrast our world exists in a state of 
becoming having been created by the Maker.  The stars and other celestial objects only 
move in one direction and thus represent physical objects that come close to the state 
of being (stability and permanence) and can serve as a model for human behavior.154  
This provides more philosophical justification for Plato’s believe that the orderly 
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orbits of celestial objects represent a model for how to live.  Just as when the 
craftsman “looks at what is always changeless” all it produces is “beautiful,” humans 
that model being will live just lives. 
Plato’s cosmology could not allow for celestial objects to be inhabited, 
precisely because they are supposed to serve as exemplars for humanity.  Being 
represents stability and permanence; Plato depicts the earth and its inhabitants as 
chaotic and ephemeral.  If the celestial objects had mortal creatures as well, it would 
undermine the distinction between being and becoming.  This distinction represents 
Plato’s justification for using the celestial objects as a moral reference point.  
Earth’s singularity and centrality and the orderly orbits of celestial objects 
represent the empirical proofs for Plato’s ethics.  In the Laws Plato brings his 
arguments full circle and uses his cosmology to provide a justification for the kind of 
religious (myths) beliefs that he had proposed before turning to cosmology. As if 
footnoting the Timaeus, the Athenian stranger in the Laws says, “reason is the supreme 
power among the heavenly bodies.”155  He invokes orderly orbits to argue against 
atheism and for a universal notion of justice.156  Unlike in previous dialogues, 
however, when Plato defends his new mythology, he can have characters reference the 
scientific basis that he established in the Timaeus. 
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2.5 PLATO’S COSMOLOGY: MYTH OR SCIENCE? 
Timaeus claims that empirical examination of the heavens provides the best method to 
live a good life.157  Many scholars believe his discussion of the value of empirical 
observation of the heavens and many of the other elements of the Timaeus indicate 
Plato means for readers to take his cosmology literally.158  On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, academics assert that Plato never intended his cosmology to be understood 
as anything more than a mythic allegory for his political philosophy.159  For these 
individuals the Timaeus contains no more claims to truth than Plato’s Atlantis myth.  
Some aspects of the Timaeus make this an attractive interpretation like the presence of 
the demiurge, a God-like entity.  The intractability of the question has caused some 
scholars to take a hybrid approach, treating some elements as literal and others, like 
the demiurge, as metaphorical.160 
The nature of the debate over the truth-value of the Timaeus makes it 
irresolvable, because it hinges on Plato’s intent, which will always remain elusive.   
Given that Plato advocated advancing as truth myths that he did not believe, in order 
to forward his ethical program, one wonders what difference it makes whether Plato 
believed his cosmology as myth or fact.  In Sophist Plato challenges the distinction 
between myth and scientific cosmology,   
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[The presocratic cosmologists] each appear to me to tell us a myth, as if we 
were children.  One tells us that there are three beings, and that sometimes 
they’re somehow at war with each other, while at other times they become 
friendly, marry, give birth, and bring up their offspring.  Another one says that 
there are two beings, wet and dry or hot and cold.  He marries them off and 
makes them set up house together.  And our Eleatic tribe, starting from 
Xenophanes and even people before him, tell us their myth on the assumption 
that what they call “all things” are just one.  Later on, some Ionian and Sicilian 
muses both had the idea that it was safer to weave the two views together.  
They say that which is is both many and one, and is bound by both hatred and 
friendship.  According to the terser of these muses, in being taken apart they’re 
brought together.  The more relaxed muses, though, allow things to be free 
from that condition sometimes.  They say that all that there is alternates, and 
that sometimes it’s one and friendly under Aphrodite’s influence, but at other 
times it’s many and at war with itself because of some kind of strife.  It’s hard 
to say whether any of one these thinkers has told us the truth or not, and it 
wouldn’t be appropriate for us to be critical of such renowned and venerable 
men.161 
 
For Plato, despite the scientific pretentions of “renowned and venerable men,” one 
cannot tell whether they have “told us the truth” and more than “myth.”  What is 
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known for sure is that many of Plato’s contemporaries, including Aristotle, read the 
Timaeus literally (although others did not).162 
Scholars have noted that Plato imitates the style of the presocratic cosmologists 
and goes so far as to incorporate elements of their philosophies.  His mathematical 
descriptions of the universe reference late Pythagorean thought.163  The use of the four 
elements owes a debt to Empedocles. 164  Plato’s articulation of the four elements as 
the imperceptibly small building blocks of matters sounds very similar to Democritus’ 
atomism.165  Whether or not Plato meant Timaeus’ cosmology as a myth, he clearly 
uses the dialogue to comment on many of the prominent cosmologies of the time. 
Taylor goes so far as to suggest that Plato simply merged the cosmologies of 
Empedocles (“the most promising line in fifth-century science”) and Pythagoras (“the 
one most directly connected with his own developments”)  making the Timaeus a 
record of presocratic thought, rather than Plato’s own ideas.166  Even though this 
interpretation has gained little traction in the academy, it does highlight the degree to 
which Plato’s dialogue reads as a scientific text quite unlike anything he had yet 
produced. 
The presocratics meant their cosmologies to be taken seriously.  The adaption 
of the presocratic style could easily have led readers to also take Plato’s cosmology 
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seriously.  Even if Plato meant the dialogue as a myth, it co-opts the prestige of 
materialist epistemology and uses it to advance his ethical interests.   
Taylor suggests Plato simply retells previously existing cosmologies, but when 
one examines the Timaeus one can easily find examples of places that Plato tweaks 
existing science in order to better uphold his ethical vision.  The Pythagorians had a 
unified system based on their understanding of mathematic principles.  Plato simply 
picks and chooses elements of the Pythagorian cosmology without recognition of this 
fact.  For example, Plato omits the existence of the counter-earth.  The Pythagorians 
believed that numerical ratios played an important role in the cosmos and thus 
believed that there would need to be ten celestial objects.  As Aristotle explains, 
  
The Pythagoreans, as they were called, devoted themselves to mathematics; 
they were the first to advance this science, and having been brought up in it 
they thought its principles were the principles of all things.  Since of these 
principles numbers are by nature the first, and in numbers they seemed to see 
many resemblances to the things that exist and come into being—more than in 
fire and earth and water… since, again, they saw that the attributes and the 
ratios of the musical scales were expressible in numbers; since then, all other 
things seemed in their whole nature to be modeled after numbers… and the 
whole heaven to be a musical scale and number.  E.G. as the number 10 is 
thought to be perfect and to comprise the whole nature of numbers, they say 
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that the bodies which move through the heavens are ten, but as the visible 
bodies are only nine, to meet this they invent a tenth—the ‘counter-earth’. 167  
 
The Pythagoreans included the counter earth in order to balance out the presence of 
the Earth and thus give symmetry to cosmic system.168  The Pythagorean’s 
hypothesized that the counter-earth would be Earth’s exact its opposite.169   
The idea of a planet where things operated opposite of Earth would not fit 
Plato’s ethical vision of the cosmos, because he sought to make the motions of the 
heavens a model for human behavior.  For Plato, the existence of a planet with the 
opposite motions from Earth would mean that the ethics of that planet would be 
greatly out of order.  Instead, Plato simply omits mention of the counter-earth.   
Another conflict with the Pythagoreans emerges over the order of the celestial 
objects.  The Pythagoreans place the sun, not the Earth, at the center of the cosmos.  
Plato, like Anaximander, places the Earth at the center.170  This can again be attributed 
to Plato’s ethical beliefs.  The earth takes its place at the center of the cosmos, because 
it needs to be distinguished from the celestial objects that are meant to be models for 
humanity.  If the earth moved as well, nothing would separate it from the celestial 
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objects.  The idea of centrality also bolsters the notion that humanity reflects the image 
of God, since humanity exists as a focal point for the rest of creation.171 
Along similar lines, the Pythagoreans discovered the existence of wandering 
celestial objects without a fixed orbit.172  Plato explicitly denies the possibility of 
disorderly celestial objects, because they would undermine his belief that cosmic 
objects serve as moral compasses.  This represents Plato’s gravest scientific alteration, 
because the wandering planets had been discovered in precisely the empirical fashion 
that Timaeus recommends early in the dialogue.  It is these wandering planets that turn 
Plato away from cosmology in his earlier dialogues. 
Plato also alters the cosmologies of Empedocles and the atomists to fit his 
ethical program.  He replaces the randomly moving atoms of Democritus with more 
structured elements. Empedocles believed that love and strife acted as two opposing 
forces driving cosmic events.173  Love creates unity, whereas strife results in chaos and 
fracture.  Empedocles cosmos lacked the orderly motion that Plato ascribes to his 
universe, because of the presence of strife.  These alterations serve a similar function 
to his revisions of Pythagorean thought.  Chaotic atoms and celestial objects call into 
question the possibility of individuals looking to astronomy as a model for ethical 
behavior.   
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2.6 PLATO’S RHETORICAL 
COSMOLOGY 
The evidence indicates that Plato changes his mind on cosmology between his middle 
and early dialogues, i.e., the Phaedo and Republic, and the later dialogues.  Carone 
believes that Plato’s opinion changes because he saw cosmology as a potential middle 
ground between the open approach to philosophy of the early dialogues and the elitism 
of the later dialogues.174  For Carone, if cosmology provides a window into the Good 
then it would be accessible to anyone living in any society.  All one had to do to learn 
about the Good was look up and watch the motion of the celestial objects.  This was a 
large departure for Plato from the middle dialogues, even if he still believed the 
highest parts of philosophy, knowledge of the forms, was only accessible to the 
elite.175  The trouble with Carone’s analysis is that it does not offer a justification for 
why Plato would revisit cosmology or why Plato would restrict his philosophy to elites 
in his middle dialogues and then reopen his philosophy to everyone in his later 
dialogues.   
Rather than see Plato’s embrace of cosmology as a redemocratization of his 
philosophy, it seems more likely that he viewed cosmology as just another strategy to 
get people to live good lives.  The cosmological turn in Plato’s thought can be read as 
a rhetorical adjustment to the audiences he was trying to persuade to accept his 
philosophy.  Remember that the first positive reference to cosmology occurs in the 
Gorgias when Socrates is trying to persuade Callicles to lead an ethical life.  In this 
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dialogue Socrates deploys cosmology in the same manner as his myth about souls 
being judged, as metaphysical reasons to be good.  This demonstrates that one can use 
cosmology to advance the Good.  Plato has Socrates admit as much in the Phaedo, 
when he initially approaches cosmology with the hope that it will compliment his 
philosophy.  By the time Plato writes his later dialogues, cosmology as a tool for the 
Good looks better than the alternatives. 
In contrast to myth and religion, cosmology had much more currency in the 
era, because unlike religion, cosmology was based in empirical verifiable reality (or at 
least conformed to the scientific method).  In the Republic, Plato says that children 
could be indoctrinated with new myths to create a societal change for the better, a 
strategy whose shortcomings have already been discussed.176  In the Sophist, Plato 
says that in the face of the scientific cosmology of the presocratics, adults are like 
children listening to myths.177  Scientific cosmology allowed Plato to deploy myth 
while overcoming problems of growing materialism and the body of contradictory 
religious myths.  The popularity of the works of the presocratic philosophers served as 
testament to the power of cosmology.  The problem for Plato was that all of the 
previous cosmologies had been far too materialist to be useful in advancing his 
arguments.  Plato’s solution: invent a new cosmology. 
The way that Plato describes cosmology in his later dialogues provides further 
evidence that he seeks to do with it, what he failed to achieve with mythology.  In the 
Republic, Plato sought to use myths to control the population so he banished the poets, 
who provided a set of myths counter to Plato’s ideals.  In the later dialogues Plato has 
                                                
176 Plato, Republic, 377c. 
177 Plato, "Sophist," 242c-43a. 
 76 
largely abandoned his critique of the poets. In the Laws he turns his ire to atheists, but 
from Plato’s description it is clear that he means rival cosmologists, 
 
They maintain that fire and water and earth and air all owe their existence to 
nature and chance, and in no cases to art, and that it is by means of these 
entirely inanimate substances that the secondary physical bodies – the earth, 
sun, moon, and stars – have been produced.  These substances moved at 
random, each impelled by virtue of its own inherent properties, which 
depended on various suitable amalgamations of hot and cold, dry and wet, soft 
and hard, and all other haphazard combinations that inevitably resulted when 
the opposites were mixed.  This is the process to which all the heavens and 
everything that is in them owe their birth, and the consequent establishment of 
the four seasons led to the appearance of all plants and living creatures.  The 
cause of all this, they say, was neither intelligent planning, nor a deity, nor art, 
but–as we’ve explained—nature and chance.178 
 
Vlastos argues that this philosophical preamble in the Laws X singles out materialist 
cosmologies as the greatest threat to Plato’s ideal society.  The indictment was so 
sweeping that even Heraclitus and Diogenes of Apollonia, who believed in an 
intelligence that provides a foundation to the cosmos, were not excluded.179  The 
punishments were also far graver than banishment for poets who told problematic 
myths in the Republic. The most lenient of the penalties Plato suggests is five years in 
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solitary confinement for reeducation. Atheists (cosmologists) that did not repent their 
ideas or that proved particularly outspoken were to be put to death.180  Plato’s call to 
punish rival cosmologists makes him, “the first political thinker to propose that errors 
of opinion be made crimes punishable by law.”181  Not only was Plato the first to do 
this, but also the law was “without parallel in any surviving code of ancient 
Greece.”182 
Further evidence that Plato shifted his concern from poets to cosmologists is 
his opposition to the atomists.  Diogenes Laertus writes that Plato sought to collect as 
many of Democritus’ works as he could to burn them, but was stopped by some 
Pythagoreans who convinced him that the books were already too widely dispersed.183  
Obviously, if this were true it would suggest that Plato had a deep disregard for 
Democritus. Chitwood suggests that the story of a philosopher wanting to burn another 
philosopher’s books existed as a trope in philosophical history and thus can be written 
off as mere exaggeration.184 This may be true in other cases, but there exists evidence 
that Plato would be more receptive to censorship than the other philosophers Chitwood 
cites.  Remember, Plato explicitly condones the destruction of books with messages 
that would mislead the people in the Republic and advocates the death penalty for 
atheists in the Laws.185  Democritus’ works taught atheistic messages that Plato would 
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have not wanted in his ideal Republic.  Chitwood believes that Diogenes Laertius 
added the story about Plato wanting to burn Democritus’ books in order to spice up 
history, yet Plato makes much more outrageous claims in his dialogues.  The other 
examples of historians saying philosophers wanted to burn each other books lack 
evidentiary support in the writings of the philosophers in question.186 
Even if Plato never desired to burn all of Democritus’ books, Diogenes 
Laertus’ story still likely reflects some element of truth.  While Diogenes invented 
stories about philosophers, these stories typically reflect a facet of reality.  The fact 
that Laertius, of all the historical figures that Plato disagreed with (and there were 
many), would write that Plato wanted to burn Democritus’ works, suggests that for 
Plato atomism was even more dangerous than, for example, the sophists. 
The other argument that suggests Plato despised the atomists is that he never 
directly referenced them in his work, something that has surprised both ancient and 
modern commentators.187  While Plato does not mention every major thinker of the 
time he certainly mentions quite a few.  Riginos suggests that the absence of 
Democritus from Plato’s dialogues is, “not in itself surprising, considering the 
different interests of the philosophers.”188  Riginos’ argument does not cohere with the 
historical evidence.  Democritus argued there was nothing at all special about 
humanity’s creation and some of the existent fragments of Democritus’ work suggest 
that he viewed humans as a more advanced animal, not a creature created in the image 
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of God.189  Evidence suggests Democritus openly argued his theory meant the soul 
could not be immortal and that he mocked the idea of an afterlife.190  In the Phaedo, 
Plato attacks Anaxagoras’ cosmology, which seems much more compatible with the 
traditional conceptions of religion than the atomist’s explicitly atheistic cosmology.191  
At the very least Plato borrows heavily from the atomist cosmology when he writes 
about the foundational elements in the Timaeus.  Riginos’ argument ignores the many 
intersections between Democritus and Plato. 
The fact that Plato’s concern has shifted from the poets to rival cosmologists 
suggests that cosmology and not religion represents the new method Plato seeks to use 
to control the population.  When Plato sought to use religion to persuade people to live 
a good life, he banished rival religions; now that he seeks to use cosmology he 
banishes rival cosmologies.  This does not necessarily mean that Plato believed his 
cosmology was true.  Remember in the Republic Plato advocates suppression of 
problematic myths even if they are true and the propagation of socially helpful myths 
even if they are false.   
Whether or not Plato initially meant the Timaeus to be read scientifically is not 
particularly relevant to his rhetorical deployment of the Unity cosmology.  All of the 
authors who suggest that Plato did not present the Timaeus as scientific truth rely 
primarily on close textual analysis with little historical contextualization.  Historical 
records and other artifacts suggest that many of Plato’s contemporaries read the 
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document as science, which implies that Plato later represented the dialogue as true.192  
Plato references the cosmological elements from the Timaeus in the Laws, which 
indicates that by that time he meant his cosmology to be taken seriously.193  The most 
compelling argument that Plato sought to present his cosmology rhetorically as truth is 
that he instructed his students at the Academy to begin building astronomical models 
of an orderly universe.194  
This last point holds enormous importance for understanding how Plato sought 
to deploy his cosmology.  Scholars who treat the Timaeus as only an allegorical story 
fail to account for the fact that Plato actually tried to produce empirical evidence for 
his claims.  This evidence could serve as scientific proof for his ethical claims in 
debates against relativists.  In fact as previously discussed, Plato makes this move 
explicitly in the Laws.  Of course, knowing that Plato subordinates all other concerns 
to his desire create an ethical society, one should be skeptical that Plato would accept 
evidence that disproved his cosmology as a reason not to act ethically.  After all, he 
considered irregular orbits a reason to disregard the whole discipline of cosmology. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Given the passage of time, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of Plato’s 
cosmological argument, but several arguments suggest that it proved lastingly 
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successful.  The first argument in favor of this thesis is Plato’s shift to the 
cosmological argument in his later dialogues.  Zeyl makes the argument that the 
cosmological account in the Timaeus was probably only a “prelude,” to the story of the 
Atlantean’s defeat by ancient Greece.195  Plato never finished the Atlantean trilogy, a 
myth in the more traditional sense, and instead wrote the Laws.  It very well may be 
that Plato abandoned the unfinished Critias (the second dialogue in the trilogy) and 
never began the third dialogue of the trilogy, because his cosmology proved more 
effective than his more traditional myth of Atlantis.  This would suggest that Plato 
believed his cosmological arguments proved more effective than traditional myths. 
The adoption of a Platonic cosmology by many important Athenians represents 
the second argument in favor of the cosmology’s rhetorical success.  Aristotle, one of 
the most influential Greek thinkers of the time, creates a cosmology based heavily on 
the Timaeus model.196  The Stoics, a sect of Greek philosophical thought, also built a 
cosmological model influenced heavily by the Timaeus.197  The next chapters will 
demonstrate that the rhetorical power of Plato’s unity cosmology extends way beyond 
ancient Greece. 
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3.0  THE DOMINANCE OF THE UNITY COSMOLOGY: UNITY FROM 
PLATO TO GALILEO 
Panhistoricism as a method will always force the difficult undertaking of choosing 
particular case studies to express the continuity of ideas throughout history.198  This 
chapter faces the unenviable task of portraying the stability of an idea over the 2,000 
years of history from Plato’s academy to the aftermath of the Copernican revolution.  
Under these circumstances the chapter could not possibility do justice to the 
complexity and differences among opinions within the period.  Instead, I will focus 
primarily on two case studies.  The first examines Christianity’s melding of Platonic 
mythology onto the cosmology of Aristotle.  The second focuses on the way the 
Copernican revolution reignited the plurality debate and thus challenged the medieval 
values dependent on unity. 
Like the other case studies I examine in-depth, both the reintroduction of the 
Platonic cosmology and the Copernican revolution represent areas of intellectual 
conflict.  The Medieval period in between these events does not need as focused an 
examination precisely because Plato’s ideas so dominated academic and church 
culture for centuries.  Teasing out the rhetorical work of the unity cosmology during 
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the intervening years would be exceedingly difficult because of its success.  As E. M. 
W. Tillyard writes, “the conception of [cosmic] order is so taken for granted, so much 
part of the collective mind of the people, that it is hardly mentioned except in 
explicitly didactic writing.”199  The unity of the world played a central role in 
anchoring this cosmic order and was largely taken for granted. 
This chapter begins with an examination of Aristotle’s reworking of Plato’s 
cosmology.  Aristotle’s scientific justification of unity ultimately had the greatest 
impact on Medieval Europe of any of the ancient cosmologies.  Aristotle, however, 
decoupled many of the rhetorical elements of the Timaeus from his discussion of 
unity.  If Aristotle’s de Caelo (350 B.C.E.), his primary work of cosmology, had 
entered Medieval thought unchanged, it could have spelled the end of the unity of the 
world rhetorical argument, despite Aristotle’s defense of unity as a fact.200   
Before Aristotle’s ideas could become a part of Medieval European thought, 
however, they had to conform to Christian dogma.  Inconsistencies between Aristotle’s 
cosmology and the Bible led to major conflicts between Averroists (followers of the 
Averroes) and Augustinian thinkers in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  Thomas 
Aquinas played a pivotal role in mediating between the warring groups, by bringing 
Aristotelian science in line with Biblical teachings.  He did this in part by rejoining the 
scientific defense of unity with the religious and philosophical implications for unity 
found in the Timaeus.  Aquinas’ reformulated cosmology merged the scientism of 
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Aristotle with the philosophy of Plato and resulted in a system that proved remarkably 
stable for centuries.   
Cosmology faded from the forefront into the background, but continued to play 
an enormous role in shaping political, religious, and philosophical possibilities. 
Shakespeare, Dante, and many other authors could make casual reference to the 
Aristotelian system, confident their audiences would get their references.201  Monarchs 
justified their power on the basis of a celestial hierarchy grounded in Aristotelian 
physics.202  They were not alone, the major social structures often appealed to 
cosmology to justify the maintenance of the status quo. 203  
The Copernican revolution shattered this stable cosmos and helped usher in an 
era of radical change.  Most examinations of the effects of the cosmological upheaval 
focus predictably on the impact of heliocentrism.  This chapter argues that 
heliocentrism represented such a threat to the established order not only because of its 
physical relocation of the earth, but also because it opened up the very real possibility 
of plurality.  Plurality threatened one of the fundamental foundations of Plato’s 
rhetorical unity cosmology.  The transition in scientific thinking from plurality to unity 
reveals the rhetorical work that the unity cosmology had done in establishing the 
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framework for debates about religion, philosophy and politics.  The dominant 
medieval European culture grounded so many of its social constructs in its cosmology 
that the Copernican revolution and attendant shift to plurality ushered in a social as 
well scientific revolution. 
3.1 ARISTOTLE 
Aristotle positioned himself as one of the primary heirs to Plato’s cosmology.  He 
studied at Plato’s academy for twenty years, until Plato’s death, earning his place as a 
top student.204  While he borrowed from many of the cosmologies of the time, Plato 
influenced Aristotle’s cosmology as much as any other thinker.205  Like Plato, 
Aristotle believed in the ethereal nature of the celestial objects, geocentrism, orderly 
orbits, and unity.206  Aristotle constructed his cosmology in the context of his broader 
physics, however, which resulted in important changes from the Timaeus.   
Although Aristotle defended unity, he did not justify it on the ground that unity 
represented perfection.  This broke with the Timaeus, where Plato argued unity’s 
connection to perfection provided proof against plurality, because a perfect god would 
create a universe as close as possible to perfection.  Dick argues that Aristotle 
probably avoided this argument, because it lacked scientific rigor.207  Plato’s argument 
depended on a perfect origin of the universe, the demiurge, and the intrinsic 
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connection of unity to perfection.  Presupposing all of these factors and then using 
them to prove unity represented precisely the type of unscientific arguments that 
Aristotle sought to avoid.208 
Aristotle defended unity on the basis of two primary arguments.  The first 
relates to the way that Aristotle conceptualizes the nature of the basic units of matter.  
In the Timaeus, Plato identified four components of matter, earth, water, fire, and 
air.209  As mentioned in the previous chapter, these “forms” functioned similarly to the 
atoms of Democritus, in the sense that they provided the foundational building blocks 
of everything on the planet. Aristotle built on Plato’s theory and assigned the various 
forms different locations to which they would naturally move.  Fire, for example, 
would move away from our planet and earth would be drawn towards our planet.210  
Aristotle argued that multiple worlds could not exist, because the Earth of the other 
world would be drawn to the center of our world, or vice versa.211  The inevitable 
collapse of one world into another ensures the impossibility of the plurality of worlds. 
The second argument Aristotle makes against plurality relates to the nature of 
the prime mover.  He theorized that since all action has a cause that the first cause 
must emerge from something special, the god-like prime mover.  He believed that each 
world would have to have its own prime mover.  He found this idea philosophically 
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impossible to justify, making it another argument against plurality.212  The need for a 
unitary prime mover bears some resemblance to Plato’s belief that unity connects with 
perfection.  Aristotle’s unitary prime mover, however, has less clear implications for 
humanity.  The unity of the world in Plato’s Timaeus provided a celestial model for 
ethical living; the prime mover of Aristotle’s de Caelo exists in the background as a 
physical necessity and without a clear connection to perfection. 
Aristotle’s scientific approach to cosmology stripped much of the philosophical 
undercurrent from Plato’s Timaeus.  Beyond the absence of the defense of unity based 
on perfection, Aristotle removes the cosmological discussion from Plato’s context 
about living good lives.  Many Platonists emphasized the mythic elements of the 
Timaeus and argued strenuously that one should not take it as a literal depiction of the 
universe.213  Aristotle went in the other direction and viewed the mythic element as 
superfluous to the Timaeus’ science.214  Plato’s rhetorical strategy depended on the 
intertwining of myth and science to accomplish what neither alone could.  Both the 
neoplatonists and Aristotle threatened to undermine the strength of Plato’s rhetorical 
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cosmological argument by decoupling the science from the myth.  Christian thinkers, 
however, would rejoin the two, by overlaying the mythic elements of the Timaeus onto 
Aristotle’s new scientific justifications for unity. 
3.2 EARLY CHRISTIANITY AND COSMOLOGY 
Philo (20 BCE-40CE), a Hellenized Jew who greatly influential Christian thought, 
borrowed heavily from the Timaeus.215  He repeats Plato’s argument for the 
connection of unity to perfection as manifested in God: “The creator is one, and he, 
making his creation to resemble himself in its singleness, employed all existing 
essence in the creation of the universe.  For it would not have been complete if it had 
not been made and composed of all parts which were likewise whole and complete.”216 
As if to make clear definitively from where he borrows the idea, Philo writes, “some 
persons who believe that there are many worlds, and some who even fancy that they 
are boundless in extent, being themselves inexperienced and ignorant of the truth of 
those things of which it is desirable to have correct knowledge.”217  The language of 
the passage demonstrates that he references the Timaeus directly.  Note the similarities 
between “ignorant of the truth of those things of which it is desirable to have correct 
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knowledge” and Plato’s remark about believers of plurality that they are, “‘unfinished’ 
in things he ought to be ‘finished’ in.”218 
Despite Philo’s embrace of the Timaeus, however, other Christians challenged 
the need to investigate the nature of the universe.  Writing towards the end of the 
Roman Empire, St. Augustine gives a critique of the Greek cosmologists reminiscent 
of Plato’s early dialogues, 
 
When, then, the question is asked what we are to believe in regard to religion, 
it is not necessary to probe into the nature of things, as was done by those 
whom the Greeks call physici, nor need we be in alarm lest the Christian 
should be ignorant of the force and number of the elements--the motion, and 
order, and eclipses of the heavenly bodies; the form of the heavens; the species 
and the natures of animals, plants, stones, fountains, rivers, mountains; about 
chronology and distances; the science of coming storms; and a thousand other 
things which those philosophers either have found out, or think they have 
found out.…It is enough for the Christian to believe that the only cause of all 
created things whether heavenly or earthly, whether visible or invisible, is the 
goodness of the Creator, the one true God; and that nothing exists by Himself 
that does not derive its existence from Him.219 
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Augustine’s mention of the “physici” refers to the Greek cosmologists.  Augustine’s 
statement downplays the importance of science to Christians, whom he believes are 
better served by focusing on their faith in God.  Augustine himself still read the 
ancient Greek texts, but many of his contemporaries and successors expanded on his 
idea that a Christian need not take an empiricist approach to nature in order to 
advocate a hostile attitude to what we today would call scientific enterprises.220 
Between the fall of Rome and the twelfth century, the Timaeus, the only of 
Plato’s dialogues continuously available in Latin throughout western history provided 
the foundation of much of Europe’s ancient knowledge.221  Few of Aristotle’s 
cosmological works or any of the other Greek cosmologists made their way into the 
hands of Christian scholars, which meant the Timaeus had little opposition.222  Two 
major translations of the Timaeus circulated, one by Calcidicus and the other Cicero.  
Both translations excluded much of the dialogue that did not examine the structure of 
the universe, like the myth of Atlantis. This had the effect of making the translations 
purely cosmological works, which in turn dampened the opinion that Plato meant his 
account of the universe as a myth.223   
Christian Platonists had another reason to take the cosmological account in the 
Timaeus as literal, rather than metaphorical, it harmonized with the creation account in 
Genesis.  Most non-Christian Platonists, on the one hand, felt the need to read the 
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Timaeus as a myth because they viewed the creation of the universe out of 
nonexistence as incompatible with science.  The Christian Platonists, on the other 
hand, were looking for a scientific defense of this and other elements of the Biblical 
account of creation.224  Despite the reservations of Augustine’s followers and others, 
the Timaeus continued to inform the Christian cosmology.  
In 1086, crusaders led by Alfonso VI, captured the Muslim city of Toledo.  
Scholars from all over Christendom came to read the ancient Greek texts that the 
Islamic scholars preserved.225  The introduction of previously absent Greek texts and 
commentaries on those texts by Arab, Jewish, and Persian scholars, like al-Kindi, al-
Farabi, Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and Ibn Rushd (Averroes), in the end of the 
twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth century helped usher in a scientific 
revolution.226  The new influx of texts included much of Aristotle’s work, de Caelo 
being one of the most influential.227  
By the twelfth century, Aristotle’s cosmology overtook Plato’s Timaeus as the 
foundation for the scientific view of the universe held by the secular masters (the term 
for scientists at universities) and many of the Catholic orders.228  Aristotle presented a 
more scientifically complete and integrated physics than found in the Timaeus, which 
made the previous attempts at natural philosophy grounded in Platonic thinking seem 
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haphazard.229 Eventually, Aristotle’s de Caelo would become the unquestioned 
cosmology until late in the seventeenth century, but first it faced a potentially 
devastating backlash from the Franciscan order and their allies. 
Many secular masters, often referred to as Averroists after the famous Arab 
platonic scholar Averroes, believed that the physical laws of de Caelo and Aristotle’s 
other works were absolute, which created two problems.  First, there existed elements 
of Aristotle’s science that conflicted with Christian teaching.  Aristotle, for example, 
argued his physics meant that the world existed eternally.230  The eternal nature of the 
world contradicted the description of creation found in Genesis. The second, more 
general problem was that very idea of restrictions on nature embedded in Aristotle’s 
thinking, de facto placed restrictions on God’s power.  Aristotle’s belief that the nature 
of the elements prevented the possibility of a plurality of worlds, for example, denied 
the omnipotence central to the Christian God.  If God wanted plurality, according to 
the Christian logic, he must be able to have it. 
In order to solve these contradictions, Latin Averroists, like John of Jandun, 
Taddeo of Parma, and Angelo of Arrezo, for example, posited two truths: the 
philosophical truth that the universe has existed forever and the religious truth that 
God created the universe.231  This angered the powerful Franciscan order of monks, 
led by general master Bonaventure.  The Franciscans generally held an Augustinian 
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perspective on empiricism and viewed the double-truth belief as heresy.232 The 
conflict between the two sides raged back and forth resulting in major events like 
British Cardinal Robert of Courçon’s ban on Aristotelian physics in 1215.233 Thomas 
Aquinas played a pivotal role in mediating between the opposed religious factions and 
creating a hybrid system that merged Christianity with Aristotelian physics.  This 
merger set the stage for the reemergence of the Platonic unity argument in the 
Medieval period. 
3.3 AQUINAS 
Aquinas’ background uniquely prepared him to offer a compromise between science 
and faith.  From the ages of 5-14 he lived in a Benedictine environment where science, 
humanism, and religion coexisted harmoniously.  He joined the Dominican order, 
notable for its commitment to teaching science, in 1243.234 Albert Magnus, one of the 
first Europeans exposed to the full corpus of Aristotelian thought, became Thomas 
Aquinas’ teacher.  Aquinas rose through the ranks of the church as the unease began to 
grow among Franciscans and others, about the compatibility of Aristotle’s ideas with 
Christianity. 
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Aquinas sought to steer a middle road between the secular and religious forces.  
He hoped to harmonize scientific thinking with Christianity and thus negate the forced 
choice between the two.235  Aquinas’ middle path meant finding ways that the 
purportedly contradictory elements of Aristotle and Christianity could be merged.  
Sometimes this meant discarding specific elements of Aristotelian thought.  In On the 
Eternity of the World, for example, Aquinas produces a justification for maintaining 
Aristotle’s ideas broadly, but rejects his claim that the universe has existed 
eternally.236  At other times, Aquinas had to give religious justification to scientific 
“facts,” providing answers to scriptural objections to scientific laws. 
The question of the Earth’s unity served as a major area of conflict between the 
Averroists and the Franciscans.  Aristotle defended a unity cosmology on the basis of 
how the four elements work.  Aristotle’s elemental theory played a central role in his 
overall thought, which meant that jettisoning it would not be as easy as arguing that 
the world did not exist eternally.  On the one hand, if the elemental justification of 
unity disappeared it would render large parts of Aristotle’s physics incoherent.  On the 
other hand, the belief that the elements placed an absolute limit on the number of 
worlds God could create denied God’s omnipotence.  Aquinas eventually drew on 
Plato’s Timaeus to provide a solution to this problem, but, before he could, he had to 
come to terms with potential areas of disagreement between the Timaeus and the 
Bible. 
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In the de Potenia (1265-1266), Aquinas first addresses Plato’s arguments about 
unity in the Timaeus, “According to Plato (Tim.) the best produces the best. Now the 
best can only be one. Since then God is best of all things, only one thing can be 
produced by him.”237 He has the above quote as a supporting argument for the 
negative case under the heading, “Can a Multitude of Things Proceed from One First 
Thing?” 238  Aquinas’ specific reference of the Timaeus indicates that the “one” 
produced by God references the world or at least includes it in the category in 
question.  Even though Aquinas supports unity as a fact of nature, he chooses not to 
limit God’s power by claiming that God can only produce one. 
Aquinas offers a definitive yes, to the question, “Can a Multitude of Things 
Proceed from One First Thing?”  He says that arguments that limit God’s ability to 
create plurality confuse the nature of cause and effect: “I answer that the impossibility 
of many things proceeding from one immediate and proper principle would seem to 
arise from the cause being determined to its effect, so that it would seem due and 
necessary that from such and such a cause such and such an effect should proceed.”239  
While unity may relate to perfection it does not place a limit on the power of God to 
create imperfect worlds.  In a specific response to his reading of Plato’s Timaeus that 
supports the proposition that a multitude cannot emerge from unity, Aquinas writes, 
“The universe as created by God is the best possible in respect of the things that 
actually exist; but not in respect of the things that God is able to create.”240  This 
passage lacks clarity; one can read it to suggest that God could create a perfect 
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plurality.  This interpretation, however, does not comport with the rest of Aquinas’ 
thinking on unity vs. plurality as will be shown below.  Instead, this passage likely 
means only that God could create a plurality of worlds, not that God in fact did so. If 
God is omnipotent, he can do anything he wills. 
Aquinas, thus, dispatches what he believes is Plato’s argument for why a 
perfect god could only create a unity.  In actuality, Aquinas either misreads or 
misrepresents Plato’s initial position.  Plato never indicates in the Timaeus that God 
must create a unity, but rather, “being free of jealousy, he wanted everything to 
become as much like himself as was possible.”241  The unity of the universe models the 
demiurge’s own perfection, because of the desire of the demiurge, not a natural 
constraint.  Aquinas ultimately turns to this justification of unity in place of the idea 
that Aristotelian physics limit out the possibility of plurality.   
Aquinas could not deny God the ability to create a plurality of worlds, because 
the Christian God has omnipotent power.  The actual existence of a plurality of 
worlds, however, would create a serious problem for the Aristotelian physics at the 
heart of twelfth-century science.  Aquinas needed an explanation for the unity of the 
world that did not rely on physics.  Aquinas makes the case for the existence of unity 
on Platonic grounds, 
 
However, it should be realized that some prove the possibility of many worlds 
in other ways. In one way, as follows: The world was made by God; but the 
power of God, since it is infinite, is not limited to this world alone. Therefore it 
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is not reasonable to say that He cannot make yet other worlds. To this it must 
be said that if God were to make other worlds, He would make them either like 
or unlike this world. If entirely alike, they would be in vain - and that conflicts 
with His wisdom. If unlike, none of them would comprehend in itself every 
nature of sensible body; consequently no one of them would be perfect, but one 
perfect world would result from all of them… it must be said that here it 
pertains to the goodness of the world to be one, because oneness possesses the 
aspect of goodness. For we see that through being divided some things lose 
their proper goodness.242 
 
Aquinas indicates that God could have created a plurality of worlds, but he did not 
because plurality represents a less perfect universe.243  Each world on its own would 
lack completeness and thus not reflect goodness.  Aquinas jettisons what he suggests is 
Plato’s mandatory connection of a perfect God and unity, but he maintains the belief 
that unity is the closest thing to perfection and thus the type of universe God did 
create.  
 Aquinas returns to the question of plurality in his masterpiece the Summa 
Theologica.  In the style of scholastic writing, he begins with objections to the position 
he will ultimately take.  He lists three arguments for plurality: God has the power to 
create plurality, because his power is unlimited; multiple worlds are better than a 
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single world; and the form-matter distinction allows for multidinous materializations 
of single forms. 
This time he begins his defense of unity with a quote from the Bible, “It is said 
(John 1:10): ‘The world was made by Him,’ where the world is named as one, as if 
only one existed.”244  At first it seems that the Biblical reference radically alters the 
nature of Aquinas’ argumentative strategy.  Before he relied solely on philosophical 
justifications for unity, now he draws upon the ultimate authority of the time: the 
Bible.  Dick and Crowe disagree with this reading, and argue instead that the briefness 
of argumentation from Biblical verses demonstrates Aquinas’ confidence with his 
philosophical arguments.245  Another possible reading is that Aquinas’ is enacting his 
alternative to the double truth of the Averroeseans.  He advocates faith and reason as 
intertwined so he provides the Biblical reference as well as the philosophical defense 
of his position.  This format was in keeping with the broader scholastic writing style of 
which Aquinas was a part.246  
After quoting the Bible, Aquinas provides a general response to the plurality 
argument before responding to three specific objections to unity. For his initial 
rejoinder he writes, 
 
The very order of things created by God shows the unity of the world. For this 
world is called one by the unity of order, whereby some things are ordered to 
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others. But whatever things come from God, have relation of order to each 
other, and to God Himself, as shown above (11, 3; 21, 1). Hence it must be that 
all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can assert that 
many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather 
believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides an infinite 
number of other worlds, was made from a casual concourse of atoms.247 
 
Aquinas much more explicitly channels Plato’s rhetorical cosmology in this paragraph.  
In his commentary on de Caelo he argued that a plurality of worlds would leave each 
individual world less than complete.  Here he connects the unity of the world to God’s 
inherent order, just as Plato’s cosmos derived from its connection to being.  Plurality 
does not only mean that our world lacks perfection, but denies the possibility of “any 
ordaining wisdom” and ushers in the materialism of Democritus.  By pointing to 
divine sovereignty (“ordaining”) and order (“wisdom”) Aquinas presents a universe 
completely at odds with the anarchic and chaotic cosmology of the atomists. 
The implication that a line of reasoning would lead to the cosmology of 
Democritus must have served as devastating indictment at the time Aquinas wrote this 
passage.  The only ideas of Democritus available at the time were filtered through his 
rival Aristotle’s cosmological criticisms, which also meant virtually none of his moral 
philosophy survived.248  This positioned him perfectly to fill the role of atheistic 
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bogeyman in a time when religion reigned supreme.249  Aquinas invocation of his name 
suggests that plurality ultimately culminates in rejection of God. 
 In responding to the three objections Aquinas lists to the unity position, he also 
explicitly invokes Plato’s Timaeus. The first objection indicates that because God’s 
power is infinite it would manifest itself in an infinite number (or at least a plurality) 
of worlds.  In his response Aquinas references back to Plato’s Timaeus, 
 
This reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in 
one order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity of order in things Aristotle 
infers (Metaph. xii, text 52) the unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), 
from the unity of the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing 
designed. 
 
This passage makes a very similar argument to his previous rebuttal, but the origin of 
Aquinas’ argument becomes clear.  The unity of God manifests itself in the unity of 
the world, even if God could have created a universe not modeled on its unity.250 
 For Aristotle, unity represented a necessary component of his physics, without 
which much of the rest of his corpus would not make sense. Other worlds called into 
question the tendency of elements to move towards their natural place.  Plato and 
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Aquinas placed the stakes much higher than coherent physics.  Aquinas echoed Plato 
in his belief that the goodness of the universe represented the closest thing to absolute 
goodness outside of God,  
 
But things participate in the divine goodness to the extent that they are good, 
by way of likeness. Now, that which is the greatest good in caused things is the 
good of the order of the universe; for it is most perfect, as the Philosopher says.  
With this, divine Scripture is also in agreement, for it is said in Genesis (1:31): 
“God saw all the things He had made, and they were very good,” while He 
simply said of the individual works, that “they were good.” 251 
 
A plurality of worlds would not elicit God’s claim of “very good,” because a plurality 
lacked perfection.  The imperfection of the universe would implicate the access to 
perfection of all creatures.  In the Summa Theological, Aquinas writes, “the principal 
good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe.”252  The idea that the 
universe represents the foundation for goodness in “things themselves,” which 
includes humans, comes very close to the Platonic idea that humanity can look to the 
cosmos as a model for morality.  Aquinas views the universe as the best thing by 
virtue of its unified nature.  Individual works (or humans) can get access to this 
goodness, by operating in conjunction with the telos of the universe.  Plurality 
                                                
251 Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles Book Three: Providence (Q. 1-83), trans. Vernon J. Bourke (New 
York: Hanover House, 1956), III, C. 64, N. 9   
 
252 Ibid.,  III, c. 64, n. 9. 
 102
fragments the universe and destroys its unified purpose that directs humans to live 
good lives. 
3.4 AQUINAS’ LEGACY 
In order to understand the impact of Aquinas’ thinking on unity, one must first 
examine the success of his attempt to unify science and religion more generally. 
Etienne Gilson argues that clear-headed figures of the time realized Aristotle’s system 
would inevitably win out because, “the strictly physical and natural part of the doctrine 
presented a system so incomparably superior to the fragmentary and little coherent 
solutions proposed by the older schoolmen.”253 Little doubt exists that Aristotle’s ideas 
represent the better science, but Gilson may be engaging in too Whiggish a history.  
The Franciscans proved a formidable foe of Averroist ideas.  In 1277, only three years 
after Aquinas’ death, the Bishop of France condemned 219 Aristotelian ideas, many of 
which applied to Aquinas’ thinking. 254 McInerny argues that if the, “spirit of the 
condemnations had prevailed, the university would have turned its back on the 
enormous philosophical achievements of Aristotle and even more seriously called into 
question the assumption that faith and reason are complementary.”255  Absent 
interventions like Aquinas’, one can imagine a world where conservative Christianity 
halted medieval scientific advancement. 
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Ultimately, Aquinas’ ideas did get the upper hand.  In response to the 1277 
ban, the order of preachers made the study of Aquinas mandatory.  He posthumously 
received the rare title of Doctor of the Church, an honorific given for contribution to 
Catholic theology.  In 1323 the church canonized Aquinas and two years later the 
condemnation of his work was removed.256  Aquinas’ successful harmonization of 
science and religion allowed Aristotle’s ideas to flourish.  Aristotle’s works became 
the foundation of the university system and were studied second only to the Bible.257 
Just about everyone who learned to read and write also learned the basics of 
Aristotle’s cosmology.258 Aristotle’s authority became near absolute, with the claim of 
ipse dixit (he [Aristotle] said it himself) serving as a phrase capable of ending 
arguments.259 Amazingly, Aristotle’s ideas gained the allegiance of humanists, 
scientists, and devote Christians, even the Protestants maintained support for 
Aristotle’s thinking after they split from the Catholic Church.260  
Once established, the structure of knowledge production kept the Aristotelian 
paradigm relatively stable for centuries.  Most scholars produced cosmological works 
in the style of commentaries.  This technique for writing allowed individuals to 
disagree with Aristotle on particular points, but not create a coherent theory to replace 
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his.  The commentary format made its authors responsive to Aristotle’s specific 
claims, but did not provide much flexibility to develop broad theories to replace his. 
Nor did the authors of these commentaries cite one another. The kind of large theory 
building Summas, like the kind Aquinas wrote, fell out of fashion and, when they did 
emerge, they mimicked the style of the commentaries rather than staying true to the 
format of the older Summas. 261 The fact that commentary writers rarely cited each 
other’s work proved another major impediment to the development of a new 
cosmology.  Had the commentaries cited one another then the problems with 
Aristotelian physics would have been compiled in a cumulative way that better 
reflected the myriad of flaws within the system.262 The writing style of the times 
resulted in lots of small debates about, for example, whether the celestial sphere 
existed as a fluid or series of solid masses or what caused an element to move from its 
natural place, but nothing that would challenge the core ideas of Aristotle.263 
Unity served as one of the core ideas of Aristotle, which existed largely beyond 
reproach.  Aquinas’ return to Platonic justifications for unity, rather than reliance on 
Aristotle’s physical laws, set the stage for this unquestioned acceptance.  Debates did 
continue on how God could create a plurality of worlds, but these were motivated 
primarily by the decree of 1277 that made it an excommunicable offense to deny 
God’s ability to create a plurality.264  The omnipotent nature of God represented one of 
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the most important tenants of Catholic Christianity and the denial of the possibility of 
plurality challenged that power.265  Many accounts that appeared positioned to defend 
the actuality of plurality, ultimately refused to do so.266 A typical example, in the 
thirteenth century, Nicole Oresme wrote extensive rebuttals to Aristotle’s scientific 
arguments against plurality, but concluded, “there has never been nor will there be 
more than one corporeal world.”267  Dick described the strange phenomenon of arguing 
up to the point of plurality but refusing to endorse it as, “a prime example of the 
uniquely medieval mixture of boldness and conservativism, of the appeal to reason 
still dominated by appeal to authority.”268 The appeal to Aristotle’s authority certainly 
had much to do with the refusal to discard belief in unity.269  Notwithstanding, 
Aristotle’s authority, however, Christian scholars had jettisoned elements of 
Aristotle’s corpus that disagreed with Biblical teaching, like the belief that the 
universe existed eternally. This meant that unity must have at the very least been 
viewed as compatible with Christianity.  
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In fact, unity not only was viewed as compatible with Christianity, but many 
individuals viewed it as crucial.  It was the philosophical and theological implications 
of plurality that prevented scholars from seriously advocating it.  The 1277 edict 
forced a consideration of arguments for plurality, because to deny God the ability to 
create any universe he wished is heresy. The actuality of plurality, however, would 
call into question the perfection of our universe and divine providence, for precisely 
the reasons that Aquinas lays out so forcefully. 
From Aquinas to the sixteenth century, only a handful of individuals argued 
that God actually had created a plurality. Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) the 
most notable exception, not only asserted the existence of planets, but their 
inhabitance.270  Ingrid Rowland, however, argues Cusa wrote in a style that made his 
claims much more ambiguous than many scholars recognize. Following contemporary 
conventions, he used paradox to demonstrate his argument, which would make it 
difficult for hostile individuals to pin down his precise position.271 Cusa also wrote at a 
time when the church felt comparatively secure in its power, although it faced the 
Western schism, Waldensians in Italy, and Lollards in England, it did not face a 
challenge as great as later Protestantism.  This resulted in more intellectual freedom 
that would be found once the counterreformation had taken hold.272  Even if one views 
Cusa’s work as a clear and open defense of the actual existence of plurality he fits well 
under the adage, plurality still existed as a minority discourse.  
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3.5 THE COPERNICAN SYSTEM 
The sixteenth century began to show a few cracks in the unity argument’s ascendancy.  
John Major, a scholastic scholar, unambiguously argued for an infinite number of 
worlds.273  In his texts he cites Democritus, which he may have been introduced to 
through means of Lucretius's recently available De rerum natura.  The biggest 
challenge to unity, however, came with the Copernican system’s contestation of 
Aristotelian cosmology. 
 Copernicus developed a heliocentric model for the solar system, which placed 
the Earth, rather than the Sun, at the center.  The Copernican model did not initially 
attract much attention from the Church, in part because most scholars, with the 
exception of a limited group of scientists, did not take it very seriously.  Copernicus’ 
On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres (Nuremberg 1543 and Basel 1566), laid 
out the case for his heliocentric universe, but he wrote the book in a style that made it 
inaccessible to all but a few astronomers.274  Copernicus, perhaps aware of the 
controversy his book would cause, closed his introduction with the claim that his 
target audience was fellow mathematicians: “Mathematics is written for 
mathematicians; and among them, if I am not mistaken, my labours will be seen to 
contribute something to the ecclesiastical commonwealth.”275  Over the next few 
decades, scholars borrowed from Copernicus’ diagrams and used his mathematical 
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models, but did not endorse the heliocentric system.  As the ideas of On the 
Revolutions slowly became more widely accepted, heliocentrism crept into scientific 
thinking.276  Later Johannes Kepler and Galileo Galilei would complete the work of 
popularizing heliocentrism. 
 Some scholars (including many apologists for the Catholic Church) try to 
downplay the significance of the Copernican theory.277  They claim that the earth did 
not hold a privileged material position in the Platonic/Aristotelian cosmos.  In these 
old systems the celestial objects represented perfection, whereas earth represents the 
degraded “becoming.”  The move of the earth from central to an orbit with the planets, 
thus, represents an increase in status if nothing else.  This reasoning holds a certain 
logic, but an anachronistic one that has little do with the way most people actually 
perceived heliocentrism.  Copernicanism did not elevate earth to the realm of the 
celestial objects.  By making the celestial objects planets like earth it degraded the 
whole universe.278  Perhaps most problematic, it raised the serious possibility of 
plurality.  If Earth did not have a central, special location, but instead orbited the sun 
just like Mars, Jupiter, Venus, etc., then it could be reasonably inferred that those 
bodies were planets similar to Earth.  Changing the astronomical bodies from celestial 
spheres to planets, opened up the possibility that they could have inhabitants.   
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Giordano Bruno, influenced both by Latin Averroesism and Platonism, helped 
make clear these potential dangers through his bold cosmological writings. Bruno, a 
mathematician, astronomer, and memory theorist, traveled across Europe and preached 
the existence of an infinite number of worlds.  In his writings he flipped Aquinas’ 
argument and said that a plurality of worlds better reflected the goodness of God: 
 
This argument is the more cogent since, if it is reasonable to postulate a finite 
goodness, a bounded perfection, all the more reasonable is the conception of an 
infinite goodness. For whereas finite goodness appeareth to us reasonable and 
convenient, the infinite is an imperative necessity…. We are then at one 
concerning the incorporeal infinite; but what preventeth the similar 
acceptability of the good, corporeal and infinite being? And why should not 
that infinite which is implicit in the utterly simple and individual Prime Origin 
rather become explicit in his own infinite and boundless image able to contain 
innumerable worlds, than become explicit within such narrow bounds? So that 
it appeareth indeed shameful to refuse to credit that this world which seemeth 
to us so vast may not in the divine regard appear a mere point, even a nullity?279 
 
The inspiration for his “new” cosmology came from Copernicus’ heliocentric system.  
He argued that the Copernican system set the stage for a revolutionary new order 
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including the unity between Protestants and Catholics and the emergence of Hermetic 
Christianity.280 
Bruno’s vocal advocacy of his cosmology contributed to his demise; in 1600, 
the Papal inquisition sentenced Bruno to death by fire for heresy.  Unlike Cusa who 
had written on plurality before him, Bruno did not mask his work in paradox.  For 
example, he wrote, “Thus is the excellence of God magnified and the greatness of his 
kingdom made manifest; He is glorified not in one, but in countless suns; not in a 
single earth, a single world, but in a thousand thousand, I say in an infinity of 
worlds.”281   Bruno also based his cosmology on the Copernican system, a scientific 
framework, which lent legitimacy to his ideas.282 Unlike Cusa, whose work existed 
only as theological musings ungrounded in any scientific basis.  Most importantly, 
Bruno wrote at a time when the Catholic Church felt a serious threat from 
Protestantism, which meant the Inquisition was especially concerned about heretical 
doctrines. 
 Historians disagree on the extent to which Bruno’s belief in plurality caused 
his death. The prevailing historiography now suggests that Bruno was killed for a 
combination of political reasons and his belief in hermetic magic rather than his 
commitment to the plurality.283  Because the Church has since destroyed the file the 
extend of his cosmology’s role in his execution may never be known for sure.  Largely 
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unexplored in the debate over Bruno’s death is the possibility that his cosmology and 
other beliefs cannot be separated from each other.284  To say that the Catholic Church 
did not kill Bruno because of his cosmology, ignores the fact that Bruno saw his 
cosmology as providing the foundation for the radical changes he wanted to enact in 
society.285  
Whether or not Bruno died for his belief in plurality, the Church opposed his 
cosmology, as Thomas Kuhn writes, “he had given [Copernicanism] a significance not 
to be found in De Revolutionibus.”286  The Copernican system now presented itself not 
only as a potential rival cosmology, but also as a rival mythic cosmology.  Bruno’s 
infinite worlds not only called into question unity, but also explicitly called into 
question some of the foundational Christian beliefs tied to unity.  The popular reaction 
to the news of Bruno’s death also suggests that many people believed that he died for 
his belief in plurality. Bruno’s execution made Descartes hesitant to write about the 
plurality of worlds.287  Bruno’s death made him a martyr for plurality, famous among 
intellectuals like Edmund Spenser, Francis Godwin, and the School of Night, a group 
of scientists and philosophers.288 
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3.6 GALILEO AND HIS TELESCOPE 
Copernicus’ theory gained ground because it had slightly better effectiveness at 
explaining celestial movements than the previous model.  Galileo’s telescope provided 
much stronger proof for the Copernican system, by furnishing difficult to refute 
evidence about the nature of the solar system.  Through his telescope Galileo observed 
that the moon had topological features much like earth and that Jupiter had a series of 
moons.  The celestial bodies no longer appeared as perfectly formed objects, but more 
similar to earth.  Galileo’s observations translated to the public much easier than 
Copernicus’ mathematical charts, which raised the attention of the inquisition.   
In 1616 the Catholic Church briefly banned Copernicus’ book, because of the 
attention Galileo brought to the question of heliocentrism.289 In 1632, Galileo 
published Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, in which he depicts the 
geocentric view as foolish.  Thomas Kuhn remarks on the strange fact that the 
Church’s reaction to heliocentrism occurred, not in the initial stages of the theory, but 
when the evidence had become all but overwhelming.290  The charges brought against 
Galileo suggest this new concern with heliocentrism undoubtedly came from its 
increasing connection to the question of plurality. 
 Of the eleven charges brought against Galileo two dealt with the plurality of 
worlds.  The eighth charge accuses Galileo of claiming the moon has earth like 
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qualities like water and mountains, which denies the ethereal nature of celestial 
bodies.291  The belief that the moon has planet-like qualities sets the stage for the ninth 
charge, which indicates that Galileo’s model opens up the possibility of, “many worlds 
and earths and seas…and that there are human beings living there.”292  The Church 
argued that plurality contradicted the scriptures and raised questions about whether 
Jesus needed to be crucified multiple times in order to save each world’s population. 293  
The fact that two charges on plurality made their way into the trial suggests that 
plurality represented one of the ultimate concerns of the Church.  
Galileo appeared to recognize the danger of supporting plurality, even as he 
defended a heretical heliocentric cosmology.  In his early works he avoided any 
discussion of plurality.  He did this despite the fact that his telescopic observations of 
earth like qualities of the supposed “ethereal objects” had obvious implications for the 
question of plurality.  Many of those who read his works made this connection and 
when they pressed Galileo to discuss it he gave a noncommittal answer. 294  The man 
bold enough to write a devastating portrayal of defenders of geocentrism as ignorant 
fools, refused to get himself entangled in the plurality debate.295  
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 Church figures referred to plurality as the “new heresy.”296  Pierre de Cazre, 
rector of the College of Dijon described how the danger of heliocentrism is not the 
location of the earth, but that it opens up the possibility of plurality, 
 
If the earth is doubtless one of the planets and also has inhabitants, then it is 
well to believe that inhabitants exist on the other planets and are not lacking in 
the fixed stars, that they are even of a superior nature and in proportion as the 
other stars surpass the earth in size and perfection.  This will raise doubts about 
Genesis which says the earth was made before the stars and they were created 
on the fourth day to illuminate the earth and measure the seasons and years.  
Then in turn the entire economy of the Word incarnate and of scriptural truth 
will be rendered suspect.297 
 
The Bible, like most religions, presents an anthropocentric creation myth.  Cazre 
feared that plurality ultimately conflicted with this central element of Christianity.  
Gabriel Naudé, physician to Louis XIII, declared plurality the greatest heresy: 
 
I am afraid that those old theological heresies are nothing compared to the new 
ones the astronomers are seeking to introduce with their worlds, or rather lunar 
and celestial earths.  For the consequences of these heresies will be far more 
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dangerous than those of the earlier ones and will bring about many stranger 
upheavals.298 
 
To appreciate the boldness of Naudé’s statement one must remember the ferocity with 
which the Church ferreted out and eliminated heretical views.  Although he does not 
say why plurality poses a greater danger, one can imagine reasons.299 
The scientific element of the heresy raised serious rhetorical concerns for the 
Church.  The claim that the Catholic Church has an expertise in Bible goes without 
saying; confronting other heresies meant a debate on the ground where the Church felt 
comfortable.300 The fragility of Aquinas’s solution of the double-truth dilemma was 
becoming evident.  Plurality gained supporters by means of the scientific evidence for 
its existence, an area outside the well-worn confines of theological debates.  Scientific 
claims have a veneer of objectivity that comes from their foundation in empirical 
observation.  Passages on the presence or absence of other worlds proved vague and 
could always be ready metaphorically, telescopic observations held the position of fact 
and less easily open to interpretation.301 
 The scientific nature of the heresy of plurality raised three possibilities for the 
Church.  First, they could provide their own scientific defense of religious dogma, 
such as geocentrism.  This had been the basic strategy throughout the middle ages, 
                                                
298 Gabriel Naudé to Ismael Boulliau, 15 August 1640, quoted in Guthke, The Last Frontier, 48. 
299 Apparently, there is little discussion in these sources that can be deemed as “scientific.”  Most of the 
reactions against plurality focused on religious and philosophical arguments. 
300 If the double truth approach had been victorious than the cosmological refutation of Aristotle’s 
cosmology would not have been nearly as big of a concern.  
301 The rise of occularcentrism helped give further credibility to the telescopic observations.  David 
Michael Levin, Sites of Vision: The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
 116
with the Church investing heavily in the defense of the Aristotelian system.  The new 
discoveries, however, made this increasingly ineffective.  Second, they could 
denounce or at the very least question science, like Augustine had in the thirteenth 
century.  Unfortunately, the window for the Church to call into question science had 
passed.  By the 1600s Catholicism, following Aquinas, had firmly established the 
harmony between religion and science.  A move to denounce science would require 
significant backtracking on the part of the Church.  Third, they could open themselves 
to the possibility of plurality, which is the direction the Catholic Church (and many 
other Christian religious groups) ultimately chose.  
 The move towards plurality, however, faced significant opposition, because of 
unity’s connection with philosophical and religious values.  The need to maintain 
harmony between religion and science ultimately forced a de facto acceptance of 
heliocentrism.  After Isaac Newton developed his new physics in Philosophiæ 
Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687), the case for geocentrism became all put 
impossible to take seriously.302  The plurality question, however, lacked much 
empirical evidence in its favor.  Many individuals accepted heliocentrism, but opposed 
the implication of plurality.  Even though he accepted Copernicanism, Reverend 
Robert Jenkin, provides a rather standard version of Plato’s unity argument, 
 
Anaxagoras said, he was sent into the World to contemplate the heavenly 
Bodies: And the contemplation of them has contributed more than any one 
thing in Nature besides, to preserve a sense of Religion among Heathens… 
                                                
302 Grant, "In Defense of the Earth's Centrality and Immobility," 67. 
 117
And these Parts of Nature which are so beneficial, and afford such satisfaction 
to Mankind in general, may fully answer all the Ends needful in their Creation, 
tho’ they should not be designed for such farther uses, as some modern 
Philosophers have contrived for them.303 
 
Jenkin argues that study of the universe instills proper values, even in those that had 
not been exposed to Christianity.  This represents the purpose of the planets, rather 
than as a home to alien life.  The use of the structure of the universe as a model for 
human goodness harkens back to Plato’s Timaeus. 
Thomas Baker, a fellow of St. John’s College in Cambridge, defends unity in 
his book Reflections Upon Learning (1699).  He claims humanity serves as a worthy 
purpose of the universe, 
 
These World-Mongers are always objecting the improbability of GOD’s 
framing so many vast and Glorious Bodies, only for the sake of the Earth, so 
inconsiderable a portion of the Whole… There is more Beauty and Contrivance 
in the Structure of a Human Body, than there is in the Glorious Body of the 
Sun; and more Perfection in one Rational Immaterial Soul, than in the whole 
Mass of Matter, be it never so bulky.  There cannot then be any Absurdity in 
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saying, That all Things were created for the sake of this inferior World, and the 
Inhabitants thereof.304 
 
He rejects the assertion that so much space would be wasted if it lacked inhabitants, by 
elevating humanity.  He claims more beauty in the human form than exists in the sun, 
which amounts to the argument that humanity is so important that God created the vast 
universe for their viewing pleasure. 
Individuals like Baker and Jenkins tried to preserve the socially stabilizing 
discourse of the Aristotelian cosmology, by salvaging the only physical aspect of it 
they could: unity.  Plato provided a scientific justification of the Good that rested on 
ethereal celestial objects, orderly orbits, geocentrism, and unity.  Galileo and Newtown 
undermined the case for ethereal celestial objects, orderly orbits, and geocentrism.  
Although heliocentrism did not disprove unity, its view of the celestial objects as 
planet-like opened the door to plurality. 
3.7 THE SHIFT TO PLURALISM 
The widespread acceptance of heliocentrism radically altered cosmological thinking, 
opening the door to plurality.305  Plurality began to gain a foothold among intellectuals 
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like the Northumberland circle in England.306  But the popularization of plurality came 
from Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle in his book Conversations on the Plurality of 
Worlds (1686). Fontenelle uses a fictional dialogue, the style of Plato and Galileo, 
between a scholar and a female Marquise that in very casual, accessible prose explores 
the possibility of plurality.   
Conversations identifies the unity of the world rhetorical argument: 
 
The same desire which makes a courtier want to have the most honorable place 
in a ceremony makes a philosopher want to place himself in the center of a 
world system, if he can.  He’s sure that everything was made for him, and 
unconsciously accepts that principle which flatters him, and his heart will bend 
a matter of pure speculation to his interest.307 
 
Fontenelle specifically highlights the strong perceived connection between human 
specialness and cosmology unity and later has the Marquise muse on the potential 
sense of pointlessness that would come with plurality: 
 
I’m beginning to see the Earth so frighteningly small that I believe hereafter 
I’ll be impressed by another thing.  Assuredly, if people have such a love of 
acquisition, if they make up plan after plan, if they go to so much trouble, it’s 
because they don’t know about vortices.  I can claim that my new 
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enlightenment justifies my laziness, and when anyone reproaches me for my 
indolence I’ll answer: ‘Ah, if you knew what the fixed stars are!’308 
 
Fontenelle elsewhere, however, relishes in the overturning of the Aristotelian system 
and its replacement with a gigantic inhabited cosmos: 
 
When the sky was only this blue vault, with the stars nailed to it, the universe 
seemed small and narrow to me; I felt oppressed by it.  Now that they’ve given 
infinitely greater breadth and depth to the vault by dividing it into thousands 
and thousands of vortices, it seems to me that I breathe more freely… The 
inhabitants of a planet in one of these infinite vortices see on all sides the 
lighted centers of the vortices surrounding them.309 
 
Despite making the Vatican’s list of dangerous books, Conversations on the Plurality 
of Worlds went on to sell out of numerous editions and by 1800 had been translated 
into Danish, Dutch, German, Greek, Italian, Polish, Russian, Spanish, and Swedish.310  
Fontenelle’s work on alien life so fascinated the public that Samuel Pierpont Langley, 
the inventor of the bolometer, wrote over 200 years later that Conversations on the 
Plurality of Worlds represents the first example of a popular science text.311 
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While Fontenelle provided the publicly accessible introduction to plurality, 
Christiaan Huygens gave plurality scientific credibility.312  Before he wrote about 
plurality, Huygens, a famous Dutch astronomer and mathematician, already had 
achieved fame for accomplishments like discovering the moon Titan.  In his book 
Cosmotheoros (1698), he outlines arguments for plurality, much like Fontenelle, but 
with, “a more scientifically developed presentation.”313 Cosmotheoros and 
Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds together spearheaded a tidal wave of 
pluralist thinking.314  
Interestingly, belief in pluralism of worlds coincided with a pluralism of 
cultural, political, and religious power centers. The rise of nation states began to 
replace the sprawling Empires of the past.  Vernacular language gained ground against 
the old Latin-based unification of learning.  The Reformation had created a plurality of 
denominations to challenge Catholic Ascendancy.  The Ottoman Empire threatened 
Austria and Christendom more generally.  Two whole continents of previously 
unheard of people had been discovered.  The world moved ever more towards plurality 
of social structures.  
By the early 1800s most scientists who studied the question of alien life 
believed the issue had been settled decisively in favor of plurality.315  The idea that so 
much space could exist without inhabitants struck them as incredibly wasteful and 
inconsistent with the way that one finds life in even the remotest parts of the planet 
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Earth.  They advocated a principle of plentitude that said life would be found wherever 
it could possibly emerge.316  The Eclectic Review, a high brow British periodical 
wrote, “the probability that the other orbs of our system are inhabited worlds must 
appear so great, that a direct revelation from heaven disclaiming the fact, would make 
but little difference in our assurance of it.”317  While the Eclectic Review’s defense of 
pluralism went beyond most others in terms of its bombast, most writers shared the 
general sentiment.318 The offbeat theory of Fontenelle began to look more and more 
like scientific orthodoxy.  
Not only did scientists accept pluralism, evidence suggests that the idea 
escaped from academic enclaves and seeped into mainstream thinking.  In 1795, the 
internationally known propagandist and polemicist whose work was central to both the 
American and French revolutions, Thomas Paine proclaimed, 
 
Though it is not a direct article of the Christian system that this world that we 
inhabit is the whole of the habitable creation, yet it is so worked up therewith, 
from what is called the Mosaic account of the Creation, the Story of Eve and 
the apple, and the counterpart of that story—the death of the Son of God—that 
to believe otherwise, that is, to believe God create[d] a plurality of worlds, at 
least as numerous as what we call the stars, renders the Christian system of 
faith at once little and ridiculous, and scatters it in the mind like feathers in the 
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air.  The two beliefs cannot be held together in the same mind; and he who 
thinks that he believes both has thought but little of either.319  
 
Paine used the common belief in plurality as a justification for an attack on 
Christianity.  Paine, an avowed deist, opposed the belief that God actively interferes in 
the affairs of humans.  He uses the prospect of a universe full of inhabited planets to 
suggest that it would be ridiculous to imagine God intervening in the affairs of earth.  
He thus inverts Plato’s argument, if unity makes humanity special then plurality makes 
it unimportant.   
Paine’s text went through eight editions in 1794, seven the following year and 
two in 1796. 320 Paine’s work brought deist ideas to the common people in an 
enormously effective manner and became a best seller in France, England, and the 
US.321  Britain, fearful of radical ideas in the wake of the French Revolution, 
ultimately banned the book and prosecuted hundreds of booksellers over thirty years 
for violating the law.322 
Rather than launch an attack on pluralism to combat its potential deist 
implications, like it had Copernicism, the most elements of the Christian Church 
largely agreed with Paine’s belief in plurality, but, of course, not his conclusion.  A 
fiery preacher of the Free Church of Scotland, Dr. Thomas Chalmers lectured 
extensively on the question in 1817 and claimed that no tension existed between 
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Christianity and alien planets.  In fact, argued Chalmers, pluralism demonstrated the 
awesome power of God, a revival of a view that precedes Aquinas.323  Chalmers’s 
lectures became a smashing success. Samuel Warren, an English barrister wrote that as 
a boy he waited four hours to hear Chalmers lecture on pluralism and Christianity and 
even with the wait he did not come early enough to get a chair.324  Chalmers collected 
his sermons on pluralism into a book, which sold 6,000 copies in ten weeks.  By the 
end of a year it had sold 20,000 copies and gone through nine editions.325 
Religious acceptance of pluralism paved the way for it to emerge in other 
contexts. Crowe argues that the astronomer Ormsby MacKnight Mitchel convinced the 
population of Cincinnati to fund the world’s second largest refracting telescope in part 
by his appeal to pluralism.326  Much as the Aristotelian cosmology became a 
commonplace of the medieval period, pluralism began to become a part of everyday 
life.  
The scientific discussion of plurality primed the American public to accept 
even the most bizarre tales of alien life.  In 1835, the American journalist Richard 
Adams Locke, who claimed a Cambridge University pedigree, wrote a series of 
newspaper articles about discoveries of life on the Moon, which he attributed to famed 
astronomer John Herschel.  In reality, he completely fabricated the contents of the 
articles, which included absurd findings like the presence of blue unicorns and a race 
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of bipedal tool-using Beavers.327  Locke meant the article to satirize the outlandish 
claims of the defenders of plurality, but the public largely accepted the story as true 
scientific discovery.328  When an enterprising journalist uncovered the fact that the 
article contained no element of truth, newspapers denounced it as a hoax rather than a 
satire.  Crowe explains the refusal to accept the article as satire,  “It was not that Locke 
lacked the skills of a satirist; it was rather that pluralist preaching and pronouncements 
had so permeated the thought of his contemporaries that they first failed to see the 
articles as satire, and failed again as they branded them a ‘hoax.’”329  Fantastic 
pluralist ideas had taken such a hold on the public that they accepted Locke’s absurd 
story as truth. 
A review of early American newspaper articles in the database American 
Periodicals Series (APS) showed fifty-seven results for the phrase “plurality of 
worlds,” between 1774-1849.330 Of the articles that took positions on the question, 
eight supported plurality and only one opposed it.  This provides further proof of 
pluralist opinions in the general public. 
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
Prior to Copernicus, Plato’s grand strategy for his rhetorical cosmology appears to 
have come true.  He wanted a philosophical defense of goodness intertwined with 
scientific theory and a ban upon rival cosmologies.  Aquinas’ updated version of 
Aristotle’s cosmology combined the latest scientific thinking with Plato’s ideas from 
the Timaeus. The rejection of the dual truth approach of the Avicennians joined 
Christianity with natural philosophy.  As far as banning rival cosmologies, most of the 
Greek cosmologies opposed to Plato’s did not make their way to Europe until the 
fifteenth century.  The universities taught the Aquinian/Platonic/Aristotelian 
cosmology and the threat of excommunication or death loomed over those that strayed 
too far from Church dogma. The actualization of Plato’s program had exactly the kind 
of results he desired.  The unity cosmology, as part of the broader Aristotelian 
cosmology, integrated itself so deeply into the popular imagination that it went without 
saying. This allowed it to offer a strong foundation for social stability, religion, and 
absolute ideals.331  
The Copernican revolution represented the end for most elements of the 
Aristotelian cosmology.  The scientific upheaval coincided with massive political, 
religious, and social change throughout Europe.  Some individuals tried to maintain a 
version of Aristotle’s cosmology and thus reinstate its rhetorical power to quell change 
by highlighting the one aspect that heliocentrism had yet to disprove: unity.  Despite 
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their efforts, pluralism gained enormous ground.  Plurality went from something a few 
scholars theorized, but did not actually defend, to a popular belief.  This sets the stage 
for the 1800s, where two enormously important figures offer defenses of unity: 
William Whewell and Alfred Russel Wallace.  
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4.0  WILLIAM WHEWELL AND ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE: UNITY 
COSMOLOGY IN THE MODERN ERA 
 “They say in Cambridge that Dr. Whewell's book, ‘Plurality of Worlds,’ reasons to 
this end: The planets were created for this world; this world for man; man for England; 
England for Cambridge; and Cambridge for Dr. Whewell!”332 
Maria Mitchell American astronomer, November 1857 
 
“Sir Oliver Lodge has himself said that the attempt to explain the universe by chance 
has absolutely failed. It must have had a designer… My whole argument tends in that 
direction, though my object in writing 'Man's Place in the Universe' was purely 
scientific, not religious.”333 
Alfred Russel Wallace, 1903 
 
 
 
The collapse of the geocentric model of the universe helped to usher in the modern 
era.334  Without a celestial justification for the status quo, new ideologies, politics, and 
philosophies emerged more easily. Modernity, at its foundation, represented an 
opening up of all the previous ideologies to challenge.335  Utilitarianism and classical 
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liberalism challenged the dominant philosophical and political orders.  Deism 
questioned the need for God’s active presence in the universe.  The French Revolution 
undermined the belief in the stability of monarchy. For many individuals, these (and 
many more) radical changes, in part or in whole, represented a dangerous move away 
from traditional ideas.336  
Some critics of the post-Copernican transformation employed a rhetorical 
strategy that sought to return to the stabilizing function of Plato’s unity cosmology.  
This strategy, however, could not simply restore the Aristotelian cosmology of the 
medieval ages.  Galileo’s models, combined with the explanatory power of Newton’s 
physics and the increased observational power of new telescopes, meant that no 
serious scholar could make a defense of many discredited elements of Plato and 
Aristotle’s cosmology.337  The new science definitively disproved the physical 
centrality of the Earth and the ethereal, perfect nature of the celestial objects and their 
orbits.  The question of a plurality of worlds, however, had yet to be definitively 
resolved by science, even though the Copernican revolution made plurality a much 
more popular position.  This chapter examines two case studies of individuals using 
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the unity cosmology in order to argue for absolute values against the relativistic values 
of modernity.338  
The first case study examines the famous Anglican philosopher William 
Whewell (1794-1886). His book Plurality of Worlds (1853) ruptured the illusion of 
plurality consensus by providing a well-argued case for the unity cosmology from a 
respected intellectual figure. Early in his career, Whewell accepted and even defended 
the pluralist position.  Like Plato, whose dialogues he published in (1861), however, 
Whewell grew concerned with the ways that pluralism provided an argument against a 
teleological and perfectible universe. Also like Plato, he saw that a defense of unity 
could represent a powerful argument against his materialist intellectual opponents, 
most notably the utilitarians, e.g., Bentham, Mill, and Locke.339  Whewell, a scientist, 
did not deny the importance of empirical observation, but advocated a hybrid method 
that mixed observation with the idealism of Plato and Kant.340  As discussed below, 
Whewell viewed the utilitarians as modern-day sophists.  In the Plurality of Worlds he 
defends a reworked version of Plato’s unity cosmology, which he uses as an argument 
for absolute values.  While Whewell made few converts in the scientific world, the 
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dialogue and debate that emerged after his book, revealed the cracks in the plurality 
consensus and helped erect a rhetorical bulwark against utilitarian ideas.  
The second case study investigates Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913), the co-
discoverer of the theory of evolution via natural selection. Wallace, like Whewell, also 
tried to revive the unity cosmology as a method to advocate for his political and social 
beliefs.  Wallace deeply opposed capitalism and colonialism, but over time he became 
more and more convinced that the Darwinian theory he helped discover justified 
political practices he despised.341  He sought a scientific counterweight to temper the 
social implications of orthodox Darwinism and return humanity to a privileged 
position.  In his books Man’s Place in the Universe (1903) and The World of Life 
(1910) he uses the unity cosmology to achieve this end.  
The 1700s saw the collapse of much of the cosmology of Plato, Aristotle, and 
Aquinas and ushered in a host of radical social changes culminating in the French 
Revolution and Napoleonic Era.342  Wallace and Whewell hoped to revive unity, the 
one aspect of medieval cosmology not definitively disproven by heliocentrism and 
Newtonian physics.  Both believed that scientific paradigms provided an intellectual 
justification for ethics--and religion--and maintained that only unity could justify 
absolute values. Whewell and Wallace believed that plurality gave credence to the 
positions of their opponents, whether or not their opponents made this connection.  
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4.1 WILLIAM WHEWELL 
Whewell’s defense of the unity cosmology came as such a shock to his peers.  Both 
David Brewster and Stair Douglas suggest that Whewell's suffering at the death of his 
wife Cordelia primed him to reject plurality, but Crowe notes that none of his writings 
provide evidence for this theory.343  Whewell’s drastic change of opinion must have 
appeared to come out of nowhere, which must have proved a major surprise, not only 
because of the heterodox nature of his opinion, but also because of the stature of the 
opinion holder.344   
By the time he wrote his defense of the unity cosmology in 1853 he had 
achieved considerable success within the academic world. Whewell held the position 
of Master at Trinity College in Cambridge on conservative Prime Minister Robert 
Pell’s recommendation to the Queen, was a founding member of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, a fellow of the Royal Society, and a 
president of The Geological Society.345  He acquired the nickname the “harmonious 
blacksmith” from Erasmus Darwin after he saw Whewell respectively listen, “all ear 
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(not all assent)” at a lecture of Thomas Carlyle.346 He would eventually become one of 
the most respected intellectual figures in England, but his rise to prominence did 
nothing to foreshadow his future public support for unity. 
Whewell straddled two major competing intellectual traditions. The empiricist 
school epitomized by John Locke and David Hume advocated an empiricist approach 
to knowledge that deemphasized epistemology not grounded in sensation.  The idealist 
school, epitomized by Immanuel Kant and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, believed that true 
knowledge could be intuited by humanity and that structural limitations severely 
handicapped an empiricist method.  Like Thomas Reid, who greatly influenced his 
work, Whewell criticized both schools and sought a middle path that drew from both 
idealism and empiricism.347  This interest in a hybrid of idealism and empiricism drew 
Whewell to scientific debates like plurality that blended scientific/empiricist and 
philosophical/idealist implications and methodologies.  
In 1833, Whewell published Astronomy and General Physics, a volume for the 
prestigious Bridgewater Treatises, in which he still defended the possibility of 
plurality.  Reverend Francis Henry, Earl of Bridgewater, commissioned the 
compendium in his 1825 last will and testament for the purpose of collecting the 
scientific evidence for God. Each of the Bridgewater Treatises covered a different 
scientific field and was written by an expert in that field.  The resulting documents 
represented a, “largely nontechnical, politically conservative, and religiously safe 
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compendium of contemporary science.”348  Given the popularity of plurality and the 
unadventurous nature of the Bridgewater Treatises, one should not be surprised that 
Whewell’s volume on astronomy and general physics remained open to the idea of 
plurality 
In his treatise, Astronomy and General Physics Whewell defends the standard 
science of the time, which included the high probability of plurality.  He writes, “we 
may thus have in the universe worlds, no one knows how many, no one can guess how 
varied.”349 Whewell showed no signs of his later concern that plurality would 
undermine teleology and ultimately Christianity.  In fact, he explicitly denounces this 
possibility when he says, “Numbers [author’s italics] are nothing in themselves; and 
when we reject the known, but unessential limits of our own faculties, it is quite as 
allowable to suppose a million millions of earths as one, to be under the moral 
government of God.”350  When Whewell later attacked the plurality position, at least 
one commentator mentioned the irony that one could easily mistake Whewell’s 
Astronomy and General Physics for a work of any number of other pluralist writers of 
the time.351   
Although his peers recognized Whewell as an expert on astronomy, he also 
engaged in a variety of other academic pursuits.  Before publishing his attack on 
plurality, Whewell wrote many important texts on philosophy, religion, and in 
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scientific fields other than astronomy.352  In fact, between his Bridgewater Treatise 
and Plurality Whewell shifted his research focus to question of morality and even 
thought about leaving Cambridge to take up a parish.353 One theme emerged across his 
works: Whewell’s prolonged conflict with utilitarian ideas.354   
Whewell believed utilitarianism had garnered enough power to present a 
serious challenge to traditional ethics with its focus on sensationalism and materialism.  
In the fields of ethics, language, and philosophy of science, utilitarian philosophers 
made great strides.  William Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy laid 
the foundation for philosophers to attack predetermined morality.355  John Horne 
Tooke offered a linguistic theory that used etymology to highlight the social constructs 
behind words like “right,” in order to show that morality exists only as a linguistic 
construct.356  J.S. Mill championed an empiricist science that claimed experience 
determined reality.357 As isolated developments these proved problematic for 
Whewell; taken together they represented a frontal attack on Whewell’s philosophical 
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beliefs and a serious implicit threat to the foundations of Christian belief, by 
supplanting the traditional spiritual order with a deist or material one. 
The growing materialism viewed empiricism as the only mechanism to 
evaluate truth, which posed a challenge to Whewell’s philosophical idealism and 
conservative political beliefs, which went beyond a mere academic question.  
Utilitarians pushed for measures that would overhaul higher education, shifting the 
focus from classics and mathematics to politics, economics, and modern philosophy, 
while decentralizing institutional power.358  Perry Williams suggests that Whewell 
connected utilitarian beliefs to the French Revolution and unrest in England, which 
jeopardized the place of the church and the established social order.359 Whewell 
believed that the impetus for these forces of social change began in the academy with 
the work of the founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, and Whewell believed that 
winning the battle of ideas in academia could help reverse what he saw as negative 
political developments.360  
In many ways the debate between Whewell and his philosophical and political 
opponents parallels Plato’s conflict with the sophists.  The prevailing historical view 
held the sophists as dangerous radicals interested in commercialism, skepticism, and 
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populism, the very beliefs Whewell associated with the materialists of his day.361  The 
few positive portrayals of the sophists typically came from liberals interested in their 
connection with ancient Greek democracy.362  In the 1850s the liberal historian and 
utilitarian sympathizer George Grote would defend Protagoras’ belief of, “man as the 
measure of all things,” as foundational to good governance and utilitarianism.363   
Whewell likely agreed with Grote’s revised historical narrative, because it 
made Plato’s conflict with the sophists more analogous to the philosophical debates of 
modern times.  He praises Grote, “for having rejected an established system for 
vilifying and misrepresenting Plato’s opponents, the Sophists, and ascribing to them in 
every thing that they say, Sophistry in its modern English usage.”364  The previous 
treatment of the sophists had treated them as hucksters with no underlying philosophy 
beyond their own self-interest.365  This caricaturing view made the debate between 
Plato and the sophists uninstructive for modern times, because Plato’s dialogues show 
Socrates triumphing over a collection of straw men.  With radicals increasingly taking 
on the mantle of sophists, Whewell was free to cast himself as a modern day Plato.366   
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As early as 1839, Whewell delivered a lecture that connected his beliefs in 
absolute morality with Plato’s.  In this passage he analogized Plato’s ancient debates 
with his conflicts with the utilitarians:   
 
We maintain, with Plato, that reason has a natural and rightful authority over 
desire and affection; with [Joseph] Butler, that there is a difference of kind in 
our principles of action; with the general voice of mankind, that we must do 
what is right, at whatever cost of pain and loss. We deny the doctrine of the 
ancient Epicureans, that pleasure is the supreme good; of Hobbes, that moral 
rules are only the work of men’s mutual fear; of Paley, that what is expedient is 
right, and that there is no difference among pleasures except their intensity and 
duration; and of Bentham, that the rules of human action are to be obtained by 
casting up the pleasures which actions produce.367 
 
Whewell does not mention the sophists by name in this passage, but it is unnecessary. 
Plato wrote his philosophy in dialogue form, Plato’s defense of “reason,” “over desire 
and affection,” occurred in debates with the sophists. Whewell contrasts Plato’s views 
with the Epicureans, ancient utilitarians and defenders of the atomist cosmology, and 
his more recent intellectual opponents Paley, Hobbes, and Bentham.368 
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Whewell analogizes the materialists of his day and the sophists of ancient 
Greece in the (1861) introduction to his translation of Protagoras, in the Platonic 
Dialogues, in a gratuitous peroration 
 
One sentence of [Protagoras’] is attacked by Plato, and is understood by the 
commentators, as if it meant that we have no knowledge except by sensation. 
He said that “Man is the measure of all things.” It is plain that this may mean 
that man’s faculties are the measure of human knowledge above all things; a 
very blameless doctrine, as seems to me. And even if the expression means that 
all our knowledge is derived from sensation, it conveys a doctrine which 
though, as I conceive, false, is extremely prevalent among many of the most 
moral, clear- headed, and right-minded persons among ourselves.369 
 
The reference to sensationalists likely refers to the growing epistemology of 
materialism in England.  Whewell’s charitable claim that the sensationalists make up, 
“many of the most moral, clear-headed, and right-minded persons among ourselves,” 
suggests he references a group big enough to include Unitarians and Anglican “broad-
church” latitudinarians, as well as religious scientists who deployed a materialistic 
epistemology.  Whewell saw many of these individuals as allies on the question of 
ethics even if they held problematic scientific views, just as Plato agreed with the 
atomists on many ethical points, but not their cosmology.  
In Whewell’s mind, the foremost sensationalists of the time were the followers 
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of proto-utilitarian philosopher John Locke.370  He accuses them of giving “exclusive 
authority of the senses in [an] extreme unmitigated manner” and refers to them as the 
“sensationalist school.”371  Again he cast the debate between his more idealist views 
and the sensationalists in term of the ancients,  
 
[The opponents of pure sensationalism] knew, too, that many of the plausible 
tenets of the new philosophy were revivals of fallacies which had been 
discussed and refuted in ancient times.  But the advocates of mere experience 
came on with a vast store of weighty truth among their artillery and with the 
energy which the advance usually bestows.  The ideal system of philosophy 
could, for the present, make no effectual resistance; Locke, by putting himself 
at the head of the assault, became the hero of his day.372  
 
Whewell argues that the advances in science that began with Galileo, gave renewed 
credence to the ancient, once discredited ideas of the sensationalists.  Whewell 
suggests that the sensationalists, buoyed by the new scientific paradigm, rushed to 
revive the materialistic philosophy of the ancient sophists, without properly 
contending with the arguments of Plato and others. 
Whewell probably would not grant the title of “moral, clear-headed, and right-
minded persons,” to these extremists of the sensationalist camp.  Locke’s followers 
                                                
370 A. P. Brogan, "John Locke and Utilitarianism," Ethics 69, no. 2 (1959). 
 
371 William Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences: Founded Upon their History, vol. 2 
(London: John W. Parker, 1840), 457-69. 
372 Ibid.,  458. 
 141
helped provide the intellectual grounding for the political and metaphysical 
revolutions that Whewell so despised.373  In the forward to his book he states that he 
wrote the manuscript for the express purpose of attacking the “ultra-Lockian” position, 
which provides yet another example of Whewell mixing morality and politics with 
scientific and epistemological questions.374 
The theme of Plato-versus-the-Sophists as a historical analogue for Whewell’s 
intellectual conflict with the utilitarians emerges again in “Influence of the History of 
Science on Intellectual Education,” which he delivered in 1854, a year after the 
publication of Plurality.  Whewell positions himself as a modern day Plato battling the 
utilitiarians’ educational program that lacks an appreciation for absolute values beyond 
human construction: 
 
The first great attempt made for the improvement of intellectual education, so far 
as history tells us, was that undertaken and prosecuted with preserving vigor by 
Socrates and Plato… the teachers whom Socrates and Plato perseveringly 
opposed – have been habitually called the Sophists; …the education which these 
teachers professed to give, and frequently gave, was precisely what we 
commonly mean by a good education.  It was an education enabling a young 
man to write well, speak well and act efficiently, on all ordinary occasions, 
public and private.  The moral doctrines which they taught, even according to the 
most unfavorable representation of them, were no worse than the moral doctrines 
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which are most commonly taught among ourselves at the present day,-- the 
morality founded upon utility [his emphasis]; but many of them repudiated this 
doctrine as sordid and narrow, and professed higher principles.”375 
 
Unlike the materialists generally, whom he equates as having improperly absorbed 
elements of sophistic epistemology, Whewell directly connects the sophists and 
utilitarians.  Whewell in this passage even goes so far as to suggest that the 
utilitarianism represents a force more “sordid” then that of the sophists, because at 
least some of the sophists believed in some form of moral code.  Given the then-
prevalent historiography, Whewell’s placing the utilitarians below the sophists 
represented a serious insult.  
Whewell makes the connection between his intellectual battle with the 
utilitarians and Plato’s struggle with the sophists, and like Plato, Whewell engaged his 
opponents across the spectrum of his work.  Whewell followed Plato, too, in 
emphasizing a strong mathematics education as a bulwark against relativism. The 
utilitarians and other radical groups sought to shift focus away from math, where they 
believed scholars could produce little new knowledge, to philosophy where new 
developments constantly occur.  Whewell fiercely opposed this plan, because he felt 
the eternal truths of math engrained a sense of absolute moral values, whereas the 
deluge of new developments in philosophy encouraged relativism by demonstrating 
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that what people believe is true today can change tomorrow.376  Whewell did not 
passively declare his opposition to the shift away from a mathematics curriculum, but 
became active in the public debate by writing position papers opposed to the proposed 
changes. He made the case that the “poll men,” college students who did not graduate 
with honors and thus did not need to meet all of the university’s rigorous requirements, 
should have to take math classes.377 Whewell felt that academia should not reserve 
mathematics for the elite, because it could steel the general population against the 
assault of relativism.  He also wrote works on ethics, as replacements for William 
Paley’s utilitarian textbook that was required reading for undergrads.378  Finally, he 
publically advocated an inductive scientific method that he believed delegitimized 
materialism.379  The span of Whewell’s efforts against materialism, relativism, and 
utilitarianism reflect Plato’s life long struggle against these forces in his own time.  
4.2 THE VESTIGES OF CREATION 
Despite Whewell’s best efforts, utilitarian thinking continued to gain ground.  J.S. Mill 
wryly observed in 1825 that his writings had become, “the textbooks of the young 
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men… at Cambridge.”380 The publication of The Vestiges of Creation (1844), 
anonymously authored by successful publisher Robert Chambers, however, proved 
more problematic to Whewell than the decline in math education or the popularity of 
Mill’s essays.381  Whewell invested heavily in the idea that science and math revealed 
eternal immutable truths, which would both prove God’s design and highlight 
appropriate universal ethics.  The Vestiges of Creation outlined a universe where life, 
planets and stars all emerged from a process of blind, impersonal evolution.  In effect, 
it stole the appeal to the eternal cosmos that undergirded Whewell’s entire rhetorical 
attack on the utilitarians, by making the fixed and divine, appear mutable and 
mechanical. 
Vestige’s evolutionary model harkens back to the cosmology of the Atomists, 
where the universe emerges from chaos by means of random chance.  Chambers offers 
a modified account of Emanuel Swedenborg’s nebular hypothesis, which argued 
nebulae (cloud-like astronomical bodies) could not be reduced to stars by further 
magnification of telescopes.382  Instead, these clouds of astronomical dust engaged in a 
process of development whereby natural forces turned them into solar systems like our 
own.  Once these solar systems had formed, life would develop in an evolutionary-like 
fashion (what Chambers called transmutation of species). This cosmogony went 
beyond even the deistic interpretations of the creation of the universe in removing the 
role of God. 
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 The radical nature of the book and its success must have proved shocking to 
Whewell.  Vestiges became a sensation capturing the attention of the educated public, 
selling 40,000 copies in Britain alone.  It became a fashionable subject at parties, a 
popular item charged out at libraries and a major source of ire for conservative 
theologians and academics, who wrote pamphlets and preached sermons about the 
dangers of the book.383  Ultimately Vestiges would play a significant role in setting 
groundwork for Darwin’s evolutionary theory.384  
 Anticipating the controversy and inevitable accusations of atheism, Chambers 
attempted an explanation of why the impersonal cosmology he advocated did not 
oppose Christian theology.385  He also made a series of rhetorical moves to hide the 
radical nature of his thesis, such as using family metaphors to explain complicated 
scientific ideas in way that seemed less threatening and quoting respectable sources, 
including a response to Whewell’s Bridgewater Treatise by respected scientist Charles 
Babbage.386  Chamber’s private correspondence suggests that he carefully calculated 
Vestiges’ deferral to the religion in order to avoid the censure that had fallen upon 
other radical books.387   
Despite these moves to harmonize his scientific beliefs with prevailing 
morality, Chambers likely welcomed the possibility that his cosmology would call into 
question the current social order.  He engaged in radical politics and may have 
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abandoned his earlier Christian religious views.388  He surrendered much of his own 
share of the Vestiges’ sales in order give away free books and pushed for a cheap 
edition to reach a mass audience, suggesting that he wanted to maximize the political 
and social impact of his book.389  The anonymous authorship of the text, however, hid 
the source of these political motives from the wider public.390   
Even without knowledge about the author, Whewell understood the danger of 
Vestiges, because he had long connected science with morality.  Whewell initially 
refused offers to respond in review form, because he did not want to raise the profile 
of the book with his response.391  He eventually acquiesced to a request to respond and 
wrote Indications of the Creator (1845), a collection of parts of his previous writings 
that he believed refuted the Vestiges.392  The text makes it clear that Whewell did not 
take the author of the Vestiges at his word and he attacks the nebular hypothesis for 
trying to supplant religion: 
Innumerable questions of the same kind might be asked, and the conclusion to 
be drawn is, that every new physical theory which we include in our view of 
the universe, involves us in new difficulties and perplexities, if we try to erect 
it into an ultimate and final account of the existence and arrangement of the 
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world in which we live.  With the evidence of such theories, considered as 
scientific generalizations of ascertained facts, with their claims to a place in our 
natural philosophy, we have here nothing to do.  But if they are put forwards as 
a disclosure of the ultimate cause of that which occurs, and as superseding the 
necessity of looking further or higher; if they claim a place in our Natural 
Theology, as well as our Natural Philosophy; we conceive that their 
pretensions will not bear a moment’s examination.393 
  
The term natural theology refers to the belief that the structure of the universe reflects 
the divine nature of God.  Whewell accuses the Vestiges of trying to supplant God as 
the structuring force of cosmos with a scientific explanation.    
Going back to his volume of the Bridgewater Treatises, Whewell had resisted 
any attempts to undermine natural theology.  He wrote, “We may thus, with the 
greatest propriety, deny to the mechanical philosophers and mathematicians of recent 
times any authority with regard to their views of the administration of the universe.”394  
A mechanized worldview makes its holder, “more than common men, liable to miss 
the road to truths of extreme consequence.”395  By “truths of extreme consequence,” 
Whewell refers to religion, which means that the mechanized scientific framework 
threatens religious belief.396  Although Whewell elsewhere says that the nebular 
                                                
393 William Whewell, Indications of the Creator: Extracts, Bearing upon Theology, from The History 
and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (London: John W. Parker, 1845), 18, 19. 
394 Whewell, Astronomy and General Physics, 334. 
395 Ibid.,  338. 
396 This fits within Whewell’s broader resistance of mechanized views of nature.  Michael Ruse, "The 
Relationship between Science and Religion in Britain, 1830-1870," Church History 44, no. 4 (1975). 
 148
hypothesis does not necessarily conflict with Christianity, his suggestion that it could 
undermine natural theology indicates that he held deep concerns about the Vestiges.397 
Whewell closes the book with a discussion of the eternal, god-derived nature of 
good and evil.  This appeal to universal and transcendental truth follows in the mold of 
previous Whewellian attacks on utilitarian social thought.398  Whewell’s inclusion of 
this passage at the end of a scientific response to the nebular hypothesis suggests he 
understands the potential political implications of Chambers’ cosmology.  Whewell, 
like Chambers, recognized that cosmology could play an enormous role in shaping the 
political environment.  He viewed the Vestiges as a scientific defense of the political 
and philosophical views of John Locke and his materialist allies and used his response 
to attack Lockean ideas.399  The way Whewell’s discussion of the Vestiges spills over 
to deal with philosophical concerns foreshadows how he uses unity as a foundation to 
discuss metaphysical issues in Plurality.  
In the contest for the dominant cosmology, however, Chambers continued to 
take a commanding lead.  Whewell’s work, Indications of the Creator, did little to 
stem the popularity of Vestiges.  The third edition of the Vestiges sold out almost 
immediately and writers in the popular press continued to write positive reviews, 
eclipsing the response of Whewell.400 As the work continued to gain popularity, 
Whewell marveled at how the Vestiges achieved a success that “No really 
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philosophical book could have had.”401  The success of Chamber’s hybrid work of 
cosmology, politics, religion, despite vicious attacks by the scientific community, 
foreshadows Whewell’s mimicry of Chamber’s popular style in Plurality.402  
As Whewell spent more time and effort on the philosophical difficulties posed 
by Vestiges’ success, he began to connect the problematic messages in Vestiges to the 
broader plurality thesis.403  Both gave credence to materialism and decentralized 
humanity.  Given this view, the popularity of plurality made things look bleak for the 
success of Whewell’s philosophical and religious views.  He claims to have written 
Plurality with the hope that it “might have some value as a strong case exactly 
opposed to [the Vestiges].”404  Since Vestiges did not deal primarily with the question 
of plurality, this line suggests a more fundamental attack on the philosophical 
underpinning of the book.   
Before publishing the Plurality of Worlds, Whewell sent drafts to intellectuals 
whose opinions he respected. When his friend Stephen James wrote him that he should 
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focus more on the scientific arguments and less on the religious elements, Whewell 
replied 
 
With regard to the relation between the Christian scheme and the Plurality of 
Worlds, I must remark that it is by no means introduced for the first time in 
pages 246 and 247.  On the contrary, the difficulties belonging to that relation 
are the starting point of my whole essay... the topic cannot be excluded for it is 
in fact the topic of my essay.405 
 
 
Whewell’s change of heart on unity and his connection of it with absolute values in 
Plurality suggests he had concluded that society needed a new cosmology (or rather a 
return to an old cosmology) to combat utilitarianism, one which emphasized the 
eternal, designed nature of creation.406 
4.3 PLURALITY OF WORLDS AND THE UTILITY DEBATE 
In 1853, Whewell published the Plurality of Worlds, in which he argues that Earth 
serves as the only habitation of intelligent life in the universe.  The book represents a 
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strong rebuke not only to the Vestiges, but the plurality thesis in general.  A significant 
part of the book reads in a dense scientific prose, which elides its function as a 
philosophical argument.  A close reading of Plurality of Worlds, however, reveals that 
Whewell rather explicitly targets utilitarianism in a way meant to be accessible to a 
wide audience. Whewell’s book, published by J.W. Parker, continued the trend of 
cosmological works becoming bestsellers, going through numerous editions.407 
Amazingly, direct, published responses to Plurality of Worlds included over eighty 
articles and twenty books.408 
If one only read the middle chapters of Plurality of Worlds, he or she would 
confront a rather dry scientific manuscript, in which Whewell exposes many of the 
weaknesses of the plurality position.   Pluralists following the Copernican revolution 
rely heavily on arguments based in analogy: 
A. Earth is a Planet 
B. Earth has life 
A. Mars is a Planet 
B. Thus Mars should have life. 
The argument suggests that because other planets have qualities similar to 
Earth that one should assume they are inhabited.  Whewell points out numerous 
dissimilarities between the other planets and Earth that call into question such an 
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analogy.  The pluralists believed that the presence of so many planets would represent 
a waste of space.  Whewell makes the rather clever case that wide swaths of time 
existed before humans came into existence, but that time does not constitute a 
waste.409  He also argues that nature has lots of waste, like embryos that fail to 
emerge.410  All of these arguments do work to undermine the central analogy at the 
heart of the pluralist case. 
 William C. Heffernan claims that from a scientific perspective Whewell’s 
arguments demolished the pluralist position.411  Heffernen makes a compelling 
argument, as many of the pluralist arguments lacked strong empirical evidence or 
conformed to any kind of rigid methodological basis.  And, of course, history has since 
vindicated Whewell’s position with humanity’s space exploration having yet to 
confirm any life (much less intelligent life) on the planets in our solar system.  Given 
the lack of methods to verify the claim of plurality empirically, however, it is 
unsurprising that Whewell could poke so many holes in the pluralist case.  Plurality 
had become the dominant scientific paradigm, to the point where many individuals 
took it for granted, resulting in poor scholarship.  The question should not focus on 
how strong Whewell’s arguments were against the pluralist position, but how strong 
they were for the unity position.  This focus will highlight assumptions and biases 
within Whewell’s arguments, just as he has done with the pluralists. 
Whewell went beyond attacking the case for pluralism to argue strenuously for 
a unity cosmology.  Heffernen chooses to view Whewell primarily as a 
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“methodological dissenter,” rather than a “proponent… of a negative answer to the 
age-old question of life elsewhere.”412  He acknowledges, but then downplays 
Whewell’s philosophical and religious motivations.  Whewell’s bold thesis that no 
intelligent life exists in the universe frequently put him on scientific ground as shaky 
as the pluralist.  Philosophy and religion motivated Whewell’s antipluralist beliefs far 
more than the scientific evidence against plurality.  
Whewell faces a difficult rhetorical task; he wants to defend the idea that 
plurality undermines humanity’s importance by making it insignificant in the context 
of the universe. The problem occurs, because, as mentioned at the end of the last 
chapter, the only other individuals making this argument were deists like Thomas 
Paine.  By contrast, religious men, like Thomas Chalmers, had defended plurality as 
consistent, if not required, by Christianity.413  Whewell wanted to defend the premise 
that plurality renders Christianity suspect and humanity insignificant (and the reverse 
that unity made Christianity true and humanity important), but combine it with a 
scientific case against plurality and for unity.  Whewell agreed with Chalmers’ 
religious conclusion, but also with the implications of unity put forth by the deists.   
The beginning of Plurality navigates this tension by slowly building the 
connection between unity and religion through a dialogue with Chalmers’ work.  
Chalmers’ first lecture on the connection between plurality and Christianity begins 
with a quote from Psalms, 
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When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars, 
which thou hast ordained; What is man, that thou art mindful of him? And the 
son of man, that thou visitest him? – Psalm viii. 3, 4.414  
 
Chalmers argues that the size of the universe does render humanity small in the grand 
scheme of things, but that God ultimately redeems humanity’s value because, “I am as 
much known to him as if I were the single object of his attention.”415  He laments that 
“infidels” have turned the Psalmist’s wonder at the size of the universe (taken in the 
modern scientific context of plurality) as an argument against Christianity.416  
Although he does not mention any infidels by name he almost certainly refers to 
Thomas Paine, given the popularity of his work.   
 In a nod to Chalmers, Whewell also begins his book by focusing on the 
question posed by the Psalmist,  
 
The earth is not at rest, with the celestial luminaries circulating above it, as the 
ancients believed, but itself moves in a circle around the sun, in the course of 
every year; and the other planets also move around the sun in like manner, in 
circles, some within and some without that which the earth describes.  This 
collection of planets, thus circulating about the sun, is the Solar System: of 
which the earth thus forms a very small part.  Jupiter and Saturn are much larger 
than the earth.  Mars and Venus are nearly as large.  If these be inhabited, as the 
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Earth is, which the analogy for their form, movements and conditions, seems to 
suggest, the population of the earth is a very small portion of the population of 
the solar system.  And if the mere number of the subjects of God’s government 
could produce any difficulty in the application of his providence to them, a 
person to who this view of the world which we inhabit had been disclosed, might 
well, and with far more reason than the Psalmist, exclaim, ‘Lord, what is man, 
that thou art mindful of him? the inhabitant of this Earth, that thou regardest 
him?’417 
 
At this point in the text Whewell has not made it clear his own answer to the Psalmists 
rhetorical question in light of the new scientific belief in plurality, although this 
passage does suggest it raises problems for religion.  Whewell quotes the Psalmist 
several more times in the first chapter without assenting to what Chalmers called the 
“infidel” position.  By the end of the book, however, it becomes obvious that Whewell 
fears plurality renders humanity insignificant and Christianity absurd.418   
Early in the text Whewell seems leery of scaring off readers by defending even 
part of the deist argument against Christianity.  In order to prevent guilt by association, 
he requests that the audience read his objection to plurality (spoken through the words 
of the Psalmist) as “difficulties of religious men, [rather] than as objections of 
irreligious men.”419  This suggests he wants the audience to read his book as a 
dialogue with men like Chalmers, rather than a defense of deists like Paine.  Whewell 
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hides behind the Psalmist’s rhetorical question, but it is clear that he agrees with the 
“infidels’” second premise, that plurality undermines humanity’s place in the universe.  
Whewell attempts to revive the intuitive connection between plurality and human 
insignificance in the face of objections from individuals like Chalmers. Whewell’s 
decision to begin his book with a defense of the deist objection to Christianity signals 
to readers that they should not interpret Plurality of Worlds as simply a scientific text.  
Instead, the question of cosmology has enormous bearing on the place of humanity in 
the universe.  
4.4 PLURALITY OF WORLDS: TIMAEUS 
Whewell’s connection of unity as a necessary condition for Christianity harkens back 
to Plato and Aquinas.  The evidence suggests this connection does not occur as a 
coincidence and that Whewell drew heavily from Plato’s cosmological rhetorical 
strategy as a model.  Early in the final chapter he denotes the two sides in the debate, 
“The two doctrines which we have here to weigh against each other are the Plurality of 
Worlds, and the Unity of the World.”420  What the term “Plurality of Worlds” meant 
would have been clear enough to general readers in the time it was published.  In fact, 
Whewell choose to name his work the “Plurality of Worlds,” even though he argued 
against the proposition, precisely because of the term’s familiarity.421  In order to 
understand the term “Unity of the World,” however, readers would have needed to 
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understand where Whewell borrowed the term.   
Although Whewell never explicitly makes the connection for the readers, it is 
likely that he took the term from the Timaeus.  Here is a passage from Whewell’s 
translation of the Timaeus where he connects the term unity with Plato, 
 
Of one: since it is made after the model. For that [model] which includes all 
Intelligible animals, cannot exist along with a second. For then, [to have a model 
really including all,] we must have one including those two, of which they would 
be parts; and then the universe would be rightly made after the likeness of this 
Including [model], not of those Included. And thus that the world, by its unity, 
should resemble the supremely perfect animal [or living thing], the Creator did 
not make either two or an infinite number of worlds; but, on the contrary, this 
world is and ever shall be the one created world.422 
 
Whewell’s clear familiarity with the Timaeus, as well as Whewell’s use of the term 
“unity” leaves little doubt that the idea that Earth’s singularity as the foundation for 
teleology emerges from it.  In a letter to Herschel, he describes the Greek classics as 
“essential… [to] the liberal education of the present age” and claims, 
 
To suppose that man will ever become, in these respects, independent of the 
history and antiquities of literature, seems to me to be equivalent to supposing 
that he will cease to keep his footing in the path of intellectual progression, of 
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advancing civilization, of the mind and feelings, which began with the 
philosophical and poetical age of Greece.423   
 
In the years prior to writing Plurality of Worlds, Whewell made a transition from a 
Kantian to a Neo-Platonist, which gives further credence to his being deeply familiar 
with Plato’s major dialogues, like the Timaeus.424  In the year he published Plurality, 
Whewell responded to a friend’s request to give a lecture by saying, “The only subject 
on which I could lecture with any satisfaction is Socrates and Plato, of whom my 
thoughts are full, and likely to be so for the next year.”425  This indicates that Whewell 
had focused his attention on Platonic ideas when he wrote the book.  The clearest signs 
that the Timaeus influenced Whewell come from the text of Plurality itself. 
Whewell adopts Plato’s and Aquinas’ notion that completeness represents a 
critical component of perfection. Thus, only a singular inhabited world could be 
perfect, whereas, plurality made each planet and its inhabitants imperfect.  Whewell 
writes in Plurality, “instead of manufacturing a multitude of worlds on patterns more 
or less similar, He has been employed in one great work, which we cannot call 
imperfect, since it includes and suggests all that we can conceive of perfection.”426  
Just as in Plato’s Timaeus and the Thomistic cosmology of the middle ages, 
humanity’s singularity provides the only possibility for its perfection.427 This 
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perfection represents a counterargument to utilitarian relativism, by pointing to the 
possibility of transcendent values beyond the human senses.  In this way Whewell 
recycles Plato’s arguments against the sophists, a tactic that becomes clearer later in 
the text. 
Whewell devotes a section of his book to Plato’s notion of ideal knowledge, as 
opposed to the relativistic thinking of what he calls the “Democritic” philosophers.  
Whewell says that the Democritic philosophers believe that truth does not exist 
independently from humanity, but instead that all knowledge derives from human 
minds.428  If one views Plurality of Worlds as a purely scientific text on the structure 
of the cosmos, the discussion of epistemology appears out of place.  If one reads 
Whewell’s book as a defense of absolute values, however, the discussion of 
epistemology fits.  Like Plato’s Timaeus, Whewell’s Plurality of Worlds uses 
cosmology as a bulwark against relativism.  The unity of the world provides 
justification for Whewell’s belief in absolute ideals over the relativism and 
materialism of his opponents.   
The origin of the term “Democritic” philosophers helps support this view.  In 
his later supplement to the original text, Whewell explain that he borrowed the term 
from Richard Owen, who in turn borrowed it from Ralph Cudworth.429  Cudworth 
places Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras under the banner of Democritic 
philosophers.  The term “philosopher” is important, because contrary to most 
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historians today, Cudworth does not believe that Democritus and Leucippus founded 
atomism.  He argues that the “physiology” of atomism predates Democritus and 
Leucippus.  In Cudworth’s reading of history the Democritic philosophers connected 
the science of atomism with the philosophy of atheism and in Protagoras’ case 
“scepticism and atheism.”430 
Cudworth believes Democritic philosophy did not follow from atomistic 
science, but it is clear from Whewell’s work that he disagrees.431  Whewell’s use of the 
term “Democritic philosopher” means that he likely accepts Cudworth’s view of the 
Democritus, Leucippus, and Protagoras as atheists and moral relativists.  Unlike 
Cudworth’s approach of trying to harmonize atomism with religion and morality, 
however, Whewell takes the opposite approach and uses unity to answer the scientific 
foundation of the Democritic philosophers’ beliefs.  Since plurality represents a 
foundational tenet of the atomism, unity would disprove it and the atheists and 
relativistic ideas that emerged from it.  This mirrors the strategy he takes to the 
heretical argument from plurality earlier in the book, where unlike Chalmers, Whewell 
does not explain the compatibility of plurality with Christianity, but denies plurality.  
By accepting the Democritic philosophers’ perspective that atomism proves atheism 
and relativism, then the opposite must hold true, with unity proving Christianity and 
moral absolutes.432 
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Whewell’s belief in the transcendental disposition of ideas helps shape his 
view of what forms intelligent aliens could take and in turn provides another argument 
against plurality.  Whewell argues that any intelligent alien race “must have had their 
Pythagoras, their Plato, their Kepler, their Galileo, their Newton.” While he does 
indicate that any speculation about this is “purely imaginary and arbitrary,” his 
imposition of a particular pathway for knowledge appears equally arbitrary.433  
Whewell believes intelligence must mirror humanity, because of his belief in the 
absolute nature of knowledge, “The Ideas according to which man builds up his 
knowledge, are emanations of the archetypal Ideas according to which the work of 
creation was planned and executed.”434  Advancement, whether intellectual or moral, 
must proceed along a given pathway because it slowly uncovers absolute truth. 
Relativistic science, morality, and religion strike at the heart of his philosophical 
ideals.  He claims humanity’s knowledge intertwines with our cosmic purpose, saying, 
“man's moral progress is a progress towards a likeness with God.”435 Absent the divine 
teleological path, humanity would live no different from animals.  This means that any 
intelligence must have been inspired by the same divine teleology.  
Whewell does not allow for the possibility of an alien intelligence that exhibits 
characteristics of true “alienness.”  Instead, he presents a stark dichotomy; aliens must 
be humans that exist on another planet or, as I will show below, animals incapable of 
any intelligent thought.  He derides the presence of humans as a “fairy tale” and does 
not concern himself with the presence of non-intelligent aliens. Humanity represents 
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the standard of excellence that ultimately provides value to the universe.  Aliens must 
either mirror humanity’s progress or be mindless brutes, disconnected from God.  
The possibility of alien animals does represent a significant change from 
Plato’s Timaeus.  Plato argues that Earth represents the only habitable planet for any 
form of mortal life.  Whewell’s cosmology allows for the possibility of animal life in 
space as long as these animals do not live under a “moral law.”436  Plato disallowed 
habitable planets because his cosmology’s defense of teleology went beyond the 
absence of life in the universe.  Earth’s physical centrality, as well as the orderly 
movement of celestial objects also played important parts in the Timaeus.  Plato’s 
planets could not host life, because they served as exemplars of “being,” eternally 
stable models for how to live a good life.  Whewell writes after the Copernican 
revolution, where the scientific consensus agrees with the heliocentric model and the 
orbits of the planets and comets are known to be erratic.  This change in the scientific 
paradigm removed the need to make the planets inhabitable to any form of life. 
Whewell’s unity cosmology relies on the one part of Plato’s cosmology that 
had not been scientifically disproven, the absence of intelligent life on other planets.  
Whewell allows for the possibility of animal life, because he does not see animals as 
posing a challenge to a human-centered teleology: 
 
As we have said, we have no insuperable difficulty in conceiving other parts of 
the Universe to be tenanted by animals.  Animal life implies no progress in the 
species…. Progress implies, or at least suggests, a beginning and an end.  If the 
                                                
436 Ibid.,  30.   
 163
mere existence of a race imply [sic] a sustaining and preserving power in the 
Creator, the progress of a race implies a guiding and impelling power; a 
Governor and Director as well as a Creator and Preserver.  And progress, not 
merely in the exercise of bodily faculties, but in the exercise of mental faculties, 
in the intellectual condition of a portion of the species, still more implies a 
special position and character of the race; which cannot, without great license of 
hypothesis, be extended to other races; and which, if so extended becomes 
unmeaning, from the impossibility of our knowing what is progress in any other 
species;--from what and towards what it tends.437 
 
For Whewell, animal life may be the product of God’s creation, but he denies animals 
receive God’s special guidance.  In other words, just as the discovery of a new species 
of mollusk would not threaten humanity’s place in the cosmos, nor should the 
discovery of that mollusk on Mars.  
Whewell’s dismissal of the value of animal life as threatening to humanity’s 
special status in the universe represented a part of his reaction to utilitarianism.438  The 
belief that animals deserved moral consideration represented one of the tenets of 
utilitarianism, which stemmed from Jeremy Bentham’s belief that pain and pleasure 
operate as the proper metric of calculating just action.439  Whewell’s rejection of 
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utilitarianism included a specific refutation of this proposition.  For Whewell, the 
human capacity for reason and moral judgment represents the crucial distinction 
between humans and animals.  He believed anything that blurred the distinction would 
justify utilitarianism.440   
The possibility of alien animals (as opposed to aliens with human level 
intelligence or beyond), did not threaten Whewell’s argument against utilitarianism.  
Whewell’s anthropocentrism prevented him from seeing animals as worthy of 
consideration.  He argued that the earth’s status as the home of a “World of Mind” 
makes it more valuable, “than thousands and millions of stars and planets, even if they 
were occupied by a myriad times as many species of brute animals as have lived upon 
the earth since its vivication.”441  Whewell makes explicit what implicitly underlined 
Medieval concerns with plurality, the presence of human-like intelligence.  Alien 
intelligence would call into question humanity’s special status, both philosophically 
and religiously.   
While the middle of Plurality of Worlds reads as a rather dry scientific treatise, 
the ethical implications Whewell outlines in the introduction and conclusion make 
clear his philosophical program.  And while Plato left no clear primary documentation 
of his motivations for writing the Timaeus, Whewell’s letters suggest he consciously 
deployed the strategy of linking scientific cosmology and ethics.  When Sir James 
Stephen, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, read an early draft of 
the manuscript he suggested Whewell remove the discussion of religion and ethics to 
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focus on the science.  As previously mentioned, Whewell responded that he had 
written the book precisely to make the religious and moral arguments, “the topic 
cannot be excluded; for it is in fact the topic of my essay.”442  Whewell wrote Plurality 
of Worlds not to make a scientific point, but a religious and philosophical one. 
Most importantly, Whewell’s confidence in unity emerged from his 
philosophical and religious beliefs, rather than his scientific knowledge.  Crowe argues 
that Whewell’s private correspondence, the text of Plurality of Worlds, and his other 
works on astronomy all suggest that he began his project with the preconceived belief 
that plurality and Christianity were not compatible.443  Whewell’s arguments attack the 
claims for plurality, but do not provide strong argumentation for unity.  Rather than 
make the case that not enough information existed to make the case for unity or 
plurality, however, Whewell sides definitely for unity.  This certainty likely came from 
his religious and philosophical beliefs, but like Plato he tries to present the science as a 
certainty and argue that his religious and philosophical beliefs emerge from it.  Unlike 
Plato, Whewell was further constrained to a scientific framework, because of the trend 
away from wide-ranging Enlightenment speculative science, to be replaced by greater 
caution and parsimony attended with increasing academic professionalization. 
Whewell entered the cosmological debate on plurality as someone more 
interested in the practical application of philosophy than the scientific process.444 He 
recognized that cosmological debates did not confine their influence to the heavens, 
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but instead had the potential for enormous implications for how people thought about 
politics, religion and morality.  The Plurality of Worlds reinvents Plato’s rhetorical use 
of the unity cosmology against relativism, for a post-Copernican world. 
4.5 THE RESPONSE 
An examination of the responses to Whewell’s Plurality helps elucidate the rhetorical 
elements of the work.  The sheer number of responses, for one, suggests that the book 
had an enormous impact.  Todhunter, Whewell’s first major biographer, found nine 
books and twenty-two articles written in response to Plurality of Worlds.  Todhunter 
remarked at the time, that “rarely in recent times has a book received so much 
attention from reviewers as [Plurality].”445 Crowe expands that number to twenty 
books and fifty-four articles.  In my research I examined the American Periodicals 
Series (APS) database and found another twenty-four articles.446  The discovery of 
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new articles in the APS database reflects the importance of the debate, in that it spread 
from England into the United States at a volume much greater than previously 
revealed.  The fervor surrounding Whewell’s book reached such a pitch that one 
journal lamented the attention spent on the plurality question, “to [sic] many men of 
scientific ability and reputation, that they devote more time to controversy and 
speculation on subjects of no practical benefit whatever… as it can neither be settled 
by argument nor science, in its present state.”447  Most reviewers, however, treated the 
question as enormously important.  
David Brewster wrote a fiery review condemning Whewell’s book and a year 
later had published his own book-length response, More Worlds than One: The Creed 
of the Philosopher and the Hope of the Christian (1854).  Brewster defends a robust 
pluralism that included the existence of life on the sun and moon.  He brutally attacked 
Whewell’s intelligence and character.  Brewster refers to Whewell’s arguments as, 
“the most ingenious, though shallow, piece of sophistry which we have ever 
encountered in modern dialectics.”448  Other reviewers latched on to Brewster’s 
accusation of “sophistry.”449  Brewster also accused Whewell of being in league with 
the atheistic philosophy of the Vestiges, “[Whewell] tak[es] for granted the truth of the 
nebular theory, adopted by the author of the Vestiges of Creation, and maintained only 
by persons who have very erroneous ideas of creation.... Sir Isaac Newton considered 
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the nebular theory as tending to Atheism.”450  Again other reviewers echoed this 
charge.451 
The accusations of sophistry and support for the Vestiges must have stung 
Whewell.  He had set out precisely to undermine sophistry and the cosmology of the 
Vestiges.  Whewell found the tone of Brewster’s reply incredibly disagreeable and he 
wrote to a friend, “why’d [Brewster] have to be so savage?”452  John Hedley Brooke 
suggests that Brewster’s personal grievances with Whewell motivated the attack, as 
the two had clashed on numerous occasions about education policy and Whewell had 
written Brewster a poor review.453  Although this feud almost certainly added 
incentive for Brewster’s caustic word choice, his daughter wrote that Brewster hated 
the book before he knew Whewell authored it.454  Furthermore, Brooke’s thesis does 
not explain the hostility shown by other reviewers. 
A more likely explanation is that pluralism had firmly engrained itself into the 
scientific community.  Todhunter indicates that Whewell’s private correspondences 
shows, “no eminent scientific name” wrote him in support of his thesis.455  Of the 
scientists Crowe examines who responded to Whewell’s book, 83 percent favored 
pluralism.456  The enmity of the reviews could easily have emerged from scientists 
attacking a heterodox position. 
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Even though most of these scientists shared Whewell’s opposition to sophistry, 
The Vestiges, and in many cases utilitarianism, they still viewed the unity proposition 
as deeply problematic.  I think this is because these scientists failed to perceive that 
advances in scientific knowledge that decentralized humanity’s place in the universe 
would become weapons against absolute values and religion.  Whewell wrote his book 
at the end of the period of natural theology, when some scientists assumed that science 
and religion would always work in tandem rather than as adversaries.457  Religion 
served as a potential mechanism to escape any sympathy individuals had with the 
philosophical and theological arguments Whewell raised against the plurality thesis.  
Two reviews seem at first to concede Whewell’s point that a plurality of worlds 
undermines humanity’s value.  The Christian Observer writes, 
 
Earth was esteemed but a spark in Jehovah’s realm, which might be blotted out 
of existence and scarcely missed in the universe of matter.  So few, also, are its 
intelligent inhabitants, compared with the mighty whole, that they might be 
annihilated and their loss in the universe of intelligences would scarcely be 
discerned—perhaps no more than a drop of water would be missed from the 
ocean, or a grain of sand from the globe.458 
 
One finds a very similar statement in The Baptist Quarterly, “For, as we have shown, 
the earth is but one of many earths.  If it were annihilated, its loss would scarce be 
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observed more than the fall of one leaf in a forest.”459  Ultimately, however, 
Christianity allows the simultaneous existence of intelligent aliens and humanity’s 
privileged position.  Brewster makes a similar move, by arguing that of all the planets 
in the universe Jesus visited earth and only earth, thereby redeeming all life on all 
planets.460 
Brewster, Chalmers, and the writers for the Baptist Quarterly and the Christian 
Observer did not appear troubled by the prospect of human marginalization in a 
crowded universe, because the Bible clearly outlined God’s personal care of humanity.  
Whewell, however, did not write his book only to preach to natural philosophers.  Like 
his forays into math education and inductive philosophy, Whewell sought a wider 
audience.  He defended a unity cosmology in order to provide a scientific refutation of 
atheistic utilitarianism.  Brewster felt confident that, 
 
A mere inference or a theory in science, however, probable, must ever give 
way to a truth revealed; but a scientific truth must be maintained, however 
contradictory it may appear to the most cherished doctrines of religion.  In 
freely discussing the subject of a plurality of worlds, there can be no collision 
between Reason and revelations.461 
 
Whewell, however, still reeling from the success of the Vestiges, and his place on the 
losing side of the battle to reform education, saw that scientific theories are not 
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neutral.  He understood that while natural theologians may be able to harmonize any 
scientific discovery with religion in their own minds, scientific theories that 
marginalized humanity’s special nature would invite atheism and utilitarianism in the 
larger public. 
Despite his failure to attract much support from the scientific community, 
Whewell did have his share of supporters.462 The book achieved major popular 
success, going through numerous editions.  Crowe finds religious journals tended to 
support Whewell’s position about fifty percent of the time.463 Ten years after 
Whewell’s book, a journalist declared a, “state of deadlock” between plurality and 
unity thought.464  More importantly, from Whewell’s perspective he succeeded in 
expanding the debate from academia into public discourse.  A mere three years after 
Whewell’s book, Anthony Trollope could refer to the Whewell-Brewster debate in his 
book Barchester Towers, confident that the audience would get the reference.465   In a 
list describing important new books, a writer for a literary magazine says The Plurality 
of Worlds, “need no comment,” as to say that the book’s fame would make any remark 
redundant.466  The last known review of Whewell’s book came out in 1867, a startling 
fourteen years after the original publication of Plurality.467 
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Whewell’s book reintroduced the Platonic unity cosmology into the public 
debate.  The Copernican revolution had smashed the crystalline heavens and opened 
up the physical space to populate the cosmos.  Popular figures like Fontenelle and 
Huygens soon filled the universe with all manner of intelligent life, which became the 
scientific and religious orthodoxy.  The success of Whewell’s work, however, suggests 
the intuitive and ancient connection between unity and human specialness held strong 
in the public imagination.  The power of the nonscientific aspects of unity ensured that 
despite widespread scientific opposition, his work would flourish.  The religious and 
moral stakes of the question of alien life also set the stage for a future revival of the 
public debate over unity. 
4.6 A. R. WALLACE: BRIDGE TO THE 20TH 
CENTURY 
By the turn of the century, the combination of the rise of Darwinism, belief in the 
nebular hypothesis, and the prevalence of a empirical methodology made the idea that 
“life is not only a possible implication but also a basic property of the universe,” the 
predominant “worldview.”468  But only three years into the twentieth century, Alfred 
Russel Wallace wrote a book that could easily be mistaken as a sequel to Plurality of 
Worlds.469  Wallace’s book Man’s Place in the Universe (1903) revived the unity 
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cosmology.  In it, he not only argued Earth was the only planet inhabited by intelligent 
life, but as Whewell’s Plurality of Worlds did, he connected this proposition with 
moral absolutes. 
Man’s Place in the Universe proved a smash success.  It went through seven 
editions in five years, including cheap ones that the publishers made for a wider non-
specialist audience.  Despite the disinterest of the academic community, the unity 
cosmology continued to strike a chord among readers.  Wallace’s impeccable 
scientific credentials meant that even people opposed to his beliefs took notice of his 
unorthodox cosmology. 
In 1870, the Entomological society elected Wallace President, he had articles 
regularly in Nature, the most prestigious science journal of the time, and in 1872 he 
was elected a fellow at the Linnaean society, the world’s most prominent society that 
studied natural history.  Alfred Russel Wallace’s fame emerged primarily for his 
contributions to evolutionary theory.  He independently developed a theory of 
evolution remarkably similar to Charles Darwin’s and the two presented their ideas 
together at a meeting of the Linnaean Society in 1858.  Wallace became a figure at the 
forefront of defending Darwinism and hewed so strongly to the hypothesis of survival 
of the fittest that he quipped, “Some of my critics declare that I am more Darwinian 
than Darwin himself, and in this, I admit, they are not far wrong.”470  Wallace’s work 
on evolution put him in personal contact with many of the scientific luminaries of the 
time like Charles Darwin and Thomas Huxley. 
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Wallace’s connection to Darwinism makes his convergence with Whewell’s 
ideas a surprising one.  Whewell so deeply despised Darwinism that he tried to ban On 
the Origin of Species from the library at Trinity.471  In fact, the differences between the 
two thinkers extend across a range of issues.  Wallace spent his youth absorbed in 
books like Thomas Paine’s The Age of Reason and attended lectures on the teachings 
of Robert Owen, a secularist and socialist.472  Robert Chamber’s Vestiges had an 
enormous impact on Wallace’s early thinking about evolution and he actually became 
friends with Chambers later in life.473  Wallace developed an interest in spiritualism 
that would last throughout his life.474  A spiritualist, socialist, secularist, evolutionist 
appears the perfect opposite of the religious, politically conservative William 
Whewell. 
The two did unite on one very important issue aside from cosmology, however.  
Both figures engaged heavily in political activism and came to the conclusion that 
science and politics were deeply intertwined.  While scholars primarily remember 
Wallace for his scientific contributions, social activism played a large role in his life.  
Of his 747 articles essays, reviews, commentaries, interviews and letters 25% focused 
on social issues only a little less than the 27% about evolution.475  Wallace pushed 
publically for socialism, nationalization of land, rights for women, and against 
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mandatory vaccination and colonization.476  He held residency in the Land 
Nationalization Society and corresponded with leading economists and political 
figures.477  He even helped create plans to set up a utopian commune in an uninhabited 
part of Africa.478  These political goals represent, in most cases, the polar opposite of 
Whewell’s, but both felt the prevailing scientific and philosophical beliefs of the time 
threatened their political program.  Whewell feared that utilitarianism would justify 
socialism and secularism.  Wallace believed orthodox Darwinism could justify 
exploitation and inequality at the expense of socialism.  Both wanted a scientific 
defense of their ethical beliefs. 
4.7 SOCIAL DARWINISM 
The very Darwinian scientific revolution that Wallace had helped usher in, represented 
a serious threat to his political ideals.  Darwinism appeared to give a biological 
justification for anti-egalitarianism.  Wallace came to this conclusion, while 
researching in the Malay islands.479  He found much to appreciate in the local Malay 
cultures: 
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It is a state of individual freedom and self-government, rendered possible by 
the equal development and just balance of the intellectual, moral, and physical 
parts of our nature—a state in which we shall each be so perfectly fitted for a 
social existence, by knowing what is right and at the same time feeling an 
irresistible impulse to do what we know to be right that all laws and all 
punishments shall be unnecessary…. Now it is very remarkable, that among 
people in a very low stage of civilization, we find some approach to such a 
perfect social state.480 
 
This group of people, which many Europeans viewed as savage, in Wallace’s mind 
exemplified many of his progressive political ideals.481  Whereas Europeans, “have 
progressed vastly beyond the savage state in intellectual achievements, we have not 
advanced equally in morals… the mass of our populations have not at all advanced 
beyond the savage code of morals, and have in many cases sunk below it.”482  Despite 
the moral inferiority of Europeans, however, it was clear to Wallace that they would 
triumph over the local cultures either by assimilating the population or exterminating 
them.483 
This violent colonization, while an abomination to Wallace, seems perfectly 
justified by Darwinian logic.  If nature preserved the “fittest” at the expense of the 
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unfit then the morally unscrupulous, but technologically superior Europeans, appear 
destined to destroy the morally just, but technologically inferior, Malaysians.  
Wallace’s fear of the political implications of Darwinism went well beyond the 
Malaysians. Darwinism became a buzzword used to justify many of the hegemonic 
practices of the time, like racism, militarism, and imperialism.484  Wallace looked 
beyond the tendency of many to throw around the term “Darwinian” carelessly and felt 
that the mechanics of a purely Darwinian (survival of the fittest) system actually did 
result in problems that required serious consideration.485   
In his autobiography, Wallace attributed many of the negative aspects of 
America, its “landlordism” and “capitalism” that destroyed the environment and 
impoverished the lower classes, to a Darwinian process run amuck.486  Wallace did not 
need to draw the connection between Darwinism and politics on his own.  Many 
individuals, both for and against institutions like capitalism, argued that not only were 
laissez faire capitalism and many other political structures inevitable on the grounds of 
Darwinism, but also ethically justified.487  
Francis Galton, the cousin of Charles Darwin, first sounded the alarm about the 
potential political implications of Darwinism grounded in the “differential birth 
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rate.”488  He felt that productive individuals (thus those with good genetics) had few 
children, while the poor and unproductive (those with bad genetics) had many 
children.489  Society thus had artificially changed the natural order from the survival of 
the fittest to a system where the least fit would out reproduce the fit.  The belief in the 
harm of the differential birth rates caused many individuals to oppose socialism, 
because by increasing equality it would further remove checks on the unfit 
propagating.490   
Galton’s ideas had a major impact on Wallace’s thinking about the political 
ramifications of Darwinism.  An analysis of Wallace’s writings that ranks the most 
influential people upon him reveals that Galton ranks eighth .491 Despite his disdain for 
coercive eugenic programs and his support for socialism, Wallace always treated 
Galton’s ideas with respect.492  Wallace felt some level of appreciation for the 
argument at the foundation of social Darwinism even though he opposed it and sought 
to find alternative interpretations of the science more consistent with his political 
beliefs. 
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Wallace’s response to the more extreme proponents of social Darwinism helps 
elucidate his thinking on the manner.  One of the most radical books ever written 
linking Darwinism to ethics and politics is the work Might is Right (1890). The book 
attacked socialism, morality, religion, and empathy and sought to instantiate behavior 
grounded in the survival of the fittest: 
 
All ethics, politics and philosophies are pure assumptions, built upon 
assumptions.  They rest on no sure basis.  They are but shadowy castles-in-the-
air erected by day-dreamers, or by rogues, upon nursery fables.  It is time they 
were firmly planted upon an enduring foundation.  This can never be 
accomplished until the racial mind has first been thoroughly cleansed and 
drastically disinfected of its depraved, alien, and demoralizing concepts of 
right and wrong…We must be, like nature, hard, cruel, relentless.493 
 
Wallace obviously viewed such a message as anathema to his own beliefs and wrote a 
letter of response in the journal The Eagle and the Serpent.  Despite his disagreement, 
he begins with a note of sympathy, writing, “I can understand Dr. Redbeard's position, 
though I cannot accept it.”494  Here Wallace acknowledges the intuitive connection 
between Darwinism and the Might is Right philosophy, but he disagrees with 
Redbeard, because he views humans as different from other animals:   
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If men were only "herds of animals" his view might be the true one. But the 
mere fact that men, everywhere, and throughout all history, have had words 
and ideas corresponding to truth, justice, virtue, right, and that there have 
always been men who would sacrifice even their lives for these ideas, proves 
that mankind is more than an aggregation of "herds of animals."495 
 
Wallace used the distinctions between humanity and other animals as an argument 
against the “survival of the fittest” justifying behavior he viewed as horrific.  In crucial 
areas these human/animal distinctions began to affect his beliefs on the mechanics of 
evolution. 
4.8 WALLACE’S SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION 
Wallace’s concerns about the political implications of Darwinism began to alter his 
scientific beliefs.  At first Wallace maintained that all successful evolutions better 
equip a creature to survive: “the assertion of 'inutility' in the case of any organ or 
peculiarity which is not a rudiment or a correlation, is not, and can never be, the 
statement of a fact, but merely an expression of our ignorance of its purpose or 
origin.”496  He began to carve out an exception for humans, however, making the case 
that one could not explain traits like consciousness and hairlessness through 
competition, because while they would benefit humans in the long term, in the short 
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term they would have no effect or even a negative effect on their survival.497 Wallace 
argued that a force beyond utility must drive successful evolutions if a mutation that is 
harmful in the short run survives to facilitate a positive evolution later on. These anti-
utilitarian evolutions served as proof for a teleological undercurrent to evolution, 
which Wallace associated with his political and spiritual beliefs.498  These changes to 
evolutionary theory ended the necessity for a constant battle for survival, which could 
translate to politics of equality and cooperation.  Wallace’s change of mind came as a 
shock to Darwin who wrote, “But I groan over Man--you write like a metamorphosed 
(in a retrograde direction) naturalist, and you the author of the best paper that ever 
appeared in the Anthropological Review! Eheu! Eheu! Eheu! --Your miserable Friend, 
C. Darwin.”499  Darwin reacted so hostilely because he, Huxley, and others sought to 
create a scientific discipline totally removed from politics and religion.500 
The Wallace who wrote Man’s Place in the Universe did not believe in the 
bifurcation between science and the other disciplines.  Many scholars claim that 
Wallace’s change of heart on evolutionary theory reflects a move towards a more 
traditional natural history approach, which integrated science, religion, and politics.501  
As Martin Fichman eloquently articulates it, “Wallace’s evolutionary cosmology, with 
its mix of sociopolitical reformism, theism, spiritualism, and ethical philosophy, 
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abandoned any pretext of ideological neutrality.”502  Of course, Darwin and Huxley 
had their own ideological agenda, but they approached it in a much more subtle 
manner.503 
Given the number of scholars who suggest that Wallace integrated science, 
politics, and spiritualism, it should come as no surprise to find a political and spiritual 
agenda in his cosmology.  However, while many scholars recognize the political and 
spiritual undertones of Man’s Place in the Universe, they do not offer much of an 
explanation of how the book connects with Wallace’s broader agenda.504  Remember 
that religious opinion split on the question of plurality and prominent Marxist figures 
like Friedrich Engels had no problem reconciling plurality with a call for social justice.  
This returns us to William Whewell, with whom Wallace begins his book.505 
Wallace proclaims his intellectual debt to Whewell’s Plurality of Worlds.  In 
the introduction this occurs mostly in terms of specific scientific arguments that 
Whewell made.  As one reads the book, however, it is clear Wallace also views the 
implications of the plurality debate in similar terms.  When discussing the Copernican 
revolution Wallace says that it, “seemed to upset the whole accepted order of nature, 
and to degrade man by removing his dwelling-place, the earth, from the commanding 
central position it had always before occupied.”506  Wallace must have been acutely 
aware that the Darwinian revolution he helped engineer had a similar “degrading” 
effect on humanity.  His cosmology represents an attempt to blunt the materialism that 
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many saw as an inevitable product of the new scientific developments.507  Wallace 
ends his book by making this claim explicit: 
 
All this life upon our earth has led up to and culminated in that of man.  It has 
been, I believe a common and not unpopular idea that during the whole process 
of the rise and growth and extinction of past forms, the earth has been 
preparing for the ultimate—Man.  Much of the wealth and luxuriance of living 
things, the infinite variety of form and structure, the exquisite grace and beauty 
in bird and insect, in foliage and flower, may have been the mere by-products 
of the grand mechanism we call nature—the one and only method of 
developing humanity.  And is it not in perfect harmony with this grandeur of 
design (if it be design), this vastness of scale, this marvelous process of 
development through all the ages, that the material universe needed to produce 
this cradle of organic life, and of a being destined to a higher and a permanent 
existence, should be on a corresponding scale of vastness, of complexity, of 
beauty?  Even if there were no such evidence as I have here adduced for the 
unique position and exceptional characteristics which distinguish the earth, the 
old idea that all the planets were inhabited, and that all the stars existed for the 
sake of other planets, which planets existed to develop life, would, in light of 
our present knowledge, seem utterly improbable and incredible.  It would 
introduce monotony into a universe whose grand character and teaching is 
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endless diversity.  It would imply that to produce the living soul in the 
marvelous and glorious body of man—man with his faculties, his aspirations, 
his powers for good and evil—that this was an easy matter which could be 
brought about anywhere, in any world.  It would imply that man is an animal 
and nothing more, is of no importance in the universe, needed no great 
preparations for his advent, only, perhaps, a second-rate demon, and a third of 
fourth-rate earth.508 (italics and bolding mine) 
 
In the passage, Wallace addresses the concerns of the “degrading” implications of the 
heliocentric model.  Humanity may not inhabit the physical center of the universe, but 
the universe exists, “to produce this cradle of organic life.”  Humanity holds the spot 
in the spiritual, metaphysical, or metaphorical center, depending on which specific 
frame one chooses to deploy. 
Beyond heliocentrism the passage tackles Darwinism, by portraying the 
process of evolution as centered upon humanity. As the telos of the universe, humanity 
becomes elevated from another mere animal produced by the Darwinian process to 
something special.  Wallace addresses this point in a reverse fashion.  Absent unity, 
humanity would be “an animal and nothing more,” which implies the opposite that 
absent plurality humanity exists as not just another species of animal.  Wallace 
believed Darwinism on a universal scale represents the true threat to spirituality and 
social progress, by justifying social Darwinism.  Darwinism on a universal scale 
introduces “monotony” into a “diverse” system and makes the process of Darwinism, 
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rather than its result, humanity, the central story of existence.  Darwinism on a 
planetary scale avoids these problems because it merely serves as the mechanism for 
bringing about humanity, not an end in and of itself.509    
Survival of the fittest on many planets also opens up the possibility for 
evolution that results in animals radically different from humanity, just as a non-
teleological evolution allows for human futures that do not result in the type of 
socialist, ecologically minded, egalitarian society that Wallace desired.  In fact, the 
future in a non-teleological world would only bring destruction as Wallace writes, “If 
man is a product of blind forces and unconscious laws acting upon non-living matter, 
then, as he has been produced by physical law, so he will die out by the continued 
operation of the same laws, against which there is no appeal.”510  For Wallace 
humanity’s very future depends on its specialness and perhaps even more importantly, 
humanity should care about that future because of its specialness. 
In The World of Life (1910), which Wallace “considered supplementary" to 
Man’s Place in the Universe, he expands on this argument.511  He shows that the 
combination of the plurality cosmology and Darwinism provides the justification for 
some scientists to devalue humanity.  Wallace quotes the well known German 
biologist Ernst Haeckel to emphasize his point, “Our own human nature sinks to the 
level of a placental mammal, which has no more value for the universe at large than 
the ant, the fly of a summer’s day, the microscopic infusorium, or the smallest 
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bacillus.”512  While Wallace claims he finds Haekel’s argument, "beyond my 
comprehension," it is clear that he means that he cannot imagine this possibility in part 
because of his unity cosmology.513  In a Darwinian plurality it also may be that 
humanity has no more value than bacteria.  However, in the unity cosmology, 
humanity exists as the central focus of the universe.   
Wallace gives another reason that unity provides the necessary foundation for 
spiritualism and ethics: Darwinism without teleology not only lacks purpose, but also 
represents a system of profound purposeless suffering.  He explains, 
 
The idea, therefore, that the whole system of nature from the remotest eons of 
the past—from the very first appearance of life upon earth—has been founded 
upon destruction of life, on the daily and hourly slaughter of myriads of 
innocent and often beautiful living things, in order to support the lives of other 
creatures, which others are specifically adapted to destroy them, and are 
endowed with all kinds of weapons in order that they may the more certainly 
capture and devour their victims.514 
 
Wallace presents an interpretation of evolution, where the mechanism of advancement 
appears unnecessarily cruel.  Wallace follows this quote with similar ones from 
Thomas Huxley and J. Arthur Thomson in order to make the case that many prominent 
                                                
512 Ibid.,  403. 
513 Ibid. 
514 Ibid.,  398. 
 187
scientists view evolution as a cruel product of nature, rather than a system consistent 
with divine benevolence.515 
The view of human life as a random product of cruelty and suffering, rather 
than divine guidance proves deeply problematic for Wallace, because he cannot 
reconcile it with a benevolent religion or a socialist future.516  He writes, “all this is so 
utterly abhorrent to us that we cannot reconcile it with an author of the universe who is 
at once all-wise, all-powerful and all-good.”517  The belief that Darwinism disproves a 
loving God has high-profile adherents, like Huxley, who Wallace quotes, “were our 
ears sharp enough, we should hear sighs and groans of pain like those heard by Dante 
at the gate of Hell, the world cannot be governed by what we call benevolence.”518  As 
previously discussed Wallace believes that the suffering intrinsic to Darwinism can 
also call into question progressive politics.519  If all life exists on a foundation of pain 
and suffering then one could easily dismiss Wallace’s socialist hopes as counter to 
biological reality, as many did.520   
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The unity cosmology helps ameliorate the Darwinian threat to Wallace’s 
beliefs on religion and politics.  In a unity cosmology, the process of evolution to 
create humanity only needs to occur once.  Wallace writes that as terrible as the 
evolutionary process may be, having it take place once would be justified because 
humanity has the power to reduce suffering,  
 
that the universe had no designer or creator, but has always existed; and that 
the life-pageant, with all its pain and horror, has been repeated cycle after cycle 
from eternity in the past, and will be repeated in similar cycles for ever.  We 
have here presented to us one of the strangest phenomena of the human mind—
that numbers of intelligent men are more attracted by a belief which makes the 
amount of pain which they think does exist on the earth last for all eternity in 
successive worlds without any permanent and good result whatever, than by 
another belief, which admits the same amount of pain into one earth only, and 
for a limited period, while whatever pain there is only exists for the grand 
purpose of developing a race of spiritual beings, who may thereafter live 
without physical pain—also for all eternity!521 
 
Evolution works to create humanity, who through the political process will bring about 
an end to pain on earth and through spiritual piety end it for all eternity by achieving 
access to some form of afterlife.  Although evolution had its problems Wallace writes 
that it must, “be the best, and almost certainly the only method, that could have 
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subsisted through the immeasurable ages and could have then produced a being 
capable, in some degree, of comprehending and appreciating it.  For that is surely the 
glory and distinction of man.”522  Evolution, thus, represents the least necessary evil to 
create humanity, which could ultimately end the world’s suffering through spiritualism 
and progressive politics. 
Plurality called into question the idea of evolution as the least necessary evil, 
because it required repeating the evolutionary process on different planets.  Wallace, 
like Whewell, viewed the existence of more races of intelligent beings as superfluous.  
Humanity could achieve the purpose of “comprehending and appreciating” creation as 
well on its own as could humanity and a variety of intelligent alien races.  The idea 
that the evolutionary process happens on a plurality of worlds further magnifies the 
concerns raised by Huxley, because the horrors of “survival of the fittest” occur 
endlessly across the universe, rather than once on earth. 
4.9 PUBLIC BATTLE 
Wallace saw the unity cosmology as central to his spiritual and political mission.  He 
wrote in his autobiography that the cosmological turn as represented by Man’s Place 
in the Universe represents, “the ‘third chapter of my book,’ that is to say of my literary 
work.”523  He felt many scientists had overstepped their bounds in pushing a 
materialistic and ethically blind worldview.  The public, meanwhile, accepted these 
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pronouncements according to Wallace, because, “when a man becomes widely known 
as a great authority in any department of science, [many people] accept him as a safe 
guide in any other departments on which he expresses his opinions.”524  Despite his 
criticism of the mixture of science with ethical and political pronouncements, Wallace 
took up a similar strategy of using a scientific foundation to provide justification for 
his beliefs.  Given Wallace’s change of view on the nature of evolution to harmonize 
his scientific beliefs with his political and religious beliefs, this should come as little 
surprise. 
The desire to continue speaking to the public ensured that Wallace would 
persist beyond Man’s Place in the Universe and The World of Life.   He vigorously 
defended his scientific position in the press, writing two articles to respond to his 
critics.525  In 1906, the famous scientist Percival Lowell wrote a follow up book to his 
argument that telescopes revealed that Mars had a series of intricate canals.526  Lowell 
argued that only an advanced civilization of intelligent creatures could have created 
these canals.  Wallace responded a year later with a book-length review that refuted 
the science behind Lowell’s claims, cementing himself as one of Lowell’s most 
prominent critics.527  For Wallace, the existence of canals on Mars implied the 
existence of intelligent life, which threatened spiritualism and socialism and it is likely 
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he felt that winning the scientific debate would go along way to convince the public of 
these other views. 
By integrating science, religion and ethics to achieve a correct scientific 
understanding of the world, Wallace believed he created a foundation for social or 
spiritual change.  Wallace understood the power of scientists to influence the terms of 
these other debates, because of their credibility with the public.528  Wallace’s desire to 
lend scientific authority to his religious and political arguments help explain why he 
rejected the label “Wallaceism,” rather than “Darwinism,” despite the many 
differences the he and Darwin had over evolution. He wanted to maintain the 
persuasive capital of Darwinism in order to make the case for his political and 
religious views, rather than have to publically legitimize a new scientific term, before 
he could use it rhetorically.529    
Wallace’s political, philosophical and spiritual views impacted his approach to 
science.  He began as an empirically minded scientist, who bragged about being more 
Darwinian than Darwin.  The connections that he and others drew between Darwinism 
and social order changed the way Wallace engaged in science.  He began by trying to 
make exceptions to the theory of evolution for human intelligence in order to place 
humanity outside the survival of the fittest framework, which justified exploitation.  
The unity cosmology served as another scientific justification for humanity’s 
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privileged position.  Wallace believed unity could provide a foundation for ethics 
grounded in transcendental values.   
4.10 CONCLUSION 
Wallace, like Whewell, failed to make many converts to his cosmology within the 
scientific community.530  Despite the scientific opposition to unity, however, 
Wallace’s cosmological writings achieved major commercial success.531  Something 
about unity resonated with the public, despite its rejection among the intelligentsia.  
Wallace’s book delighted Calvinist Christians who continued to reject the peace the 
Catholic Church had made with plurality.532  Many presumed the new science of the 
modern era had definitively enshrined plurality, but nothing could be further from the 
truth.   
Plato’s cosmological argument for the Good reached its zenith in medieval 
Europe, but the advent of modernity only represented a setback.  While scientists 
relegated orderly orbits, geocentrism, and ethereal celestial objects to the dustbin of 
history, unity remained an open question.  Whewell and Wallace recognized unity’s 
value as a human-privileging science in a time when biology, geology, and physics all 
increasingly marginalized the species.  While fellow scientists may have shunned their 
work, Whewell and Wallace kept the plurality debate alive in the public imagination.  
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The defense of unity by figures with political and religious views as divergent 
as Whewell and Wallace demonstrates the power of the cosmology.  If they had lived 
during the same time period, Whewell and Wallace would likely have fiercely opposed 
one another politically.  Whewell favored conservativism, whereas, Wallace supported 
radical social change.  They both believed that their ideologies depended on an 
inherent dignity of humanity and the existence of transcendent values.   Both men 
viewed unity as a scientific proof for these two foundational beliefs. 
The way the unity plurality debate intertwined with broader philosophical and 
religious issues meant that despite the paucity of evidence for either side, strong 
opinions abounded.  A writer from the National Magazine cautioned that since the 
Bible did not explicitly take a position on plurality it was best to keep an open mind, 
but such an even- handed approached proved exceedingly rare.533  Most of those who 
mentioned plurality had strong opinions on the manner.  One astute writer for Littell’s 
Living Age suggested, “[the question of plurality] will never be settled, it may form a 
point of comparison for the minds, the methods, and the states of opinion in different 
ages.”534   
The plurality vs. unity question represents a cosmological Rorschach test that 
can reveal the underlying philosophical beliefs of its most ardent debaters.  Equally 
important, the scientific framework underlying cosmological claims made them 
rhetorically powerful in a time when scientific thinking gained increasing credibility.  
Whewell and Wallace could encode philosophical, political, and religious ideas into 
the very structure of the universe. 
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 194
5.0  TIPLER AND BARROW 
What should one make of this quartet of WAP, SAP, PAP, and FAP? In my not so 
humble opinion I think the last principle is best called CRAP, the Completely 
Ridiculous Anthropic Principle.535 
Martin Gardner 
 
Important changes between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the discursive 
framework of the scientific enterprise should have rendered the unity cosmological 
argument obsolete.  The nineteenth century saw the solidification of the new discipline 
of “science,” emerging out of natural philosophy.536  “Science,” stripped of its past 
associations with religion, emerged as one of the definitive rhetorical frames of the 
twentieth century.537  In modern times the scientific community largely promotes an 
“objective,” materialist methodology that seeks to leave philosophical concerns like 
teleology and morality by the wayside.538  This culture of “objectivity” manifests itself 
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religion into their scientific beliefs.  Yet it is easy to go too far in the direction of conflating science and 
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most clearly in disregard for religious and spiritual ideas as tools for explaining how 
the world works. 539  Even absent outright disciplinary rejection of the spiritual and 
philosophical, the scientific social structure delimits thought outside the confines of 
accepted scientific methods.540  These developments appear to set a difficult 
environment for a rhetor to reintroduce the unity cosmology argument. 
Tipler and Barrow’s 1986 book The Anthropic Cosmological Principle 
managed to revive both the unity cosmology and its connection to absolute values, 
without surrendering scientific legitimacy.541  Both respected scientists, Tipler and 
Barrow present some of the contemporary thinking on cosmology and quantum 
mechanics, as well as a deep review of the history of teleology.  The defense of 
religion or philosophy with science can undermine the scientific ethos by calling into 
question the scientist’s objectivity, a point that will be made more fully later in the 
chapter.542  Tipler and Barrow successfully walk a fine line, however, only hinting at 
the philosophical implications of their work, all the while adopting a technical style 
reminiscent of a scientific journal.543 The successful balancing act made their work 
acceptable within scientific community, despite the book’s deviation from the normal 
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practice of excluding the philosophical implications from discussions.544  This 
scientifically legitimated philosophy helped ensure Tipler and Barrow’s ideas took 
hold well beyond the hard sciences.545  Philosophers and theologians made heavy use 
of the book to defend teleology with a “new” scientific justification, as will be 
discussed below. Beyond academia, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle became a 
best seller and even found its way into the political speeches of the President of the 
Czech Republic.546 
Despite the new science found in the book, Tipler and Barrow deploy a version 
of Plato’s ancient unity cosmology argument. Brian Aldiss, writing in Nature, referred 
to the Tipler and Barrow’s Anthropic Cosmological Principle as “a powerful sequel to 
Whewell’s argument.”547  Aldiss appears to have made the connection between the 
two works based on solely on their defense of unity.  This chapter reads The Anthropic 
Cosmological Principle rhetorically, and claims that it serves as a sequel to the work 
of Whewell, Aquinas, Wallace, and Plato not only because of its denial of plurality, 
but also in how it presents a modern day instantiation of the 
philosophical/cosmological argument from the Timaeus.548  Tipler and Barrow face 
new constraints based on the preferences of their audience, which shape the way they 
frame the issue, but the fundamental connection of human aloneness with absolute 
                                                
544 Advertisements for the book appeared in philosophy journals, science journals, and religion journals, 
which suggests Oxford University Press understood the potential cross over nature of the work. 
545 Even in the Creationism vs. Evolution debate a prime example of religion vs. science, modern 
defenders of creationism put forth the scientific justification of Intelligent Design. 
546 Vaclav Havel, "The New Measure of Man," The New York Times, July 8, 1994; Julian Barbour, 
"Why We Should Fear Vast Change," The Times Higher Education Supplement, April 18 2003. 
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548 Marie George argues that the Anthropic Principle generally represents a reformatted version of 
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values has changed little. Tipler and Barrow present metaphysics in the guise of 
physics, which creates a broadbased rhetorical appeal grounded in the respect afforded 
to science.  
5.1 THE STATE OF THE DEBATE 
Although Wallace’s unity position found few active scientific defenders, the 1920s-
30s saw many dismiss the possibility of alien life beyond the solar system as unlikely, 
due to stellar collisions.  Astronomer Royal Sir Harold Spencer Jones’s Life on Other 
Worlds (1940), which became the standard text on the subject for a quarter of century, 
rejected this view.549 Jones put forth an image of a vast universe, in which our solar 
system did not have a special location.  He wrote, “with the universe constructed on so 
vast a scale, it would seem inherently improbable that our small Earth can be the only 
home of life.”550  The book that would replace Spencer’s as the dominant text on the 
plurality question, Carl Sagan and Iosef Shklovskii’s Intelligent Life in the Universe 
(1966), proved even more supportive of the probability of alien life.551   
By 1980, voices in the scientific community speaking on the plurality question 
typically favored the belief in alien life, although not nearly as strongly as in the late 
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1800s.  Carl Sagan rocketed to fame by speaking and writing about the likelihood of 
extraterrestrial life.  NASA made the search for alien life one of its top priorities 
during the exploration of Mars, which helped gain the mission enthusiastic public 
support.552  In fact, scientists attributed NASA’s ability to acquire public funding in 
the economic downturn of the 1970s to Sagan’s promise of discovering intelligent 
aliens.553  Frank Drake created a formula (the Drake equation) for determining the 
probable number of intelligent alien civilizations, which had the technology to send 
signals of their existence.  Most readings of the Drake equation by scientists of the 
time placed the number of such civilizations fairly high.  In no small part due to 
Drake’s equation, the plurality thesis maintained a comfortable place with the 
astronomy community.554  In 1983 the United States government provided 1.5 million 
dollars to the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) to scan for radio messages 
from alien civilization.555  SETI represented one of the few areas of agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union: both invested resources into 
exploring the question of alien life and scientists from both countries met to discuss 
the question.556 
Despite the broad support for plurality some scientists still held strong in their 
support for unity beliefs.  Many biologists, for one, never came on board to the 
plurality consensus, with figures like Theodosius Dobzhansky, George Gaylord 
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Simpson, J. Francois, Francisco Ayala, and Ernst Mayr defending unity.557  The 
evolutionary argument against unity rested on the statistical improbability of 
intelligence’s evolution on earth.558  Many biologists felt that earth had won the 
equivalent of a cosmic lottery and the chances for intelligent life to emerge on any 
given planet were so small that for it to occur twice was improbable even in a vast 
universe.559   
The 1970s also contained hints of the emergence of a vocal unity contingent 
within the field of astronomy.  In 1975, Michael Hart made the case against alien life 
in a major astronomy journal, by invoking Fermi’s paradox.560  Fermi’s paradox gains 
its name from physicist Enrico Fermi (although its origin is much older).561  In 1950, 
while working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Fermi asked the simple 
question, if intelligent aliens exist, “where are they?”562 Only a few years after Hart’s 
article, in 1979, scientists opposed to belief in alien intelligence organized a 
conference focused on the Fermi’s paradox.563  Although voices sympathetic to the 
plurality spoke, like Jill Tatar of the SETI institute, the conference participants came 
down firmly against the probability of intelligent aliens.   
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In 1980, Frank Tipler, then a professor of Mathematics as U.C. Berkeley, 
entered the debate with his article “Extraterrestrial Intelligence Does Not Exist.”564  
Tipler was born February 1, 1947 in Andalusia, Alabama. He claims that as a child he 
was inspired by “Werner von Braun, and decided then that I wanted to be an 
astrophysicist.”565  His parents raised him as a Christian fundamentalist, but he became 
an atheist at sixteen, because he felt that science clearly contradicted the claim that the 
Earth was only 6,000 years old.566  After finishing his Ph.D. at M.I.T., he became a 
post-doc for the famous Princeton physicist John A. Wheeler, who Tipler notes on his 
website was the Ph.D. advisor of the even more famous R. P. Feynman.567  Before his 
interest in alien life, Tipler published several articles on general relativity in 
prestigious journals.568   Even George Ellis, Professor of Applied Mathematics at the 
University of Cape Town, who became one of Tipler’s harshest critics, claimed that 
Tipler did “nice work” in these early articles.569 
In his 1980, Tipler provided a defense of Fermi’s paradox.  His article 
answered the claim that no aliens have visited Earth because space colonization would 
prove prohibitively expensive.  He theorized that Von Neuman probes (intelligent 
machines that have the ability to self replicate) could quickly and relatively cheaply 
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explore the entire universe.  Tipler makes the case that an intelligent alien race would 
certainly deploy Von Neuman probes to explore the universe and colonize other 
planets.  While one can object that Tipler would have little knowledge of what an alien 
race would or would not do, he makes a compelling case for why probes represent a 
more efficient--and thus more likely--method of exploration than the radio waves that 
many in the SETI community believed aliens would send.570  Tipler claimed the 
absence of any signs of probes as proof of the lack of intelligent extraterrestrial life.  
More importantly for this dissertation, Tipler examines the philosophical implications 
of the unity v. plurality debate and made it a focus of his article.571  Tipler entered the 
fray read to combat both the majority scientific support for plurality and its 
philosophical implications.   
5.2 TIPLER’S RHETORICAL ANALYSIS 
The editor divided Tipler’s initial manuscript article into three parts, because of a 
miscommunication.  The journal released the three parts over the course of the same 
year.  The first section released focused primarily on Tipler’s updates to the Fermi 
paradox.  The other two parts provide a history of extraterrestrial life debate, in which 
Tipler explores the extra-scientific implications of unity by means of examining the 
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motivations of scholars engaged in the debate.  Unsurprisingly, given his position as 
an active defender of unity, Tipler only recognizes the plurality defenders as having an 
ulterior agenda connected to philosophy and religion. He concludes his section on the 
history of the plurality debate by saying, on the one hand: “I contend that, as has been 
the case for 2000 years, these philosophical and theological beliefs are the main 
motivations for the belief in [extraterrestrial intelligence].”572 Figures throughout 
history who defended unity, on the other hand, Tipler portrays as objective scientists 
(although he does make an exception for unity thinkers in the Medieval period).  This 
dichotomy becomes evident in the way Tipler narrates historical events.  He describes 
Whewell as, “the first person to take a critical scientific look at the empirical, as 
opposed to the philosophical or theological, evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence 
(authors italics).”573  Tipler criticizes defenders of plurality for their lack of “a sense of 
history.”  Tipler means that plurality proponents fail to recognize that they merely 
recycle the arguments of previous plurality defenders, without any critical 
reflection.574   
Tipler seeks to undermine the ethos of the plurality defenders further, by 
connecting them to three discredited scientific theories: spontaneous generation, 
Laplace’s nebular hypothesis, and the great chain of being (an anti-Darwin belief, that 
preceded Darwin according to Arthur O. Lovejoy).575 Presumably Tipler meant to 
discredit the idea of plurality through guilt by association; the pluralists believed these 
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wrong ideas, so their support of plurality is equally suspect.  Leaving aside the 
potentially ad hominem nature of this argument, Tipler does not mention unity 
thinkers’ belief in these same discredited concepts.   
Tipler’s article selectively engages the links between discredited science and 
participants in the plurality debate.  Proponents of unity often supported these 
doctrines as well, just as many plurality proponents opposed them.  Whewell actually 
defended a modified version of the nebular hypothesis, in his book Plurality of 
Worlds, while many plurality defenders (like Brewster) not only rejected the nebular 
hypothesis, but actively castigated Whewell for relying on it.576  Nor does Tipler 
mention that Whewell fiercely opposed Darwinism and supported a version of the 
great chain of being.577  Similarly, Tipler points to Wallace’s book Man’s Place in the 
Universe to suggest that Darwinism demands unity, with no recognition of Wallace’s 
significant back-tracking from orthodox Darwinism or the support of other Darwinians 
for plurality, including, most notably, Charles Darwin himself.578  Tipler narrates 
events in way that denies plurality defenders scientific credibility, while elevating the 
credentials of unity proponents.  This sets the stage for his characterization of plurality 
advocates as motivated primarily by extrascientific reasons. 
Beyond Tipler’s one-sided reporting of the scientific beliefs of the debate 
participants, he portrays defenders of plurality as religious fanatics.  He accuses 
Brewster of going after Whewell with a “missionary zeal,” by which he means 
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Brewster behaved irrationally.579  Tipler then attributes this same “missionary zeal” to 
Frank Drake’s defense of SETI.580  He argues that Carl Sagan, Fred Hoyle, Frank 
Drake, A.G.W. Cameron, and other prominent believers in plurality practice a new 
religion based around salvation by an advanced alien race.581 Tipler presents himself 
as part of a scientific corrective to the thousands-of-years-old mystical religion of 
plurality.582  In this respect, he positions himself as another Whewell or Wallace, 
whom he champions as scientific purists.  The truth of Tipler’s representation of 
modern day SETI defenders aside, he replicates the closed-minded commitment to his 
cosmology he accuses his opponents of having.  His one-sided reading of the plurality 
debate reflects either his own lack of “a sense of history” or a purposeful slanting of 
events. 
Although the Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society did not have 
much readership outside a specialized audience, Tipler hoped his article would reach 
the wider public.  He points to the lack of popular dissenting voices as reason for 
plurality’s ubiquity at the end of the eighteenth century and compares it to the modern 
day, “If there is no opposition to a view, it will become generally accepted whatever 
the evidence for it (witness the contemporary situation of [Extraterrestrial Intelligence] 
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in the popular press).”583  Tipler’s concern for the public perception of alien life points 
to his opinion of the stakes of the debate.  Rather than approach the existence of alien 
life as a technical question, best left to private debate between scientists, he sees his 
role as a public intellectual, countering the efforts of Sagan and others.  It was not long 
before Tipler, now a professor of mathematical physics at Tulane University in New 
Orleans, got his wish that his ideas would be exposed to a larger audience.   
In 1981, the popular science magazine Physics Today published an abridged 
version of his article.584  The new adaptation, also titled “Extraterrestrial Intelligent 
Beings Do Not Exist,” presented the argument for unity in a more accessible format, 
although much of the metaphysical undertones were absent.  The article condensed 
Tipler’s original thirty-six pages of arguments into three and replaces his myriad of 
references with a suggestion that readers interested in learning more view his original 
articles in the Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society.  A comic of the 
universe with a speech bubble coming from one tiny spec of space (presumably Earth) 
saying “Where is everybody?” accompanied the piece.585  The Physics Today article 
brought Tipler one step closer to his goal of providing a popular venue for his work. 
Tipler’s initial forays into the alien life debate had a major impact on the 
debate.  Senator William Proxmire drew on Tipler’s arguments when he made the case 
that Congress should cut funding for SETI.586  More importantly, Tipler reintroduced 
the idea that philosophical beliefs intertwined with the question of alien life.  Tipler 
argues that pluralists historically have had religious and quasireligious motivations for 
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their scientific conclusions. He indicates that he wants to enter the public debate to 
correct the mistaken public belief in alien life.  Although he hints at an ulterior motive 
of his own, he does not articulate the stakes of the debate for him, beyond a concern 
for scientific accuracy.  Tipler’s next endeavor would begin to build the case for the 
philosophical values associated with unity, providing both a philosophical and 
scientific rebuttal of the position of the pluralists. 
5.3 THE ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE 
Six years after the initial publication of Tipler’s article “Extraterrestrial Intelligent 
Beings Do Not Exist,” Tipler again saw his unity ideas presented in a popular venue.  
He co-wrote the Anthropic Cosmological Principle with John D. Barrow, a professor 
of astronomy at Sussex University.  Like Tipler, Barrow had impressive scientific 
credentials.  By the year 1986, when the Anthropic Cosmological Principle was 
released, Barrow had published seventy-four articles, many in top-tier journals.  In 
1983, he co-wrote The Left Hand of Creation, a popular science book explaining the 
origins of the universe with Joseph Silk, a astronomy professor at the University of 
California Berkley. Tipler and Barrow brought a scientific pedigree to their work that 
bolstered its credibility notwithstanding its content.  
Their book merges the titular concept of the Anthropic Principle with the unity 
cosmology and uses this fusion as a defense of absolute values.  Before one can 
understand how they deploy the unity cosmology it is important to understand the 
Anthropic Principle.  Despite having many similarities with unity, the Anthropic 
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Principle exists as a distinct concept.  The Anthropic Principle comes in a variety of 
forms, which Tipler and Barrow explore in the book.  They defend a radical version of 
the-already-controversial Anthropic Principle, which connects human existence to the 
existence of the universe. 
The authors identify four meanings of the Anthropic Principle, which they 
delineate into specific terms.  The first, proposed in modern times by Princeton 
Physics Professor Robert Dicke, they refer to as the weak Anthropic Principle (WAP).  
The WAP claims that the universe has to be amenable to life; otherwise, no life would 
exist.  The WAP amounts to little more than a tautology and Tipler and Barrow 
suggest it is, “in no way either spectacular or controversial.”587  The strong Anthropic 
Principle (SAP) goes further than the WAP and says that not only do the conditions of 
the universe allow for intelligent life, but, “the Universe must have those properties 
which allow life to develop within it as some stage in its history” (my italics).588  
Tipler and Barrow acknowledge that the SAP often gets equated with intelligent 
design by a creator god, wherein a divinity creates the universe specifically for life.589  
Tipler and Barrow, however, defend a different version of the SAP, Princeton 
Professor of astrophysics John Wheeler’s participant Anthropic Principle (PAP), 
which says that intelligent observers, like humans, are necessary for a universe to 
exist.   
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The PAP derives from one of the quirks of quantum mechanics, in which some 
scientists believe nothing can exist in a physical form before an observer witnesses it. 
Tipler and Barrow believe many universes exist, but universes without intelligent 
observers can only exist in a quantum (but not physical state).590 The PAP has the 
incredibly counterintuitive implication that life that postdates the existence of the 
universe is responsible for the physical manifestation of the universe.591  The 
likelihood for a universe to allow the evolution of observers, thus, selects for universes 
amenable to life to become physically manifest.  This selection process explains the 
large number of physical laws and properties of our universe that seem tailor made for 
life (like water’s unique characteristics and the overall composition of atomic matter), 
because a universe hostile to life will not develop observers and thus not move from a 
quantum to physical state.592  
The elevation of humanity to cause, rather than effect of the universe appears 
compatible with the human-centric theme of the unity cosmology, although not 
identical to it.  SAP does not necessitate human observers; alien intelligences could 
quantumly select the biofriendly traits for the universe.  Tipler and Barrow vigorously 
deny the possibility of alien life, however.  They rehash Tipler’s version of Fermi’s 
paradox as well as provide a series of biological arguments against the likelihood of 
intelligence developing.593  At first the authors do not make clear the relevance of the 
absence of alien intelligence to the Anthropic Principle. It seems at first as though the 
                                                
590 Ibid.,  472-96. 
591 It would be wrong to dismiss the PAP solely on the grounds of its counter-intuitiveness, as many of 
the foundational ideas from quantum physics seem incredibly strange. 
592 Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, 505, 06, 10, 24-41. 
593 Ibid.,  556-70, 76-600. 
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authors had simply added Tipler’s original article on the lack of aliens as a chapter to 
an otherwise unrelated book.  The sections on alien life seemed out of place with the 
broader thesis and philosopher J. J. C. Smart even suggests that they contradict the 
larger idea that life selects for biofriendly universes.594  After all if intelligent 
observers select for the physical properties of the universe, then one could rightfully 
expect multitudinous observers.  This brings us to the fourth form of the Anthropic 
Principle discussed by Tipler and Barrow, the Final Anthropic Principle (FAP). 
The FAP states that once “intelligent information-processing” (by which they 
mean humanity to be succeeded by artificial intelligence) emerges it, “will never die 
out.”595 The FAP builds on the framework of the SAP, in other words, for the FAP to 
be true intelligent life must be necessary for the universe to exist.  The FAP also relies 
on the absence of alien life, because if extraterrestrial intelligent life existed then 
humanity could be replaced as the quantum observers necessary for the universe.  The 
FAP represents Tipler and Barrow’s modern instantiation of the unity rhetoric of Plato, 
Whewell, and Wallace, although understanding exactly how requires a broader 
examination of the book.  
                                                
594 J.J.C. Smart, "The Anthropic Cosmological Principle," The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 149 
(1987). 
595 Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, 23.  The idea that intelligent machines 
will replace humanity represents an obvious difference from earlier manifestations of the unity 
cosmology.  One could read Tipler and Barrow’s depiction of the future as one that denies the 
importance of humanity, because of our inevitable replacement by machines.  This reading clashes with 
the way Tipler and Barrow view personhood, however.  For them information represents the foundation 
of personhood, which means the creation of intelligent machines differs little from bearing new human 
children.  Both represent extensions of human information and thus one should view them as equally 
children of humanity.  As I will discuss later, Tipler believes a human can become functionally 
resurrected by having all of the data on its brain place onto a computer.  The kink between information 
with humanity does not apply to aliens, because by definition they do not have a connection to 
humanity.   This chapter later presents more reasons that aliens undermine humanity’s special place in 
the universe, but artificial intelligence would not. 
 210
5.4 THE SCIENTIFIC FRAME 
Before one can examine the argument for teleology and absolute values embedded in 
their cosmology, it is important to understand the rhetorical frame within which Tipler 
and Barrow operate.  Unlike Plato, Aquinas, Whewell, and Wallace, Tipler and 
Barrow write at a time when natural philosophy no longer exists as the primary 
academic discourse.  Hostility to metaphysics faced Tipler and Barrow with the unique 
challenge of rhetorically appealing to unity without giving the appearance of being 
unscientific.  In the beginning of their book they recognize the challenge and seek to 
forestall any claims against their objectivity.  They write, 
 
The authors are cosmologists, not philosophers.  This has one very important 
consequence which the average reader should bear in mind.  Whereas many 
philosophers and theologians appear to possess an emotional attachment to 
their theories and ideas which requires them to believe them, most scientists 
tend to regard their ideas differently.  They are interested in formulating many 
logically consistent possibilities, leaving any judgement regarding their truth to 
observation.  Scientists feel no qualms about suggesting different but mutually 
exclusive explanations for the same phenomenon.  The authors are no 
exception to this rule and it would be unwise of the reader to draw any wider 
conclusions about the authors’ views from what they read here.596 
 
                                                
596 Ibid.,  15.  
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Tipler and Barrow seek to maintain the aura of objective scientists crunching the data, 
rather than philosophizing.  The passage amounts to an anti-rhetorical, rhetorical 
gambit, downplaying the importance of rhetoric in favor of hard science, at the same 
time making a rhetorical move to bolster their credibility. 
Mary Midgley, a professor of Philosophy at Newcastle University, examines 
this passage and writes, “What these authors hope to do is to import into metaphysics 
the kind of impartiality that comes naturally in the physical science, simply by 
handling it with scientific methods” (author’s italics).597  She makes a strong argument, 
but the passage does more than signal the inner intentions of the authors. Tipler and 
Barrow could have presented a scientific study of teleology without announcing they 
conducted an unbiased study.  The passage lets the audience know that they should 
read the text as scientific, rather than a work of philosophy or even a book separated 
into distinct sections on science and philosophy.  Tipler and Barrow paint a picture 
where they felt compelled to their conclusions by the raw data rather than their own 
beliefs.  This establishes a framework that means the reader needs to confront and 
refute the science behind their argument or they risk the kind of, “emotional 
attachment to their theories and ideas” that Tipler and Barrow renounce. 
The standard of scientific proof as the metric of argument places refutation 
beyond the ability of much of the general public who purchased the book, as well as 
many academics.598 The length of the book alone, at over 700 pages, makes a close 
                                                
597 Mary Midgley, Science as Salvation: A Modern Myth and its Meaning (New York: Routledge, 
1992), 23. 
598 Well-educated authors writing about the book share the view that its science makes for a difficult 
read.  David B. Myers, "New Design Arguments: Old Millian Objections," Religious Studies 36, no. 2 
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reading a daunting task.599  The authors include an enormous number of footnotes, 
both citations and further explanations, a fact noted in popular and academic 
reviews.600  Tracking down all of their sources and reading them would take more 
effort than all but the most dedicated reader could sustain and reading the material 
cited would not ensure understanding.  Much of the science exists beyond the 
comprehension of lay audiences; for example, long mathematical equations pepper the 
text.  The book often reads as pieces of scientific journal articles meant for specialized 
audiences, rather than a work that would have public success.  The standard of 
scientific refutation forecloses the avenues of response to all but the most educated 
readers.601 
The difficulty of the text creates a structural authority that places the reader in 
a dependent relation to the authors.  Of course difficulty alone does not guarantee 
ethos, much less readership.  Tipler and Barrow employ a strategy where most of the 
philosophical implications of their work occur at the beginning and the end of the text 
in highly readable prose, which draws in the lay reader.  The difficult to follow 
sections occur in the middle of the book.  Most readers will likely skip over the math 
sections and not follow up on the footnotes, despite the central role they play in the 
book’s argument.  The text arouses a desire for a knowledgeable authority to do the 
                                                                                                                                        
(2000): 141; Paul A. Robinson Jr., "Is the Universe an Accident?: An Answer from Two Scientists," 
Christian Science Monitor, July 3, 1986. 
599 Even the authors recognize the unusual length of their book and begin with a joke, quoting the Duke 
of Gloucester’s quip of, “Ah Mr. Gibbon, another damned, fat, square book.  Always scribble, scribble, 
scribble, eh?” when he was presented with the second volume of The Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire.  Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, v. 
600 Smart, "The Anthropic Cosmological Principle," 466; Timothy Ferris, "I Think, Therefore the 
Universe Is," New York Times, February 16, 1986; Robert Klee, "The Revenge of Pythagoras: How a 
Mathematical Sharp Practice Undermines the Contemporary Design Argument in Astrophysical 
Cosmology," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53, no. 3 (2002): 337.  
601 Wander, "The Rhetoric of Science," 227. 
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work of interpreting the scientific findings, which the authors then satisfy with their 
impressive credentials.602  
Tipler and Barrow both hold docterates in scientific fields and work at 
respected universities, which gives them a powerful ethos.603 The fact that famous 
Princeton scientist John Wheeler endorsed the book in the forward, also heavily 
contributes to their aura of objectivity.  As Robert Klee remarks, “the foreword was by 
none other than John Wheeler, [is] as sure as sign of the book’s scientific legitimacy as 
anything.”604  Beyond the support of Robert Klee, the publication of the book by the 
prominent academic publisher Oxford University Press adds another layer of 
intellectual sanction. The difficulty of the text combined with the qualifications of the 
authors, means that most readers probably take for granted the accuracy of Tipler and 
Barrow’s scientific claims.605 
Like Plato, Whewell, and Wallace, Tipler and Barrow employ the rhetorical 
appeal, “the scientific evidence speaks for itself.”  The conventions of the time when 
Tipler and Barrow write, however, make this rhetorical framing even more 
important.606  Wallace could include passages explicitly about humanity’s special 
place in the universe, because he wrote at the tail end of natural philosophy’s 
respectability in academia (the scientific community in particular).  If Tipler and 
                                                
602 Burke discusses the way forms can create audience desires and than satisfy them as a way to impart 
narrative (or in this case messages).  Kenneth Burke, Counter-statement (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968), 29-32. 
603 Tietge, Rational Rhetoric, 188. 
604 Klee, "The Revenge of Pythagoras," 337.  Of course that Klee feels the need to defend the legitimacy 
of the book in the first place reflects the fact that some prominent voices saw the book as deeply 
problematic. 
605 This occurs frequently in scientific argument.  Science exists as the dominant intellectual paradigm, 
but the average citizen lacks a strong scientific literacy.  This means the ethos of the scientist stands in 
for actual understanding of the specifics of the science.  Segal and Richardson, "Scientific Ethos." 
606 Weaver, "Dialectic and Rhetoric at Dayton, Tennessee ". 
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Barrow used the language Wallace did, it could be grounds for outright dismissal by 
scientific audiences.607  The result of their attempt to avoid the appearance of 
unscientific claims, however, is that Tipler and Barrow’s metaphysics become 
entwined with their physics to the point that accepting one requires accepting the 
other.  The next section details the anthropocentric philosophical background for the 
supposedly objective and value-free Anthropic Principle. 
5.5 THE UNITY RHETORIC 
Because of the desire to appear objective the metaphysical implications of their 
scientific inquiry emerge only sporadically throughout the 700-page book and often 
through the words of other thinkers.  The first two major sections of the book detail the 
history of teleology, a concept known primarily from philosophy and theology.  Tipler 
and Barrow’s history begins with the Old Testament and the ancient Greeks, a time 
when, “philosophy and science were conjoined and ‘metaphysics’ was concerned with 
the method as well as the meaning of science.”608  The connections between the 
Anthropic Principle and religion and science come through clearly in the history, 
which touches on figures already discussed in this dissertation like Plato, Democritus, 
and Aquinas, as well as a myriad of other important individuals (including advocates 
for the Anthropic Principle in nonwestern cultures).  This history provides the 
                                                
607 This will be evident in the reception of Tipler’s book The Physics of Immortality, which I will 
discuss towards the end of the chapter.  Frank J. Tipler, The Physics of Immortality: Modern 
Cosmology, God, and the Resurrection of the Dead (New York: Doubleday, 1994). 
608 Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, 28. 
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foundation for Tipler and Barrow’s defense of the FAP as the key foundation of 
teleology, absolute values, and the meaningfulness the universe. 
Tipler and Barrow acknowledge the potential philosophical implications of the 
Anthropic Principle in their first two sections where they detail the history of 
teleological arguments.  They claim that the purpose of the history is their “aim to 
[show] that the Anthropic Principle is not the new and revolutionary idea that many 
scientists see it to be.”609  The eighty-two-page background, however, goes beyond 
establishing an argumentative precedent for their theory.  It serves the function of 
establishing the stakes of the debate, with the Anthropic Principle associated with 
stable meaning and values in contrast to relativism.  This rhetorical connection appears 
to philosophize in precisely the way the authors disavow in their earlier claim to 
scientific objectivity.  The form of a historical primer helps obfuscate the break with 
their earlier statement, by allowing Tipler and Barrow to make philosophical 
arguments through the words of others.610 
The clearest emergence of Tipler and Barrow’s philosophy comes at the 
conclusion of the section on history, with nine whole pages of discussion on Teilhard 
de Chardin, the Christian mystic, philosopher, and self-proclaimed scientist.611  Tipler 
and Barrow focus on Teilhard’s concept of the Omega point. Teilhard believed that 
life evolved purposefully towards intelligence.  The emergence of intelligence brought 
about the “noosphere,” which Teilhard describes as the collective and integrated 
                                                
609 Ibid.,  108-09.  
610 Lessl argues that Carl Sagan uses historical symbolism to sneak metaphysical ideas into his 
“objective” science.  Tipler and Barrow’s rhetorical move is even cleverer, because they often do not 
need to invest history with symbolism as Sagan did, but rather they report the ideas of historical figures 
in a way that ultimately advances their own beliefs. Lessl, "Science and the Sacred Cosmos," 180. 
611 Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, 195-203. 
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thought of humanity.  Over time the noosphere evolves as technology and socialization 
bring about more knowledge. Teilhard believed that eventually humanity would reach 
the Omega point, where the sum total of knowledge coalesces into a super-intelligent 
collective, an intellectual precursor to the FAP.   
Tipler and Barrow go beyond summarizing Teilhard’s view, however, and 
actually build on his theories. Tipler and Barrow acknowledge that some scientists 
attacked Teilhard as a mystic masquerading as a scientist, but Tipler and Barrow 
defend his work as scientific. 612   Tipler and Barrow do point to areas where new 
science has definitively disproved Teilhard, such as his understanding of information 
processing theory.  Rather than discredit Teilhard, Tipler and Barrow suggest that 
these refutations prove that Teilhard made refutable and thus scientific claims.  The 
authors then suggest ways that one can save Teilhard’s overall theory with a few 
changes.  Rather than locate the Omega point on Earth as Teilhard did, Tipler and 
Barrow claim that it could occur at the singularity of the universe (the point in time 
right before the universe collapses back into the state it existed before the big bang).613  
The authors indicate their own theory represents a modernized version of Teilhard’s 
general thesis of evolution to totalizing intelligence.  
Tipler and Barrow’s move to modernize Teilhard’s thesis does not represent a 
neutral scientific observation.  Tipler and Barrow say plainly, “the basic framework of 
[Teilhard’s] theory is really the only framework wherein the evolving Cosmos of 
                                                
612 Ibid.,  196. 
613 Ibid.,  203. 
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modern science can be combined with an ultimate meaningfulness to reality.”614 
Teilhard’s Omega point represents a cosmos of meaning, unlike the purposeless 
universe of the atomists that provides the foundation for the modern cosmos.  In order 
to draw out this point, they contrast the meaningful existence inherent in the Omega 
point, with the possibility of “heat death,” which they describe as a prevailing view 
among scientists.   
Tipler and Barrow maintain that in contrast to the Omega point, heat death 
obliterates the possibility for a meaningful universe.  Heat death occurs far in the 
future when energy becomes evenly dispersed throughout the universe, resulting in the 
death of all life.  The most famous reaction to heat death comes from Bertrand Russell, 
who Tipler and Barrow quote at length, 
 
… the world which science presents for our belief is even more purposeless, 
more void of meaning, [than a world in which God is malevolent]. That Man is 
the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; 
that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but 
the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no 
intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the 
grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all 
the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast 
death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man’s achievement 
must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these 
                                                
614 Ibid.,  204. 
 218
things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy 
which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these 
truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair can the soul’s 
habitation be safely built.  [Brackets and ellipses by Tipler and Barrow]615  
 
Russell’s view of heat death represents one of the most depressing passages in western 
philosophy.  No human achievement, however spectacular, can escape the universe’s 
ultimate fate of frozen silence.  Russell did not ponder the prospects of heat death 
alone; Paul Davies claims it had a “profoundly depressing effect on generations of 
scientists and philosophers.”616  People find heat death depressing not because it will 
adversely affect any human now alive, but because it robs humanity of a future. 
Inevitable extinction denies a telos or purpose to our existence, which renders 
humanity insignificant and the universe meaningless.  
For Tipler and Barrow, heat death represents the philosophical polar opposite 
of Teilhard’s teleological and perfectible future. Teilhard’s Omega point gives human 
life significance and purpose by building towards perfection; heat death renders human 
action meaningless because it portends a future of cosmic nothingness.  It is important 
to note that heat death and the Omega point (understood as the emergence of an 
interconnected super intelligence) do not represent mutually exclusive possibilities.  
The future events’ meanings for our present time, however, do conflict.  This 
prompted Teilhard to posit the Omega point as mutually exclusive with heat death 
                                                
615 Ibid.,  167. 
616 Paul Davies, The Last Three Minutes: Conjectures about the Ultimate Fate of the Universe (New 
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because if the Omega point did not exist forever, “it would not be Omega.”617  If a 
human created supercomputer inevitably collapsed in a universal heat death, then it 
lacked any meaning as far as Teilhard was concerned, just as the FAP only has 
meaning if humanity never goes extinct. 
Tipler and Barrow end their discussion of the history of teleology with 
Teilhard and heat death and return to it in their final chapter, because the distinction 
between the two views of the future sets the terms of the debate for their own vision of 
the future embodied in the FAP.  In the first pages, they reference Russell’s passage on 
heat death and quote Nobel prizing-winning physicist Steven Weinberg making a very 
similar argument.618  The FAP, however, offers hope to avoid this form of cosmic 
despair,  
 
Although mankind--and hence life itself--is at present confined to one 
insignificant, doomed planet, this confinement may not be perpetual…once 
space travel begins, there are, in principle, no further physical barriers to 
prevent Homo sapiens (or our descendants) from eventually expanding to 
colonize a substantial portion, if not all, of the visible Cosmos.  Once this has 
occurred, it becomes quite reasonable to speculate that the operations of all 
these intelligent beings could begin to affect the large scale evolution of the 
Universe.  If this is true, it would be in this era--in the far future near the Final 
State of the Universe--that the true significance of life and intelligence would 
                                                
617 Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, 201. 
618 Ibid.,  613-14. 
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manifest itself.  Present-day life would then have cosmic significance because 
of what future life may someday accomplish.619 
 
Tipler and Barrow appear to accept Russell and Weinberg’s central thesis that heat 
death does render human behavior pointless.  Tipler and Barrow challenge the belief 
that heat death inevitably awaits humanity, however, and offer an alternative vision of 
the future where the actions of intelligent can shape the cosmos.  The ability to enact 
change on a universal scale gives “cosmic significance” to the lives of present day 
humans.   
Tipler and Barrow lay forth the cosmic changes they imagine saving future 
intelligence from destruction and infusing present day human life with value.  In their 
model, human intelligence expands out to encompass the entire universe and creates a 
machine so powerful that it represents an Omega point in a truer sense than Teilhard’s 
belief in super-intelligence on Earth.620 As the last paragraph of their book they write, 
 
life will have gained control of all matter and forces not only in a single 
universe, but in all universes whose existence is logically possible; life will 
have spread into all spatial regions in all universes which could logically exist, 
and will have stored an infinite amount of information, including all bits of 
knowledge which it is logically possible to know.  And this is the end.621 
 
                                                
619 Ibid.,  614. 
620 Ibid.,  664-77. 
621 Ibid.,  677. 
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This picture of the future defies imagination, but its clear what is symbolizes, total 
domination of the universe by intelligence.  As “life spread[s] into all spatial regions in 
all universes which could logically exist” the universe becomes synonymous with 
intelligence (the intellectual offspring of humanity today).  For Tipler and Barrow 
intelligence infuses the universe with meaning; nature and the desires of intelligence 
become one.  Aesthetically the universe becomes unity, as the Omega point 
incorporates all of its constituent parts. 
Buried in a footnote they further unpack the meaning of this final passage, “a 
modern-day theologian might wish to say the totality of life at the Omega point is 
omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient!”622  The Omega point represents humanity 
becoming god through science.623  This technological singularity provides the perfect 
foundation for transcendent ethics throughout all time, just the way the orderly, 
crystalline, celestial objects of Plato’s Timaeus provided the model for human 
ethics.624  Tipler and Barrow argue the FAP, with its Omega point, provides a 
scientific cosmological foundation for meaning and purpose in the lives of humanity. 
                                                
622 Ibid.,  382. 
623 Mary Midgley recognizes Tipler and Barrow’s book as a form of techno-salvation myth.  Midgley, 
Science as Salvation: A Modern Myth and its Meaning. 
624 The figurative use of religious language in describing the Omega point gives scientific cover to the 
metaphysical ideas buried in the passage.  The authors can always claim to have simply taken poetic 
license, which is bolstered by their claim that a “theologian” (not they) would describe the Omega point 
as “omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient!”  Lessl, "The Culture of Science and the Rhetoric of 
Scientism," 181. 
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5.6 ABSENT ALIENS 
The previous sections demonstrate how Tipler and Wallace maintain a scientific style 
and present the FAP as a justification for teleology.  This has obvious connections to 
the cosmological arguments of thinkers like Plato, Aquinas, Whewell, and Wallace, 
who held similar philosophical beliefs that connected these ideas to the structure of the 
universe. The FAP, however, is not the same as the absence of alien life central to the 
unity cosmology. One can read the fine-tuning of the universe discussed in The 
Anthropic Cosmological Principle as the only proof necessary of teleology and 
absolute values.  Under this interpretation the discussion of the absence of aliens is a 
superfluous indulgence of Tipler’s past work.  I believe, however, that the unity 
cosmology represents a central component of Tipler and Barrow’s argument. 
Without unity, the FAP and the Omega point fail to necessitate meaning and 
purpose to the lives of humans.  First, the Omega point by definition must be singular, 
even absent the technical question of whether two universal super computers could 
exist simultaneously.  Only by achieving total knowledge does that computer gain the 
status of the Omega point, Omega being finality.  The existence of two such 
computers may raise Teilhard’s objection that absent singularity, “it would not be 
Omega.”  This means that to achieve the Omega point any intelligence would have to 
join in the effort. 
The inclusion of alien life into the Omega point raises a host of difficult 
questions for Tipler and Barrow.  The “alien” represents, by definition, an unknown 
factor. The idea of the Omega point represents an extrapolation of present 
technological trends into the future.  Tipler and Barrow build their case for the Omega 
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point, by putting the future in the form of mathematical equations. The existence of 
aliens disturbs these neat equations by adding an unpredictable variable.   
The addition of aliens to the cosmos forces Tipler and Barrow to explain what 
about humanity specifically, among all the life on earth, makes it the telos of the 
universe.  Without confronting the alien question, beyond denying alien existence, 
Tipler and Barrow can rely on age old anthropocentrism to explain why humans alone 
and not, for example, humans, dolphins, octopi, worms, and/or trees represent the 
central focus of the cosmos.  Aliens blur the line between humanity and other species, 
by forcing the question of what, if anything, makes humanity unique among 
animals.625 Without intelligent aliens in the equation, Tipler and Barrow are free to 
assert that of the known life forms only humans and their robotic offspring can fulfill 
the demands of the FAP. 
The existence of intelligent aliens also raises the possibility that humanity need 
not survive to create the Omega point, because some other race of intelligent observers 
could achieve the goal.  In other words, the FAP becomes compatible with human 
extinction as long as some alien species survives to create the Omega point.  This not 
only matters for our distant, distant offspring (be they organic or mechanical), but also 
for all humans living today.  Tipler and Barrow assign our present day lives meaning 
based on their contribution to the Omega point.  Absent a clear connection to this final 
goal, humanity lacks “cosmic significance.”  Without future participation in the 
Omega point humanity again faces the bleak prospects of extinction, just as in the 
scenario of universal heat death (even if it occurs earlier through other means).  The 
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prospect of human extinction returns the cosmic despair and purposelessness that 
Russell and others discuss, not for our distant descendants, but for all humans today. 
Tipler and Barrow’s connection of the absence of alien life to the FAP also 
provides some of the easiest-to-measure proofs of the theory.  While they provide as 
substantial amount of evidence that they believe proves the fine-tuned nature of the 
universe, what constitutes fine-tuning is often a matter of interpretation.  The absence 
or presence of intelligent alien life represents a much easier thing to determine 
objectively, given the proper knowledge.626  By conflating human singularity and the 
FAP, Tipler and Barrow provide what they believe to be a more persuasive argument. 
Beyond the absence of alien life’s persuasion value, the very structure of Tipler 
and Barrow’s argument for unity speaks to their broader concern for the special nature 
of humanity.  They depend heavily on Fermi’s paradox, which denies the existence of 
aliens because they have not contacted humanity, but Fermi’s paradox presupposes, 
not proves, their teleological universe.  The Soviet SETI scientists, in contrast to their 
American counterparts, highlighted the problem of radical difference when attempting 
to contact or understand the motivations of aliens.627  Even though many Soviet 
scientists believed aliens certainly existed, they had doubts that we would have a 
means to communicate with them or recognize their attempts to communicate with 
us.628  Furthermore, the complications of discovery and communication assume aliens 
                                                
626 Of course, determining what constitutes “intelligent” or even “life” can be a tricky matter.  Despite 
these concerns the endeavor still appears a much more straightforward task that reading purpose into the 
universal structure. 
627 Sheridan, "SETI's Scope", 67-93. 
628 Nicholas Rescher independently develops a similar argument focused on the likelihood that alien 
science differs radically from our own.  Nicholas Rescher, "Extraterrestrial Science," in 
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have a desire to find and communicate with humanity in the first place.  The idea that 
alien races could live their lives totally independent of any concern for humanity calls 
into question our species’ cosmic importance.  Tipler and Barrow’s faith in the fact 
that aliens would have a compelling interest and the technical means to contact us, 
mirrors European disbelief at the possibility of two continents of humans living 
unaware of Europe.  If one views humanity as peripheral, rather than central, to the 
cosmos, than it should come as no surprise that humanity has not been contacted by 
alien life. 
The unity cosmology represents an essential component of Tipler and Barrow’s 
version of the Anthropic Principle.  Including aliens into the cosmos raises questions 
about the anthropocentric nature of Tipler and Barrow’s claim that humans, rather 
than, say, dolphins, are the purpose of the universe.  Intelligent aliens could construct 
an Omega point independent of humanity, which means that humans need not be the 
species that survive until the end of the universe.  The absence of aliens represents an 
easily understood proof of human specialness in contrast to that derived from 
mathematical formulas, which makes it useful for defending the Anthropic Principle.  
Finally, Fermi’s paradox fits within the larger narrative of humanity serving as the 
metaphorical center of the universe.  Just like Plato and Aquinas to whom they 
acknowledge their deep intellectual debt, Tipler and Barrow connect unity to 
teleology.629 
                                                
629 It is worth noting that at the time Tipler and Barrow released their book, the American academy was 
embroiled in a “culture war.”  Postmodernism, poststructuralism, and identity politics had challenged 
many of the practices of the university.  The literary canon came under attack by those interested in 
increasing the presence of works by underrepresented groups.  Historians challenged the ability of their 
profession to provide objective analysis of the past. Professors influenced by continental philosophers, 
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5.7 RECEPTION 
An examination of the reception of The Anthropic Cosmological Principle helps to 
reveal the continued success of the unity cosmology.  In his series of articles on 
Fermi’s paradox, Tipler remarked that other scientists had a religious attitude towards 
his denial of intelligent alien life, which prompted them to defend plurality 
ferociously.  His new book with Barrow not only touched on alien life, but teleology, 
religion, and the meaning of life.  Given the gravity of the issues under discussion, the 
response to the book proved very positive.  This chapter examines a variety of articles, 
books, and speeches inspired by Tipler and Barrow’s book in order to gauge its 
rhetorical effectiveness. 
The first set of responses I examine come from academia.  I reviewed the 131 
results from searching the title “The Anthropic Cosmological Principle” in JSTOR.630  
I choose JSTOR because it is a premier database of over 500 academic research 
journals, which span across academic disciplines and tracks many journals back well 
before the mid-1990s.  This should provide a representative collection of the academic 
uses and critcisms of the book.631 
                                                                                                                                        
like Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, and Jacques Derrida attacked the possibility of “Truth.”  
Whether or not they intended it Tipler and Barrow’s work serves a rebuke to these modern forms of 
relativism by defending the possibility of absolute values, absolute knowledge, and an absolute future 
for humanity.  Peter Novick, That Nobel Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American 
Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Allan Bloom, The Closing of the 
American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). 
630 Roger C. Schonfeld, JSTOR: A History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
631 Lots of recent scholarship justifies using book reviews to assess reception.  Leah Ceccarelli, "A Hard 
Look at Ourselves: A Reception Study of Rhetoric of Science," Technical Communication Quarterly 
14, no. 3 (2005): 257–65; James L. Machor, "The American Reception of Melville's Short Fiction in the 
1850s," in New Directions in American Reception Study, ed. Philip Goldstein and James L. Machor 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 87-98; Steven Mailloux, "Judging and Hoping: Rhetorical 
Effects of Reading about Reading," in New Directions in American Reception Study, ed. Philip 
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I found six reviews of the book, with four being overall positive.632  Joseph 
Silk writing in one of the top two academic science journals, called the book “a 
marvelous treasure trove.”633  Philosopher Michael Heller appeared equally enamored 
with the book and wrote, “Nobody interested in philosophical aspects of modern 
cosmology, or modern science in general, could easily be excused from reading this 
book.”634  The Anthropic Cosmological Principle even received a positive review in 
the art journal Leonardo, with James Goldman highlighting the book’s aesthetic 
connections, before declaring it “a definitive and indispensable resource.”635 
Of the remaining two reviews, one opposed the book and the other gave a 
relatively neutral account.  The negative review came from a biologist, who was 
deeply unsettled by Tipler and Barrow’s defense of teleology.  He went so far as to 
question the sincerity of Tipler and Barrow’s arguments and stated, “assuming that the 
book was intended to be provocative, it is an unequivocal success.”636  Given the 
book’s coverage of so many controversial topics one would expect many more such 
comments than actually occurred.  The neutral account came from a literary journal, 
much later than the other reviews and situated the book among other books about 
scientific cosmology.637 
                                                                                                                                        
Goldstein and James L. Machor (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 23-32; Kenneth M. 
Roemer, "Placing Readers at the Forefront of Nowhere: Reception Studies and Utopian Literature " in 
New Directions in American Reception Study, ed. Philip Goldstein and James L. Machor (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 99-119. 
632 Joseph Silk, "New Series," Science 232, no. 4753 (1986); Michael Heller, The Review of 
Metaphysics 40, no. 3 (1987); Smart, "The Anthropic Cosmological Principle."; James A. Goldman, 
Leonardo 21, no. 3 (1988). 
633 Silk, "New Series," 1036.  
634 Heller: 565. 
635 Goldman: 334. 
636 Preston Cloud, The Quarterly Review of Biology 62, no. 1 (1987): 64. 
637 Monroe K. Spears, "Review: Cosmology and the Common Reader," Sewanee Review 99, no. 1 
(1991): 113-21. 
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The Anthropic Cosmological Principle made its way on the book lists of 
philosophy, science and philosophy of science journals.638  The influence of the book 
becomes apparent when one examines the way other scholars cite it.  Often academics 
cite the book for scientific purposes absent any reference to its broader themes, 
typically Tipler and Barrow’s description of how the universe emerged from 
nothing.639  Historians cite Tipler and Barrow for anecdotes of important scientific 
figures or their defense of Whig history.640  The JSTOR results also reveal exposure of 
the book within the academic artistic community.  The book inspired a poem, a new 
theme for science fiction, and an innovative approach to music.641  And, of course, 
authors cited the book to reference the claim that the universe is finely tuned for 
human existence.642  The achievement of so many citations, much less citations across 
                                                
638 "Recent Publications in Philosophy Source," Noûs 20, no. 4 (1986); "New Titles," BioScience 38, no. 
1 (1988); "Recent Publications," The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, no. 3 (1986). 
639 I. Prigogine and J. Geheniau, "Entropy, Matter, and Cosmology," Proceedings of the National 
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Russell, "Presidential Address: 'Rude and Disgraceful Beginnings': A View of History of Chemistry 
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641 Barry Mazur, Harvard Review, no. 16 (1999): 145; David Rosenboom, "Propositional Music: On 
Emergent Properties in Morphogenesis and the Evolution of Music. Part I: Essays, Propositions and 
Commentaries," Leonardo 30, no. 4 (1997): 296; David N. Samuelson, "Review: Botching the Science 
in Science Fiction," Science Fiction Studies 19, no. 1 (1992): 104. 
642 Mark Colyvan, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest, "Problems with the Argument from Fine 
Tuning," Synthese 145, no. 3 (2005): 334-35; Neil A. Manson, "Anthropocentrism and the Design 
Argument," Religious Studies 36, no. 2 (2000): 171-72; D. J. Bartholomew, "Probability, Statistics and 
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a plethora of disparate disciplines, sets The Anthropic Cosmological Principle apart 
from all but the most successful academic works. 
Most interesting for this study, however, academics began using the book to 
make Platonic claims to truth.  B. L. Hebblethwaite cites the book’s arguments of fine 
tuning as a proof for the God hypothesis.643  James Applewhite, unhappy with the 
“postmodern” state of art,” uses the Anthropic Principle to call for a return to 
transcendent universal values within aesthetics.644  Stuart N. Hart begins his case to 
extend more rights to children with a appeal to the Anthropic Principle, 
 
recent studies of the origins and progress of the universe have led cosmologists 
to postulate the "Anthropic Principle" to respect accumulating evidence that the 
universe embodies a design and fine-tuning mechanisms directed toward the 
achievement human life (Barrow 1998).  Evidently we are not the insignificant 
product of a chance occurrence in the backwater of evolution.  These facts 
suggest that there is something quite special about human beings, something 
that deserves respect.645 
 
                                                                                                                                        
Theology," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 151, no. 1 (1988): 140-41; M. A. B. Whitaker, "On 
Hacking's Criticism of the Wheeler Anthropic Principle," Mind 97, no. 386 (1988): 262; Timothy 
McGrew, Lydia McGrew, and Eric Vestrup, "Probabilities and the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Sceptical 
View," Mind 110, no. 440 (2001): 1027; B. L. Hebblethwaite, "Mellor's 'Bridge-Hand' Argument," 
Religious Studies 22, no. 3/4 (1986): 477; Peter Forrest, "Aesthetic Understanding," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 51, no. 3 (1991): 538; Roger White, "Does Origins of Life Research Rest 
on a Mistake?," Noûs 41, no. 3 (2007): 457. 
643 Hebblethwaite, "Mellor's 'Bridge-Hand' Argument," 477. 
644 James Applewhite, "Postmodernist Allegory and the Denial of Nature," Kenyon Review 11, no. 1 
(1989): 8. 
645 Stuart N. Hart, "Making Sure the Child's Voice Is Heard," International Review of Education 48, no. 
3/4 (2002): 251. 
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Given the passion of Hart’s plea for children’s rights in the rest of his article,  it is 
difficult to imagine him changing his mind based on new scientific data about the 
origin of the universe. One has to wonder if cosmology informs Hart’s (and the other 
previous examples) opinion on child welfare or whether he latched onto Tipler and 
Barrow’s cosmology as a defense of his preexisting beliefs.646  Independent of these 
authors’ actual beliefs on the universe’s relation to values, they all felt that Tipler and 
Barrow’s version of the Anthropic Principle lent credence to their argument. 
The academic uptake of Tipler and Barrow’s work for ethical and religious 
purposes goes beyond the JSTOR sample.  William Gairdner includes it as a proof of 
absolute values against what he sees as the current postmodern agenda of politics and 
philosophy.647  On the importance of the cosmic structure to philosophy he writes, 
 
Some highly respected physicists and mathematicians go much further.  They 
are persuaded that the entire cosmos came into existence so that human 
consciousness would eventually arise to observe it!  We may have gotten 
bumped from the centre of our own solar system over recent centuries, but 
such new and fascinating modern views argue that we belong right back at the 
centre again…. [T]he general direction of today’s scientific community and, 
therefore, of the public mind – and certainly of public education, which we 
must assume to reflect that mind – has strongly run against this idea.  We 
increasingly describe ourselves in definatly materialistic, atheistic, and 
                                                
646 Tipler and Barrow make the claim that Herbert Spencer modeled his cosmology after his political 
beliefs. Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, 188.  
647 William D. Gairdner, The Book of Absolutes: A Critique of Relativism and a Defense of Universals 
(London: Mc-Gill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 101-04. 
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therefore, relativistic terms….  The bleakness of this view could hardly be 
better expressed than by Havard astronomer Margaret Geller, who asks: “Why 
should the universe have a point?  What point?  It’s just a physical system, 
what point is there?” … when there is no point to anything, relativism rules. 
[author’s italics]648 
 
Gairdner recognizes the power of the Anthropic Principle to influence social values.  
Its ability to return humanity to the “centre” of the universe, reverses what he sees as 
moral decline rather than scientific error.  Errol E. Harris wrote two books that 
explored the religious and philosophical implications of Tipler and Barrow’s 
Anthropic Principle.649 Harris’s book argues that the PAP and SAP represent a natural 
argument for absolute values and design (in his second book he makes it clear that by 
design he means the truth of Christianity).650   M. A. Corey wrote another defense of 
God, teleology, and absolute values that depends on Tipler and Barrow’s book.651  
Unsuprisingly, given their religious conclusions, both Harris and Corey reject Tipler 
and Barrow’s secular Omega point and replace it with a religious event.652  Despite the 
move to desecularize (or resacralize) Tipler and Barrow’s arguments, however, the 
same argumentative framework undergirds their positions. 
                                                
648 Ibid.,  11. 
649 Errol E. Harris, Cosmos and Theos: Ethical and Theological Implications of the Anthropic 
Cosmological Principle (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1992); Errol E. Harris, Cosmos 
and Anthropos: A Philosophical Interpretation of the Anthropic Cosmological Principle (London: 
Humanities Press International, 1991). 
650 Importantly, Harris also denies the likelyhood of intelligent alien life, citing Tipler and Barrow as his 
only source.  Harris, Cosmos and Anthropos, 9. 
651 M. A. Corey, God and the New Cosmology: The Anthropic Design Argument (Lanham: Rowman & 
Little, 1993). 
652 Harris, Cosmos and Theos, 22, 199; Corey, God and the New Cosmology, 187-88. 
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5.8 EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS 
It is worth exploring why The Anthropic Cosmological Principle had the impact that it 
did on the academic world.  John Leslie had made the connection between the God 
hypothesis and the Anthropic Principle several years earlier with little fanfare.653  A 
JSTOR search for his article returns only 17 results, including the original article and 
three other articles by John Leslie.654  Of the remaining 13 articles, nine overlap with 
citations of Tipler and Barrow’s book, which suggests interest in Leslie’s work did not 
grow until after the publication of the Anthropic Cosmological Principle.655  Five of 
the thirteen share a footnote with Tipler and Barrow’s book.656  As for the results that 
do not overlap with citations of The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, one is the the 
table of contents from the issue of The American Philosophical Quarterly containing 
the original article.657  Another hit comes from a series of corrected errors from the 
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article, in a later issue of The American Philosophical Quarterly.658  The next result 
turns up only a mention of the title in a list of recently released philosophy articles.659  
This leaves only one article that cites Leslie’s article without reference to Tipler and 
Barrow.660  
Given the similarity of their arguments, the difference between Tipler and 
Barrow’s 131 results on JSTOR and Leslie’s 17 cries out for explanation.  The 
medium of the two pieces, certainly, represents a contributing factor.  Leslie’s piece 
came in the form of a journal article meant for specialized audiences; Tipler and 
Barrow’s book became a popular success, making it more visible across academic 
disciplines. Tipler also proselytized for his views, attending philosophy conferences 
and presenting primers specifically designed for non-scientists academics to 
incorporate the Anthropic Principle in their work.661  The length allowed Tipler and 
Barrow to cover a range of topics, reflected in the diversity of the ways others cite 
them. I do not think this accounts for the entirety of the difference, however.  The 
articles and books that use the Anthropic Principle to defend absolute moral values cite 
Tipler and Barrow and not Leslie, unless the works explicitly defend religion.662   
Tipler and Barrow’s book epitomizes a more rhetorically palatable defense of 
teleology.  For starters Tipler and Barrow’s work rhetorically performs the scientific 
objectivity that they claim in their introduction, as I detailed above.  The fact that so 
many scientific journals cite the book for its discussion of physics, independent of any 
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660 Dennis Temple, "Hume's Logical Objection to the Argument from Design Based on the Uniqueness 
of the Universe," Religious Studies 28, no. 1 (1992). 
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662 Corey, God and the New Cosmology; Hebblethwaite, "Mellor's 'Bridge-Hand' Argument." 
 234
reference to teleology suggests that scientists take the work seriously.  This in turn 
gives those that cite the book in defense of absolute moral values or teleology, 
scientific authority.  The “objective,” “hard science” of Tipler and Barrow makes their 
work appear more legitimate than Leslie’s philosophizing. 
The non-religious nature of the book may have even been a boon to religious 
academics.  William Lane Craig, a theist, takes issue with Tipler and Barrow because, 
“the thrust of the book's argument is in the end anti-theistic,” but proclaims, “I have 
already seen this book cited by two prominent philosophers of religion in support of 
the teleological argument.”663  Craig, like the unnamed “prominent philosophers” 
Craig cites and many others, uses Tipler and Barrow’s work as a starting point to 
defend religion.  Craig does not need to spend much time responding to Tipler and 
Barrow’s opposition to the design argument, because said opposition barely exists in 
the book.664  As we will see later in this chapter, this lack of opposition may well be by 
design.  To put things another way, Tipler and Barrow present metaphysics in the 
guise of physics, which appeals to the religious and nonreligious alike.  As Earman 
notes, “my concern is with attempts to wrap PAP [the belief that observers create the 
physical universe] in the cloak of scientific respectability.  These attempts amount to 
no more than hand waving.”665  What Earman dismissevily refers to as “hand 
waiving,” actually constitutes a successful rhetorical strategy to coopt the 
respectability of science.  Law Professor Jeffrey F. Addicott even proposed the 
Anthropic Principle, in the style of Tipler and Barrow, as an acceptable compromise to 
                                                
663 William Lane Craig, "Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design," The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39, no. 3 (1988): 389. 
664 Ibid.,  395. 
665 Earman, "The Sap Also Rises," 313. 
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teach in public schools, instead of intelligent design. Addicott’s argument: “the 
doctrine is recognized as a legitimate scientific axiom within the scientific 
community.”666  Tipler and Barrow’s scientific style allowed a cover for theists, absent 
in more traditional design arguments. 
Beyond the credibility gained by a scientific approach, Tipler and Barrow’s 
version of the Anthropic Principle likely gained adoption because it catered to human 
vanity.  Tipler and Barrow acknowledge that any intelligent observer could represent 
the catalyst that causes a universe to become actual; however, throughout the book 
they vigorously deny the likelihood of intelligent alien life.  The privileging of 
intelligent observers combined with the belief that humanity represents the only 
intelligent observers positions humanity as critical to the cosmos.  In a quote that 
reflects both the need for scientific credibility and the absence of aliens, Gairdner 
writes,  
 
For it was the hardcore scientists like Copernicus and Galileo who 
inadvertently drove us out of the centre of the universe as it was then 
conceived, and now, as we shall see, it is the hardcore scientists [Tipler and 
Barrow] suggesting we belong back at the centre again.667 
 
The connection to scientific credibility should be obvious.  “Hardcore scientists” 
engineered the Copernican revolution, therefore a counter paradigm must also emerge 
                                                
666 Jeffrey F. Addicott, "Storm Clouds on the Horizon of Darwinism: Teaching the Anthropic Principle 
and Intelligent Design in the Public Schools," Ohio State Law Journal 63 (2002): 1595. 
667 Gairdner, The Book of Absolutes, 101. 
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from scientists.  The quote does not mention aliens specifically, but the desire for a 
return to the “centre” speaks to a Platonic cosmology free of alien life.  While 
humanity cannot literally hold a place in the center of the universe, it can 
metaphysically, as Whewell and Wallace suggest.  
Leslie, by contrast, goes out of his way to disconnect Anthros (humanity) from 
the Anthropic Principle.  He even suggests the new name of the “Psychocentric 
Principle,” which would include all intelligent life.668  Leslie’s formulation of the 
Psychocentric Principle likely lacked the appeal of Tipler and Barrow’s for this reason. 
The pyschocentric principle does not return humanity to the center of the universe. 
The Anthropic Cosmological Principle’s accessibility, both in writing style and 
availability, scientific credibility, and focus on humanity, made it a player across 
disciplines in academia. The enduring success of any academic book written in the last 
three decades, remains a rarity.  For Tipler and Barrow’s work to achieve such 
attention across disciplines over such a long period of time, represents a remarkable 
feat.  The Anthropic Cosmological Principle did not just succeed within academia, it 
spilled over into the public consciousness. 
5.9 PUBLIC RECEPTION 
The Anthropic Cosmological Principle had an impact beyond the confines of 
academia.  The book became a bestseller, a difficult task for any scientific text, much 
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less one with so many opaque concepts.669  The popularity of the book helped expose 
many new people to the idea of a human-focused cosmology.  While scholars debated 
the Anthropic Principle going back to the middle of the twentieth century, Tipler and 
Barrow’s book brought it into the public realm.  As a writer for the Hamilton 
Spectator put it, “The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, co-authored with Frank J. 
Tipler in 1986, took ‘anthropic principle’ from the pages of obscure journals and 
introduced it to popular culture.”670 
The idea of the Anthropic Principle had obvious appeal to defenders of religion 
outside the confines of academia.  As previously mentioned, William Craig wrote that 
the Anthropic Principle represents a proof of God in academic journals.  Craig also 
makes the same argument, in more generally accessible language, on his website.671  
The self proclaimed purpose of his website is inform the “public arena,” in order,  
 
• to provide an articulate, intelligent voice for biblical Christianity in the public 
arena. 
• to challenge unbelievers with the truth of biblical Christianity. 
• to train Christians to state and defend Christian truth claims with greater 
effectiveness.672 
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670 "The Anthropic Principle," The Hamilton Spectator March 17, 2006. 
671 William Lane Craig, “The Teleological Argument and the Anthropic Principle,” Reasonable Faith, 
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Craig not only talked about the Anthropic Principle on the website.  He travels the 
country lecturing at colleges or debating atheists on the question of God.  The 
Anthropic Principle represents a core of his argument in these public presentations.673  
While Craig represents a player in the academic debate about the Anthropic Principle, 
one should have little doubt that his larger interest lies in using the idea to spread the 
Christian faith. 
Secular figures also had use for Tipler and Barrow’s Anthropic Principle.  The 
President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, made the Anthropic Principle a central 
part of his speech when he received the prestigious Liberty Medal on July 4th 1994 at 
Independence Hall in Phildelphia.  He received the medal for his inspiration of the 
velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia, which peacefully overthrew the Communist 
regime.  At the time of the speech, Havel held the position of President in the newly 
created Czech Republic.  Previously he had been the last President of Czechoslovakia, 
but had stepped down, because he did not want to preside over the split of the country.  
In the early nineties other former Communist countries like Yugoslavia were also 
being torn apart by ethnic conflicts (although much more violently).  It’s clear from 
the content of his Liberty Medal speech that a concern for social fragmentation 
occupied his mind. 
Havel begins by claiming that the world currently lacks a stable foundation for 
absolute ethics: 
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The same thing is true of nature and of ourselves. The more thoroughly all our 
organs and their functions, their internal structure, and the biochemical 
reactions that take place within them are described, the more we seem to fail to 
grasp the spirit, purpose, and meaning of the system that they create together 
and that we experience as our unique "self".  And thus today we find ourselves 
in a paradoxical situation. We enjoy all the achievements of modern 
civilization that have made our physical existence on this earth easier so in 
many important ways. Yet we do not know exactly what to do with ourselves, 
where to turn. The world of our experiences seems chaotic, disconnected, 
confusing. There appear to be no integrating forces, no unified meaning, no 
true inner understanding of phenomena in our experience of the world. Experts 
can explain anything in the objective world to us, yet we understand our own 
lives less and less. In short, we live in the postmodern world, where everything 
is possible and almost nothing is certain.674 
 
Havel argues that this lack of grounding has resulted in “cultural conflicts” and “tribal 
cults” that threaten the “survival of a civilization.”  He likely refers to the ethnic 
conflicts occurring in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere.  He uses the Anthropic 
Principle as a ‘transcendent” grounding that allows for a universal ethic that can 
prevent “tribal” conflicts.  
As a solution to the problems of cultural break down Havel looks to the 
Anthropic Principle, 
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I think the Anthropic Cosmological Principle brings to us an idea perhaps as 
old as humanity itself: that we are not at all just an accidental anomaly, the 
microscopic caprice of a tiny particle whirling in the endless depth of the 
universe. Instead, we are mysteriously connected to the entire universe, we are 
mirrored in it, just as the entire evolution of the universe is mirrored in us. 
Until recently, it might have seemed that we were an unhappy bit of mildew on 
a heavenly body whirling in space among many that have no mildew on them 
at all. This was something that classical science could explain. Yet, the 
moment it begins to appear that we are deeply connected to the entire universe, 
science reaches the outer limits of its powers. Because it is founded on the 
search for universal laws, it cannot deal with singularity, that is, with 
uniqueness. The universe is a unique event and a unique story, and so far we 
are the unique point of that story. But unique events and stories are the domain 
of poetry, not science. With the formulation of the Anthropic Cosmological 
Principle, science has found itself on the border between formula and story, 
between science and myth. In that, however, science has paradoxically 
returned, in a roundabout way, to man, and offers him - in new clothing - his 
lost integrity. It does so by anchoring him once more in the cosmos.675 
 
Havel uses the singularity inherent in the Anthropic Principle to push for human 
singularity.  Although he does not state it explicitly, a plurality cosmology would 
                                                
675 Ibid. 
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justify the dangerous separatism he fears will engulf the globe in violence.  The 
Anthropic Principle not only elevates humanity above an “unhappy bit of mildew,” but 
also connects all people together.   
Havel clearly grasps the rhetorical power of the unity cosmology as an 
argument against relativism.  He recognizes the ancient roots of the argument and 
claims that it can “anchor” humanity.  He appreciated the rhetorical power of the 
Anthropic Principle so much that he delivered a very similar speech in Washington on 
October 3, 1997, after he received the Fulbright Prize 676  Beyond those watching the 
initial speech several major newspapers published the text of Havel’s speech, giving a 
wide platform to Tipler and Barrow’s ideas.677 
 The academic and popular uptake of Tipler and Barrow’s work 
demonstrates the staying power of the unity cosmology even in modern times.  
Theists, philosophers, artists, and politicians all found the Anthropic Principle a useful 
tool to persuade others of their beliefs in absolute values.  Perhaps the most bizarre 
and forthright deployment of Tipler and Barrow’s Anthropic Principle comes from 
Tipler himself, not in the original book The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, but in 
his later works. 
                                                
676 Vaclav Havel, "From Plato to NATO," The Herald, January 31, 1998. 
677 Vaclav Havel, "Looking at the World Through Post-modern Eyes," Palm Beach Post, July 14, 1994; 
Havel, "The New Measure of Man."; Vaclav Havel, "Our Changing Times, and the New Measure of 
Man," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 10, 1994. 
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5.10 TIPLER’S LATER WORK 
Tipler and Barrow present, at least the fascade, of disinterested scientists in The 
Anthropic Cosmological Principle.  They leave the implications of the Anthropic 
Principle rather vague beyond its connection to teleology generally.  In Tipler’s book 
Physics of Immortality (1994), he much more clearly defines the stakes of the debate 
over cosmology.678  The reception of The Anthropic Cosmological Principle appears 
largely unaffected by Tipler’s The Physics of Immortality, as very few of the sources 
cited above mention it.  Nor does it appear that the book proved as big a commercial 
success as The Anthropic Cosmological Principle.679  A brief examination of the The 
Physics of Immortality, will, however, help elucidate Tipler’s purpose in writing the 
original book and give credence to my reading of his unity cosmology.  In the The 
Physics of Immortality, Tipler makes explicit many of the ideas that required a subtle 
reading in The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. 
Tipler returns to the connection between cosmological ideas and political and 
ethical thought.  This time instead of speaking mainly though the citation of other 
authors, Tipler explicitly interjects his own views on the subject.  He examines the 
cosmology of eternal return, which suggests that the universe expands and collapses 
infinitely.  As a result of this endless cycle, all events repeat themselves infinitely.  
                                                
678 Tipler, The Physics of Immortality. 
679 Although from what I have read The Physics of Immortality was on the bestseller list in Germany for 
15 weeks. Tressider, "Meaning of Life is, Er, God and Omega." 
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Tipler believes that the eternal return cosmology had an enormous effect on both 
politics and philosophy within the twentieth century.680 
Tipler writes that the cosmology of eternal return, “is the basic foundation for 
the entire corpus of Nietzsche’s philosophy.”681  He believes the same holds for 
Heidegger and his philosophical work.  Tipler portrays both of these philosophers as 
critical ideological justifications for Nazism.  He claims that the Nazis choose the 
swastika as a symbol based on its ancient meaning as a symbol for the cosmology of 
eternal return.  Thus cosmology stands at the heart of Nazism.  As Tipler writes, “the 
political consequences of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return philosophy have been 
castrophic.”682  
Given the boldness of the attribution of such an important effect to the eternal 
return, Tipler sloppily constructs his argument.  He quotes a few passages from 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, and some leading Nazi officials talking about eternal return. 
While it is interesting that these figures talk about cosmology, Tipler fails to prove 
anything beyond a correlation.  Much more significant, Tipler appears prepared to 
grant that if the Nazis had been correct about the structure of the universe, then 
Nazism would have been justified,   
 
The Nazis who were aware of [the nonantisemitic] attitudes of Nietzsche 
emphasized that, in so rejecting racism, Nietzsche was rejecting the 
                                                
680 Tipler, The Physics of Immortality, 74-89. 
681 Ibid.,  79.  
682 Ibid.,  82. 
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implications of his own Eternal Return idea.  In this one and only aspect of 
philosopy the Nazis are correct; I thus reject the Eternal Return.683 
 
This passage goes beyond Tipler’s previous argument that the eternal return had 
enormous rhetorical power that influenced the Nazis.  Here he suggests that Nazism 
logically makes sense in a universe of eternal return.684   
This ups the ante from The Anthropic Cosmological Principle; in that book 
Tipler suggests that cosmology (heat death) could inspire the sense of life’s 
pointlessness.  Here he argues that cosmology (eternal return) played a key role in the 
rise of the Nazis.  More importantly, if the eternal return cosmology were correct, then 
we lack a justification for criticizing the behavior of the Nazis because life is in fact a 
pointless arena for the exercise of power.  This demonstrates the crucial importance 
for Tipler of having the correct cosmology to guide ethical behavior.  It just so 
happens Tipler believes the cosmology that is good both for morality and scientific 
accuracy is the FAP. 
In addition to his renewed focus on philosophy, Tipler does more to draw out 
the religious importance of the Anthropic Principle.  The Anthropic Cosmological 
Principle kept the Omega point a vague construction, and relegated its religious 
connotation to a footnote.  In The Physics of Immortality, Tipler begins to explore 
what he meant by the cryptic remarks about the Omega point in The Anthropic 
                                                
683 Ibid.,  83. 
684 Admittedly, this section of Tipler’s book has some ambiguities.  Tipler sometimes refers to 
Nietzche’s “Eternal Return philosophy,” which could be read as disctinct from the cosmology itself.  
After all,  Tipler mentions the stoics shared the cosmology of eternal return, and while Tipler does not 
acknowledge it, their cosmology has little resemblance to Nazism.  My reading of the text leads me to 
believe that Tipler uses these terms interchangeably such that the eternal return cosmology logically 
results in Nietzsche’s philosophy of eternal return. 
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Cosmological Principle.   He predicts the giant super computer will have the capacity 
to replicate everyone who has ever existed in the form of data.  The personalities of 
every person who has ever lived, will be uploaded into a simulation, which Tipler 
labors to argue is equivalent to actually being reborn.  The result, 
 
The Omega Point Theory allows the key concepts of the Judeo-Christian-
Islamic tradition now to be modern physics concepts; theology is nothing but 
physical cosmology based on the assumption that life as a whole is immortal.  
A consequence of this assumption is the resurrection of everyone who have 
ever lived to eternal life.  Physics has now absorbed theology; the divorce 
between science and religion, between reason and emotion, is over.685 
 
Tipler’s futuristic technoheaven draws the connections between the Anthropic 
Principle and religion further than any of the religious scholars who cited his earlier 
book. Cosmology no longer represents a sign of God, but literally creates God.686   
None of these claims conflict with the arguments Tipler presented in his earlier 
book.  In fact, one can easily read Tipler’s new arguments act as clarifications of his 
old positions. Although it is worth nothing that when Barrow heard of Tipler’s new 
ideas about the Omega point he said they were best left as “science fiction.”687  Still, 
                                                
685 Tipler, The Physics of Immortality, 338.  The idea that physics must encompass theology if theology 
is to survive occurs throughout the book. Ibid.,  3, 6-11, 337. 
686 Tipler foreshadows this conclusion again, in his response to an article by Martin Gardner when he 
writes, “It is fideism which is metaphysics and fantasy. Worse, fideism requires religion to be divorced 
forever from science. Gardner’s real objection to our Omega Point theory is that it threatens to end the 
divorce.”  Frank J. Tipler, "Frank J. Tipler, reply by Martin Gardner," The New York Review of Books  
(1986). 
687 Tressider, "Meaning of Life is, Er, God and Omega." 
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Tipler and Barrow originally wrote the Omega point would be, “omnipotent, 
omnipresent, and omniscient!”688  Why not imagine it capable of resurrecting all 
human life?  They discussed the danger of heat death for philosophical thinking; why 
not imagine the wrong cosmology at the heart of Nazism?  The foundations of these 
new arguments rested within The Anthropic Cosmological Principle; The Physics of 
Immortality simply brings them to the fore.689 
The change from the subtle to the explicit alerted the critics of Tipler’s 
rhetorical strategy, resulting in a set of reviews very different from the reviews of The 
Anthropic Cosmological Principle.  The three reviews on JSTOR all spoke negatively 
of the book, in contrast to the generally positive reviews of his previous book.690  
Brian Rotman wrote, 
 
I suspect physicists will dismiss Tipler’s claims and project as those of an 
isolated raver and move to distance themselves from what they’ll see as sheer 
bad publicity for their science.  Others, especially those concerned to question 
the rhetorical maneuvers and metaphysical presuppositions of contemporary 
science, will see it as a symptom of a near-suffocating hubris on the part, not 
just of Tipler, who is merely its vehicle, but of forces within physics itself.691 
 
                                                
688 Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, 382. 
689 This highlights Booth’s point that science often shares many of the characteristics of religion, but 
refuses to acknowledge these overlaps.  Wayne C. Booth, "Rhetoric, Science, Religion," in The 
Essential Wayne Booth, ed. Walter Jost (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 264-79. 
690 Brian Rotman, SubStance 24, no. 3 (1995); ibid.; Varadaraja V. Raman, "Hope from Physics," 
Science 267, no. 5200 (1995); Albert B. Stewart, The Antioch Review 53, no. 3 (1995). 
691 Rotman: 152-53. 
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This quote indicates that Rotman understands that most of Tipler’s argument 
represents an appeal to science as the ultimate authority.  While the extremity of 
Tipler’s claims may cause scientists to “dismiss” them as an aberration, Rotman says 
the really interesting take away is how Tipler’s book just represents a common 
practice (appeal to scientific authority) taken beyond its rhetorical acceptance.  
Varadaraja V. Raman comes to a similar conclusion,  
 
Readers of E. T. Bell's Men of Mathematics may remember the questionable 
anecdote in which Euler reportedly told an unbelieving Diderot in Catherine the 
Great's court, "Sir, (a + bn=Vn = x, hence God exists." The mathematically 
untutored Diderot (so the story goes) could not reply and promptly went back to 
France. This book may be regarded as a more serious, and considerably 
expanded, version of Euler's quip.692 
 
Raman recognizes the practical effect of the scientific complexity of Physics of 
Immortality is that most readers have to take Tipler as his word.  Most of the reviews 
of The Anthropic Cosmological Principle acknowledge its scientific difficulty, but 
they did not read this difficulty as a strategy of obfuscation.  The more explicit nature 
of Tipler’s conclusions in the Physics of Immortality appears to have ruptured the 
protective shield of “scientific objectivity.”  As a result, the reviewers clearly identify 
the rhetorical strategies deployed by Tipler.  Effective deployment of the unity 
cosmology as an argument in modern times requires a much more subtle approach, 
                                                
692 Raman, "Hope from Physics," 1042. 
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best exemplified by his earlier book. 
5.11 CONCLUSION 
In the Anthropic Principle Tipler and Barrow combine the belief that the universe 
appears tailor made for intelligent life, with the unity cosmology.  They claim that the 
cosmos that emerges from these principles places humanity at center stage of universal 
events.  While humanity may seem small in the face of the expanses of space, each 
human life contributes to the end goal of the Omega point.  This magnificent telos of 
the universe gives meaning to lives of all humans who live, have lived, and will live.  
This meaning staves off the relativistic, nihilistic, and genocidal philosophies that 
Tipler believes a purposeless cosmos justifies. 
While the idea of a futuristic super computer dominating the universe sounds 
like science fiction or a new age religion, Tipler and Barrow don the cloak of scientific 
discourse, which gives legitimacy to their ideas.  They write in a style with enough 
accessibility that their philosophical implications are understandable to the average 
reader, but the scientific justifications for these principles have to be taken on faith.  
The omega point becomes a mathematical inevitability rather than a bold, largely 
unsubstantiated prediction.   
The unity cosmology represents a central tenant of the rhetorical appeal of the 
Anthropic Cosmological Principle.  Because of humanity’s solitary place in the 
universe, we move to the center of the stage in the cosmic drama Tipler and Barrow 
outline.  The Omega point does not represent an abstract end of the universe created 
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by alien beings; the Omega is built by our descendants retroactively granting purpose 
and value to our own lives.        
Tipler and Barrow’s book the Anthropic Cosmological Principle had an 
enormous impact.  Presses publish tens of thousands of academic books every year.  
Only an elite few works capture the imagination of both the academic and wider 
audiences, spawning over a hundred articles and being referenced by heads of state.  
The success of the book only seems unusual when viewed as a random occurrence, 
however.  It would be wrong to take the book’s popularity as an improbability that 
demands explanation, much as the authors argue humanity’s existence demands 
explanation.  If one looks historically the unity cosmology has often struck a chord 
with audiences and elevated scientific works to best sellers. 
Although in many ways vastly different, the core unity-perfection connection 
at the heart of Tipler and Barrow’s work has changed little from Plato’s time.  Few 
arguments have remained present throughout such a span of time.  More importantly, 
fewer arguments have continued to capture the public imagination in the way that 
Plato’s unity argument has.  Something about the connection of unity with perfection 
resonates powerfully in western societies as an answer to the ancient claim that “man 
is the measure of all things.” 
6.0  CONCLUSION: MAN AS THE MEASURE VS. THE UNITY OF THE WORLD 
Alfred North Whitehead once claimed that all western philosophy is a footnote to Plato.  Dilip 
Gaonkar remarked that, if Whitehead is correct, any attempt to move beyond the status quo 
should return one to the ideas of Plato’s nemeses: the sophists.  One can easily construct a 
reading of history as a battle between these two schools of thoughts.  On one side the Platonic 
ideas of teleology, Truth, and absolute morality; on the other, the sophistic beliefs of 
contingency, perspectivism, and moral relativism.  My dissertation argues that in the 
foundational conflict between these sets of ideas, Plato introduced the unity cosmology as an 
argument for his philosophy.  Just as the larger Platonic/sophistic debate has played out through 
history in modified forms, the unity cosmology has reemerged throughout time in different 
guises as an argument for Platonic values. 
Plato writing in the fourth century BCE and Tipler and Barrow writing over 2,000 years 
later both deploy the unity argument.  One must imagine that much of The Anthropic Principle, 
with its emphasis on quantum mechanics, exists beyond the comprehension of the smartest 
ancient Athenian (and many smart individuals today).  At its core, however, both the The 
Anthropic Principle and the Timaeus make the same rhetorical appeal.  For hundreds of years 
(1100-1500) the unity argument helped cement the European social structure.  Whether he 
intended it or not, Plato stumbled upon an incredibly effective rhetorical connection that lives on 
in the public imagination to this day. 
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The case studies examined in this dissertation are far from exhaustive. Philosopher Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Christian mystic Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955), 
and biologist Simon Conway Morris (1951-Present) all connected unity to Platonic values and 
could easily merit their own chapters.  As recently as 2000, University of Washington professors 
Peter Ward and Donald Brownlee wrote a book defending unity.693  Future scholarship should 
delve into these and the many other examples of the unity rhetoric in order to find unifying 
strains as well as further differences. 
Also notably absent from this dissertation is the examination of the rhetorical meaning of 
unity and plurality in other nonwestern cultures.  If a similar unity argument does not occur in 
other cultures, it strengthens the importance of Plato’s work as the key origin.  If it does exist 
independently that would point to a more fundamental connection between singularity and value 
that crosses cultural lines.  Even if Plato represents the genesis of the unity argument, an 
examination of how nonwestern cultures adopt the unity argument and adapt it to fit their own 
needs would likely prove a fascinating study. 
Beyond unity and plurality this dissertation seeks to generate interest in the rhetorical 
study of cosmology more generally.  Toulmin’s Cosmopolis provided a case study in the way the 
Copernican cosmology functioned as an argument.694  Few in the Communication discipline 
have followed up on Toulmin’s work to examine the way other cosmological beliefs shape our 
values. The debates over whether the universe exists in a steady state or had a particular origin 
like the big bang could potentially serve as a fruitful area of rhetorical study, for example. 
                                                
693 Peter Ward and David Brownlee, Rare Earth: Why Complex Life is Uncommon in the Universe (New York: 
Copernicus 2000). 
694 Toulmin, Cosmopolis. 
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6.1 THE RHETORICAL PROBLEM OF UNITY 
The unity argument has proved rhetorically efficacious throughout history, but that does not 
necessitate it will be so in the future.  Perhaps the greatest danger to its effectiveness lies in the 
scientific foundation, “we are alone.”  A 2011 study, recently suggested over a billion habitable 
planets in our galaxy alone.695  For those that tie their values to the absence of alien life, these 
sorts of discoveries represent a recalcitrance that must be overcome.  As Kenneth Burke writes, 
“interpretations themselves must be altered as the universe displays various orders of 
recalcitrance to them.”696  In the Medieval period, the failure of scholars truly to come to terms 
with the problems of the Aristotelian cosmology reflects the power of cognitive dissonance as a 
tool to overcome recalcitrance.  Scholastics did not seize upon mounting inconsistencies in the 
cosmology in order to fashion a new one, in large part because of the Aristotelian cosmology’s 
connection to political, philosophical, and religious beliefs.  Even the Aristotelian system, 
however, ultimately collapsed under the weight of the scientific evidence for heliocentrism. 
The large unknowns about the question of alien life present a potential catastrophe for 
those that rely on the unity argument.  I do not mean to suggest that alien life (intelligent or 
otherwise) exists for certain or even if it did that humanity will ever find definitive proof of its 
existence.  There is a very real possibility that this could occur, however.  By tying their beliefs 
closely with a particular cosmology, defenders of teleology, Truth, and absolute morality risk a 
scientific paradigm shift that could undermine support for their beliefs, just as the Copernican 
revolution helped undermine many of the social structures tied to the Aristotelian cosmology.   
                                                
695 Michael G. Gowanlock, David R. Patton, and Sabine M. McConnell, “A Model of Habitability Within the Milky 
Way Galaxy,” arXiv.org http://arxiv.org/abs/1107.1286. 
696 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3 ed. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984), 256. 
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6.2 THE DANGERS OF UNITY 
The unity argument points to a disturbing tendency in humanity, the need to assign worth 
relationally.  The fact that the unity argument often functions as an enthymeme means that 
people already associate singularity with value.  The existence of alien life does not 
fundamentally alter any of the characteristics of humanity, but people believe that the presence 
of extraterrestrials in some way devalues their own existence.  This framing of human worth 
raises the specter of serious problems for the way that humans approach alienness.   
The connection of unity with human value raises the stakes in identifying potential alien 
life.  The National Research Council wrote an extensive report on the difficulties scientists could 
have in recognizing alien life.697  The belief that the discovery of life will collapse teleology, 
Truth, and absolute morality will politicize these efforts in a way that further complicates them.  
Whewell, Tipler, and Barrow all allowed for the possibility of nonintelligent alien life in their 
versions of the unity argument.  The line between intelligent and nonintelligent life remains hotly 
contested, even with animals like dolphins.  If difficulties emerge categorizing a species with 
which humanity has shared the planet since its evolution, one can imagine the enormous 
difficulty in trying to determine whether a truly alien species should be considered “intelligent.” 
Similar debates occur over what would constitute sentient artificial intelligence.  
Anthropocentrism puts social barriers in front of the classification of other species as intelligent, 
because recognizing alien life as intelligent threatens to break down human “containment 
                                                
697 Committee on the Limits of Organic Life in Planetary Systems, The Limits of Organic Life in Planetary Systems, 
ed. Series, trans. Translator, Number of, Series The Limits of Organic Life in Planetary Systems (Original 
Publication; repr.; reprint, Reprint)); ibid. 
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strategies, props supporting a dangerously brittle identity.”698  One can easily read the unity 
argument as this kind of strategy and individuals cling to their identities, “brittle” or not.    
Historically, basing one’s value in opposition to others has resulted in violence.  
Zimmerman makes connections between the unity cosmology and European disbelief at the 
prospect of new continents full of people.699  The fractured cosmos that resulted from the contact 
helped justify European genocidal violence against the indigenous peoples.700  Scholars claim 
that dehumanizing rhetoric has preceded every major genocide.701 What form violence could 
take remains difficult to say, but the unity cosmology does currently influence philosophers of 
existential risk in ways that cause them to deprioritize potential human threats to alien life.702  
The unity cosmology does not necessitate either recalcitrance in identifying life or violence 
towards it, but these are potential concerns. 
Decoupling the unity from human values opens up the potential for rhetorical openness to 
alien life.  Michael Hyde refers to this openness as “acknowledgement” and positions it as an 
ethical responsibility.703  Others have made the case that openness to the possibility of alien life, 
whether or not it exists, has important effects on our relations with other humans.  Grinspoon 
writes, “certainly, efforts to communicate with intelligent extraterrestrials do not make much 
sense unless they are made on behalf of all humans.  Merely contemplating the possibility of 
finding other life makes obvious our deep identification with all Earth’s inhabitants [bold and 
                                                
698 John Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), 230. 
699 Zimmerman, "Encountering Alien Otherness." 
700 Küpper, "The Traditional Cosmos and the New World," 368-75, 89; Zimmerman, "Encountering Alien 
Otherness," 157-60. 
701 Susan Opotow, "Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction," Journal of Social Issues 46 (1990): 1-20; Leo 
Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale, 1981), 93. 
702 Joseph Packer, "Alien Life in Search of Acknowledgment" (Masters, Wake Forest, 2007), 62-64. 
703 Hyde, The Life-Giving Gift of Acknowledgment. 
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italics mine]”.704  Or as Primack and Abrams put it, “Dealing wisely with aliens or simply 
contacting them may be a distant goal, but understanding what it would mean can have an 
immediate and powerful effect.  It makes clear what truly matters today: to be the kind of human 
beings we aspire to be in the long run, and to adopt this perspective now.”705  The unity argument 
prevents these radical rhetorical reconfigurations by putting human value in opposition to the 
existence of alien life. 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
Despite its potential drawbacks, the unity argument has represented a rhetorical force throughout 
much of human history.  Few signs exist that its use by rhetoricians to defend teleology, Truth, 
and absolute morality will abate anytime soon.  The universe as a foundation for argument has 
enormous appeal.  The connection between singularity and Platonic values can serve as an 
unstated premise, which allows individuals to structure the unity argument as an enthymeme.  
The cosmological nature of the unity vs. plurality debate speaks to the structure and purpose of 
the universe.  Unity, thus, undergirds a broader understanding of human ethos, understood as our 
dwelling place.  The scientific nature of the defense of unity gains it the credibility society 
affords to science.  All of these rhetorical strengths, combined with the unity argument’s long 
track record, indicate that it will remain an argumentative force well into the future. 
                                                
704 Grinspoon, Lonely Planets.  
705 Abrams, The View from the Center of the Universe, 235.  
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